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FEA Methodology for System-Level Redundancy Evaluation:  Application to Non-
Composite Steel Bridges.  Major Professor: Robert J. Connor.   
Currently, all steel bridges with members designated as Fracture Critical Members 
(FCMs) are required to undergo hands-on inspections every 24 months.  A FCM is a 
primary steel tension member (or portion of) which failure results in collapse or loss of 
serviceability of a bridge.  However, presently, there are no codified procedures used to 
evaluate system-level redundancy in steel bridges.  In this dissertation, finite element 
analysis (FEA) procedures, techniques and inputs were researched in order to develop 
bridge models that account for the mechanisms that lead to redundant capacity after the 
failure of a primary steel member.  These mechanisms include partial composite action 
between the slab and steelwork and other phenomena not typically considered in current 
practice.  The researched set of FEA procedures, techniques and inputs were 
benchmarked against available field experimental data and used to characterize the 
dynamic effects due to sudden failure of a primary steel member.  The FEA methodology 
was completed with reliability-based load combinations describing the loading conditions 
a steel bridge must sustain after the failure of a steel tension member in order to be 
considered redundant, and a set of minimum performance requirement that ensure 
adequate strength and serviceability of a steel bridge in the faulted condition.  The 
application of the developed FEA methodology in conjunction with existing rational 
methods for determining the hands-on inspection interval results in a comprehensive 
xviii 
approach to efficiently maintain an inventory of bridges with members that are currently 
designated as FCMs.  
1 
CHAPTER 1 PROBLEM DEFINITION  
1.1 Introduction   
Complete member failures in existing steel structures though very uncommon, 
have occurred due to various causes.  Causes range from truck impacts resulting in severe 
damage to a component, to poor connection detailing or fabrication/welding resulting in 
fracture.  While member failures are uncommon, collapse resulting from component 
failure is even less common.  The ability of a structure to carry loads after the failure of 
an individual component is generally referred to as redundancy.  Depending on the 
configuration, some steel structures have traditionally been considered as redundant in 
the absence of any actual analysis that proves this to be the case.  For example, bridges 
with four or more girders in the cross section are generally classified as redundant, even 
though no calculations are made to confirm this assumption.  Conversely, experience with 
other structures that are assumed to be non-redundant, such as two girder bridges, have 
been shown to have significant reserve strength even after the failure of a main 
component.   
Currently, a special type of member in a non-redundant structure is a Fracture 
Critical Member (FCM).  A FCM is defined as a tension member, or part of a member, 
whose failure may result in collapse of the structure or significant loss of serviceability.  
These FCMs must meet stringent fabrication requirements and must undergo hands-on 
inspection every two years, which significantly increases the fabrication and long-term 
operating costs of the structure.  The objective of these inspections is to identify potential 
problems early, such as fatigue cracks that could lead to fracture of a member and hence, 
2 
the assumed collapse of the structure.  However, if it can be shown with high confidence 
that the bridge can continue to carry live load after the failure of a primary member at 
some prescribed target reliability, it would only be reasonable that these arm’s length 
inspection intervals may be extended or possibly eliminated.  A System Redundant 
Member (SRM) is defined as a steel primary member or portion thereof subject to tension 
for which the redundancy is not known by engineering judgment, but which is 
demonstrated to have redundancy through a refined analysis.   
However, calculation of the response of a system taking into account load-path 
and structural redundancy is not a task for which codified guidance is available.  Current 
design practices utilize a member-by-member basis; that is, a factored resistance is 
checked against a factored load for each member.  Nevertheless, the overall system 
capacity though remains unknown.  Current typical design practice operates in the linear 
elastic range and does not take into account the portion of load that may be redistributed 
as the structure starts operating in its inelastic range.  In order to accurately estimate the 
capacity of a structure, a computational method must be applied.  The computational tool 
of choice in this study is non-linear finite element analysis (FEA).   
FEA allows consideration of phenomena that are very difficult to implement in 
typical design or evaluation procedures; particularly partial composite action between the 
slab and the steelwork.  At service load levels, bridges that are designed as non-composite 
consistently behave compositely due to interfacial frictional forces between the slab and 
the steelwork.  This interaction allows shear transfer and may constitute an alternative 
load path, which needs to be considered when analyzing for redundancy.  However, if the 
bond is broken, the slab will function independently of the steel girder and the capacity 




1.2 Research Hypothesis   
Non-composite steel bridges may exhibit redundancy that can be accurately 
estimated with computational structural analysis.  While it is possible to model the 
performance of the steel system in the faulted state assuming no contribution from the 
slab, this may result in overly conservative estimates.  If the composite action is 
overestimated, of course, a non-conservative estimate of the reserve strength will be 
predicted.  Thus, an accurate methodology for modeling such behavior is needed when 
evaluating the redundancy of non-composite bridges in the faulted state.   
A finite element methodology was developed and used to account for the 
mechanisms that lead to redundant capacity after the failure of a component, including 
partial composite action between the slab and steelwork and other phenomena not 
typically considered in current practice.  Reliability principles were utilized to characterize 
the loading conditions a steel bridge must sustain after the failure of a steel tension 
member in order to be considered redundant.  Successful implementation of these 
procedures may lead to lessened inspection requirements in bridges traditionally 
classified as fracture critical.   
1.3 Research Objectives   
Several research objectives were pursued in this study.  The first objective was to 
develop a FEA methodology applicable to non-composite steel bridges.  Reliability 
principles used in current design and evaluation procedures were studied in order to 
stablish the loading to be applied in the analysis of a structure after the failure of a steel 
tension member.  These recommendations are intended for the construction of detailed 
finite element models capable of capturing material inelasticity, geometric non-linearity, 
dynamic effects and complex load paths.   
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The second objective was to apply the developed FEA methodology to non-
composite steel bridges that could be considered non-redundant with FCMs.  The 
application of the FEA methodology to existing structures served to accomplish the 
following tasks:   
 Validating the developed methodology.  This was achieved by replicating loading 
scenarios and bridge conditions experienced in the field, and comparing the 
analysis results with available field data.   
 Calculating dynamic amplification factor due to sudden member failure.  This was 
achieved by explicitly simulating sudden failure of a tension member and the 
subsequent dynamic response.  The dynamic amplification due to free vibration 
of the structure was calculated.   
 Establishing criteria for evaluating redundancy.  By applying reliability based 
loading conditions and establishing failure criteria, it can be determined if a 
structure can be considered redundant.   
After the FEA methodology has been developed and applied, the calculation of an 
inspection interval in which the results from the redundancy evaluation are utilized is 
discussed.  The calculation of the arm’s length inspection requirements was based on the 
application of the FEA methodology to existing evaluation procedures.   
1.4 Research Methodology   
In order to attain the objectives pursued in the current research and described in 
section 1.3, five principal tasks were carried out.  The first one consisted of a review of 
literature to understand the behavior of steel bridges with FCMs.  The focus of the review 
was on redundancy and fracture-criticality, reliability principles and dynamic behavior of 
bridges.  A summary of relevant literature is shown in CHAPTER 2.   
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The second task, described in CHAPTER 3, was the study of FEA procedures, and 
specification of techniques and inputs to characterize resistance of non-composite steel 
bridges with members traditionally consider as FCMs.  CHAPTER 3 details the 
development of analytical procedures able to capture the effects of slab concrete pouring 
and hardening, sudden (dynamic) failure of a main component, and slow (quasi-static) 
failure of a main component.  Additionally, the following inputs and techniques were 
specified to construct detailed finite element models: 
 Material models for steel and concrete components. 
 Elements to capture individual component behavior. 
 Constraints to transfer load among components. 
 Contact interaction between the slab and flanges of girder and stringers. 
 Connection failure. 
 Boundary conditions to capture substructure flexibility. 
 Load application. 
In the third task, the FEA procedures, techniques and inputs of CHAPTER 3 are 
utilized to model two structures which have had full-depth fractures while in-service , as 
reported in CHAPTER 4:  the Neville Island Bridge (two-welded plate girder bridge), and 
the Hoan Bridge (three-welded plate girder bridge).  In order to benchmark the 
methodology, the loading scenarios and bridge conditions experienced in the field were 
replicated, and the analysis results were compared with available field measured data 
(i.e., displacement and/or strain measurements).  The dynamic response after sudden 
failure of a tension member was studied by simulating a sudden failure of a steel tension 
member and analyzing the subsequent free vibration of the bridge.   
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In order to apply the FEA procedures, techniques and inputs of CHAPTER 3, it is 
necessary to establish loading combinations and a performance criteria to evaluate the 
structure.  These constitute the fourth task, which is described in CHAPTER 5.  Reliability-
based load models were developed in agreement with the approaches currently used in 
design and evaluation of bridges.  The load models need to capture the demands to which 
the structure is subjected under two scenarios, (1) the occurrence of the fracture event, 
when the structure experiences inertial effects, and (2) an extended period of service 
between the occurrence of the fracture and its discovery.  Failure criteria for which the 
results of the analysis must be tested were established and considered both strength and 
serviceability limit states.   
The fifth task, detailed in CHAPTER 6 is the evaluation for redundancy of the 
Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge.  The performance of these structures after the 
failure of a steel tension member that may be considered to be a FCM was evaluated.  
The finite element models developed in accordance with the analysis procedures, 
techniques and inputs of CHAPTER 3 were subjected to the loading combinations 
developed in CHAPTER 5.  To establish whether the failed tension member is a FCM or a 
SRM, the results were compared to the minimum performance requirements of CHAPTER 
5.  This task also serves for illustrative purposes, in case researchers or analysts will follow 
the procedures described in this research to evaluate steel bridges traditionally 
considered as non-redundant.  Arm’s length inspection intervals for the Neville Island 
Bridge and the Hoan Bridge were calculated by applying the methodology developed by 
M. Parr et al. (2010) [1] in conjunction with the results obtained from redundancy 
evaluations.   
1.5 Research Impact   
The proposed research was performed as part of the NCHRP Project 12-87a: 
Fracture-Critical System Analysis for Steel Bridges, which main objective was to 
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recommend design and evaluation specifications to AASHTO (American Association of 
State Highway and Transportation Officials) using a methodology that quantifies when a 
steel tension member is considered non-redundant.  Although previous studies have 
considered redundancy in design and evaluation, there are no analysis methodologies in 
current specifications or manuals to quantify system-level redundancy.  The current study 
intends to fill that void in current structural engineering practice, as it provides designers 
and evaluators with a solid methodology which considers reliability principles and is 
validated through its application to real structures.   
In addition to the impact on bridge design and evaluation, the current study also 
provides tools to make bridge inspection more efficient.  Biennial hands-on inspection is 
required for all non-redundant bridges with FCMs.  However, as no specifications for 
quantifying redundancy exist, a bridge is considered redundant or non-redundant 
depending on its geometry.  Bridges that are typically considered non-redundant may 
show sufficient redundant capacity and could undergo lessened inspection procedures.  
As hands-on inspection are very expensive, this will result in large savings to bridge 
owners.  Further, performing inspections needlessly puts the public and bridges 
inspectors at risk with no benefit in terms of safety.   
Currently, in the United States, there is a growing concern regarding the state of 
existing infrastructure. APTA (American Public Transportation Association) reported that, 
as a consequence of budget restructuration due to the 2008 recession, the majority of 
transportation agencies has seen their resources cut, specially affecting larger 
transportation agencies [2], [3].  The ASCE (American Society of Civil Engineers) 2013 
Report Card for America’s Infrastructure awarded an average of D+ (bridges scored C+), 
and did not foresaw improvements under current conditions [4].  The combination of 
increasing budget cuts and worsening state of U. S. infrastructure requires efficient 
resource management.  Application of the current research results in better 
understanding of bridge behavior that can increase efficiency in the allocation of 
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resources destined to improve transportation, particularly those spent in bridge 
inspections.  
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CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE  
In this chapter a summary of the existing literature focused on the concept of 
fracture criticality is presented.  It was conducted with the objective of compiling 
information relevant to redundancy in structures traditionally considered as non-
redundant, particularly those with members described as fracture critical.  It is organized 
according to topic in the following manner:   
 Section 2.1 describes the origin of current engineering practice regarding non-
redundant structures with steel tension members susceptible to fracture.   
 Section 2.2 presents a discussion on the concepts of redundancy and fracture-
criticality.   
 Section 2.3 summarizes current AASHTO design and evaluation procedures 
regarding redundancy and FCMs.   
 Section 2.4 describes the application of reliability principles in design and how 
they are applied to characterize redundancy.   
 Section 2.5 summarizes analytical research and full-scale tests conducted to study 
post-fracture redundant capacity.   
 Section 2.6 provides cases in which systems typically considered as non-redundant 
experience failure of a fracture critical component did not result in structural 
collapse.  The structures to be analyzed in this study are described in further detail. 
10 
2.1 Fracture Control Plan in the United States   
In 1967, the Silver Bridge connecting Point Pleasant, Virginia and Gallipolis, Ohio 
collapsed resulting in the death of 46 people.  The collapse was triggered by failure of an 
eyebar in a non-redundant suspension link [5].  As a result of the collapse, a considerable 
amount of research regarding fracture in steel bridges was carried out over the following 
years; which generated debate over the best procedures to improve fracture safety in 
steel bridges.  The debate led to the creation of the term “Fracture Critical Member” and 
a series of suggestions to improve safety of steel structures, mainly: 
 More stringent fabrication and material requirements.  Major emphasis was put 
on higher material toughness and reduction of defects in welds, particularly in 
those members susceptible to fracture.   
 Improved design and evaluation procedures.  Although design procedures that 
explicitly consider fracture were not developed; focus was paid to consideration 
of fatigue and redundancy in design and evaluation.   
 Improved inspection procedures.  Increase in frequency and requirements in in-
service inspection requirements with the objective of recognizing flaws that may 
lead to fracture.   
All of the aforementioned topics were considered in the development of the first 
Fracture Control Plan (FCP), published by AASHTO in 1978 [6].  Particularly, large efforts 
were conducted to improve welding procedures and assess fatigue resistance.  However, 
by far the costliest and most far-reaching was related to the requirement of hands-on 
inspections to be conducted every 24 months for the life of the structure.  The fracture 
control plan has evolved over time, and is currently implemented as follows: 
 Fabrication provisions are described in the AASHTO/AWS D1.5M/D1.5 Bridge 
Welding Code [7]. 
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 Design provisions, including material specifications, are included in AASHTO LFRD 
Bridge Design Specifications [8].  The specification focus on toughness 
requirements and the application of AASHTO/AWS D1.5M/D1.5 Bridge Welding 
Code.   
 Evaluation provisions are described in AASHTO Manual for Bridge Evaluation [9].   
 Inspection provisions are federally mandated programs described in the National 
Bridge Inspection Standards in the Code of Federal Regulations [10].   
In current practice, fracture of non-redundant tension members is avoided by the 
use of better fabrication procedures, tougher materials, and detailing.  There are no 
explicit calculations made that utilize fracture mechanics concepts.  Similarly, the use of 
redundant structures is encouraged, however, the engineer has no tool other than 
experience to establish whether a structure has adequate redundant capacity after the 
failure of a component.  In fact, the provisions regarding redundancy have not changed 
significantly since the inception of the original Fracture Control Plan (FCP).  The treatment 
of fracture and redundancy in design and evaluation is quite different than the treatment 
of fatigue.  Fatigue was also a concern in the 1978 FCP, and currently, it is explicitly 
considered in both highway and railroad bridge design.  The analysis is based on stress 
range-number of cycles (S-N) curves, characteristic of different detail categories, which 
are classified according to their susceptibility to flaw propagation.  Structural engineers 
have detailed codified tools to properly account for fatigue.  However, such tools are 
lacking for the evaluation of the fracture or redundancy as limit states.   
2.2 Fracture Critical Members and Non-Redundant Structures   
As previously explained in section 2.1, the fracture control plan of 1978 gave birth 
to the term “Fracture Critical Member”.  Today, most engineers would agree that the 
choice of this term was not ideal as in the eyes of some, it implies the member will fail at 
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some point during the life of the structure.  The National Bridge Inspection Standards 
(NBIS) define Fracture Critical Member as “a steel member in tension, or with a tension 
element, whose failure would probably cause a portion of or the entire bridge to collapse” 
[11].  The AASHTO Manual for Bridge Evaluation (AASHTO MBE) gives a similar definition:  
“Fracture Critical Members or member components are steel tension members or steel 
tension components of members whose failure would be expected to result in collapse of 
the bridge” [9] .   
These definitions are vague and subjective as a particular member might in 
tension or compression depending on the load case, and there is not a universal definition 
of collapse.  Further, since no explicit calculations are ever performed to assess 
susceptibility to fracture (i.e., no fracture mechanics calculations are performed), the 
engineer does not have any tools to address the fracture limit state, as if fracture 
occurrence was certain and unpredictable.  Conversely, that is not the case with all other 
limit states, independently of their probability of occurrence or criticality to the integrity 
of the bridge, such as buckling or yielding.   
The concept of redundancy is effectively embedded in the definition of a FCM.  
Redundancy could be broadly defined in engineering as duplication of critical components 
or functions of a system with the intention of increasing reliability of the system.  Hence, 
proving redundancy nullifies fracture-criticality.  Or, in other words, if it can be 
demonstrated that a structure can perform adequately after the failure of any tension 
member, by definition, there are no FCMs in the structure.   
Three classifications of redundancy are defined in the FHWA Steel Design 
Handbook [12].  Internal redundancy, or member-level redundancy, is defined as the 
capability of a structural member to transfer load among its components through 
sufficient load-paths; e. g.:  bolted built-up member in which a cover plate has failed.  
Load-path redundancy is defined as the existence of alternative and sufficient load paths 
after the failure of a member within a structure; e.g.:  failure of a girder in a multi-girder 
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bridge.  Structural redundancy is observed in a structure when failure of a member merely 
results in changed boundary conditions and/or supports; e.g.:  cantilever action after 
failure of an interior span in continuous span bridges.  Load-path and structural 
redundancy do not occur separately in most structures, the combination of both may be 
denoted as system-level redundancy.   
The FHWA Steel Design Handbook also describes a non-redundant member as one 
in which failure results in the structure not being able to carry an acceptable level of live 
load, and a redundant member as the opposite.  Additionally, a quasi-redundant member 
is defined in the FHWA Steel Design Handbook as “a member that would traditionally be 
classified as non-redundant but through refined analysis has been shown to be 
redundant”.  Hence, a redundant structure is the one that does not have non-redundant 
members; and in order to stablish whether a member is non-redundant or quasi-
redundant, refined analysis must be performed [12].   
In 2012, FHWA published a memorandum underlining the FHWA policy regarding 
FCMs.  At the time, only load-path redundancy may be considered in design and 
fabrication, while internal or member-level redundancy was not considered at the time 
in either design or fabrication.  The utilization of refined analysis procedures to 
demonstrate structural redundancy were formally recognized.  The memorandum 
introduces the definition of SRM as:  “a member that requires fabrication according to the 
AWS FCP, but need not be considered a FCM for in-service inspection.”.  It also states that:  
“System Redundant Members should be designated on the design plans with note to 
fabricate them in according with AWS Chapter 12.” and comments on the need to monitor 
the bridge condition should future changes in bridge condition results in a SRM becoming 
a FCM [13].   
NCHRP Synthesis 354: Inspection and Management of Bridges with Fracture-
Critical Details provides a summary of which members are considered as Fracture Critical 
Members according to different manuals and handbooks [14].  In addition to the 
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consensus on the fracture criticality of pin and hanger systems applied to suspended 
spans, the following members are considered to be FCMs by all cited sources in NCHRP 
Synthesis 354:   
 Girders in one-girder systems, independently of the type of girder (box or plate 
girder) or fabrication procedure (welded, riveted or bolted).   
 Plate girders in two-girder systems independently of fabrication procedure.  
Particularly in simple spans, suspended spans and end spans in continuous span 
units.   
 Depending on the girder spacing, girders in systems with three or more girders 
may be considered as fracture critical.   
 Truss tension members, independently of type (eyebar, welded, riveted). 
Particularly in two-truss systems for simple spans or suspended spans.   
 Tension members in three-truss systems may be considered to be Fracture Critical 
Members.   
 Other members that are considered as Fracture Critical Members are simple span 
steel pier caps, cables and anchors in cable stayed bridges, tied arch girders in tied 
arch bridges, and cables and eyebar chains in suspension bridges.   
The results from a survey sent to several transportation agencies in the United 
State and Canada regarding the opinion of owners with respect to the fracture-criticality 
depending on the system were reported in NCHRP Synthesis 354 as well.  These are shown 
in Table 2-1.  According to these results, there is some difference of opinion regarding 
which structural systems would be classified as containing FCMs.   
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Table 2-1.  Survey responses regarding fracture-criticality of different systems (NCHRP 






Two-girder bridges 38 0 
Three-girder bridges 9 28 
Three-girder bridges with girder spacing larger 
than 13’ 
10 21 
Multi-girder bridges with girder spacing larger 
than 13’ 
3 32 
Truss girders 34 3 
Two-girder bridges fabricated using HPS 70W 31 1 
Truss bridges fabricated using HPS 70W 28 2 
Single-steel “tub” girder bridges 32 5 
Twin-steel “tub” girder bridges 22 12 
Multi-steel “tub” girder bridges 0 34 




As one of its final remarks, NCHRP Synthesis 354 suggests that there should be a 
clarification between Fracture Critical Member and non-redundant member.  While large 
efforts have been made to identify FCMs and to implement special fabrication and 
inspection procedures for them, it should also be noted that non-redundant steel tension 
members are not the only type of non-redundant members in structures.  In truss 
systems, failure of a compression member may be more critical than failure of a tension 
member as compression forces are not as easily redistributed.  Failure of substructures 
such as piers is often most critical and these are typically non-redundant and made of 




2.3 Fracture and Redundancy in AASHTO Design and Evaluation 
Specifications   
The AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications (AASHTO LRFD BDS ) provides 
procedures for the calculation of factored demands and resistances to be used in the 
design of bridges [8].  Article 1.3 – Design Philosophy provides the fundamental design 
equation for any load combination, :   
 
where  is a load modifier,  is a load factor,  is the nominal force effect,  is a 
resistance factor, and  is the nominal resistance.  For force effects for which a maximum 
value of  is appropriate:   
 
and, for force effects for which a minimum value of  is appropriate:   
 
where  is a ductility factor,  is a redundancy factor, and  is an importance factor, 
each of them must be between 0.95 and 1.05.  No analytical requirements are described 
in AASHTO LRFD regarding the computation of these factors ( , , ).   
Article 1.3.4 – Redundancy states that “Multiple-load-path and continuous 
structures should be used unless there are compelling reasons not to use them.”  The 
application of the redundancy factor is limited to strength limit states and its value may 
be selected to be 0.95 for “exceptional levels of redundancy beyond girder continuity and 
a torsionally-closed cross-section”, 1.00 for “conventional levels of redundancy” and 
“foundation elements where φ already accounts for redundancy”, and 1.05 for 
“nonredundant members”.  However, there is no explicit direction to determine how to 
17 
choose between “conventional” and “exceptional” levels of redundancy.  Further, from 
an analysis point of view, redundancy should be considered in the computation of 
resistance rather than computation of load demands.   
Article 6.6.2 – Fracture presents notch toughness requirements for all primary 
bridge members that are in tension under the Strength I load combination.  It also 
requires fabrication of FCMs in accordance with section 12 of AASHTO/AWS D1.5M/D1.5.  
The engineer is responsible for determining which components are fracture critical.  
“Unless a rigorous analysis with assumed hypothetical cracked components confirms the 
strength and stability of the hypothetically damaged structure, the location of all FCMs 
shall clearly be delineated on the contract plans”.   
In the commentary (C6.6.2) it is stated that there are no codified refined analysis 
criteria. Thus the criteria, including the analysis procedures and software to be used, must 
be agreed upon between the engineer and the owner.  However, requirements and 
recommendations regarding acceptable methods of structural analysis are discussed in 
section 4 of the AASHTO LRFD BDS.  This includes guidance with respect to material non-
linearity and large deformations, but there is no specific information on how to explicitly 
consider fracture or analyze for redundancy.   
The AASHTO Manual for Bridge Evaluation (AASHTO MBE) compiles governing 
provisions regarding evaluation and load rating of highway bridges structures [9].  Article 
6A.4 – Load Rating Procedures presents the general equation for computing a rating 
factor , for a single component subjected to a single force effect:   
 
where , , , and  are the factored load effects of a specific 
load combination.   is the factored capacity of the structures, computed as:   
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limited by:   
 
where  is the nominal resistance,  is a condition factor,  is the system factor, and 
 is the resistance factor. 
The AASHTO MBE and the AASHTO LRFD BDS are not consistent with respect to 
the consideration of redundancy.  For example, in the AASHTO LRFD BDS lack of 
redundancy is considered through load increase while in the AASHTO MBE it is considered 
through resistance decrease.  Further, as the system factor defined in the AASHTO MBE, 
, is related to the structural redundancy, it is comparable to the redundancy factor, , 
in the AASHTO LRFD BDS.  The minimum value of  is 0.85, and the minimum value of 
 is approximately 0.95.  This results in higher levels of conservatism in the 
AASHTO MBE than in the AASHTO LRFD BDS, which could lead to a newly designed bridge 
failing its first load rating.   
Although the AASHTO LRFD BDS does not explicitly provide information to identify 
non-redundant structures, the AASHTO MBE provides a set of values for  depending on 
the type of superstructure, as shown in Table 2-2.  In the commentary it is stated that if 
the engineer can demonstrate adequate levels of redundancy, the system factor may be 
taken as 1.0, and up to 1.2, but the instances in which system factors larger than 1.0 are 






Table 2-2.  System factors for flexural and axial effects (AASHTO MBE) [9].   
Superstructure Type  
Welded Members in Two-Girder/Truss/Arch Bridges 0.85 
Riveted Members in Two Girder/Truss/Arch Bridges 0.90 
Multiple Eye Bar in Truss Bridges 0.90 
Three-Girder Bridges with Girder Spacing ≤ 6 ft 0.85 
Four-Girder Bridges with Girder Spacing ≤ 4 ft 0.95 
All Other Girder Bridges and Slab Bridges 1.00 
Floor beams with Spacing > 12 ft and Noncontinuous Stringers 0.85 
Redundant Stringer Subsystems between Floor beams 1.00 
 
It is important to note that the provisions of Table 2-2 have not been 
demonstrated through research to guarantee any actual level of redundancy since they 
are simply based on adjustments to the reliability index.  In other words, it is not known 
if application of the factors in the table will actually result in any improved behavior of 
the system.  Just as one simple example, they do not ensure that shear studs will be 
properly detailed to ensure adequate pull-out strength of shear studs when the deck is 
heavily engaged in the case of a failed plate girder.   
Article 6.1.7 – Nonredundant Structure provides a definition of non-redundant 
structure, and states:  “There may exist in a structure critical components whose failure 
would be expected to result in the collapse of the bridge. Special considerations of these 
nonredundant components may be required in load rating the structure.”.   
Article 4.11 – Fracture-Critical Members deals with steel tension members in non-
redundant structures, and states:  “Fracture-critical members or member components 
(FCMs) are steel tension members or steel tension components of members whose failure 
would be expected to result in a partial or full collapse of the bridge.   
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Tension components of a bridge member consist of components of tension 
members and those portions of a flexural member that are subject to tension 
stress.   
Any attachment having a length in the direction of the tension stress greater than 
4 in. (10 cm) that is welded to the tension area of a component of a “fracture-
critical” member shall be considered part of the tension component and, therefore, 
shall be considered “fracture-critical”.   
FCMs have all or part of their cross section in tension.  Most cracks in steel 
members occur in the tension zones, generally at a flaw or defect in the base 
material.  Frequently the crack is a result of fatigue occurring near a weld, a 
material flaw, changes in member cross section, or some combination thereof (See 
Article 4.10).   
After the crack occurs, failure of the member could be sudden and may lead to the 
collapse of the bridge.  For this reason, bridges with fracture-critical members 
should receive special attention during the inspections. ”.   
And its commentary (C4.11) states examples of FCMs:  “Steel bridges with the 
following structural characteristics or components should receive special attention during 
the inspections:   
 One- or two-girder I- or box girder systems,   
 Suspension systems with eyebar components,   
 Steel pier caps and cross girders,   
 Two truss systems,   
 Welded tied arches, and   
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 Pin and hanger connections on two- or three-girder systems.   
The above examples are not a comprehensive list of FCMs or fracture-critical 
bridge structure types and shall not serve as a checklist.”.   
The AASHTO MBE, in contrast to the AASHTO LRFD BDS, provides information for 
the identification of non-redundant structures and FCMs.  However, there are no codified 
procedures for the evaluation of capacity (i.e., redundancy) after the failure of a primary 
component.  The need for such procedures is inferred from the concerns regarding 
fracture control in bridges constructed prior to the adoption of the 1978 AASHTO Guide 
Specification for Fracture Critical Non-Redundant Steel Bridge Members.  As these old 
bridges were not designed for fatigue or fabricated to avoid fracture, failure of a steel 
tension member is much more likely, and their redundant capacity shall be taken into 
account when making operation and maintenance decisions.  These concerns are 
described in Article 7.4 - Fracture-Control for Older Bridges in the AASHTO MBE and its 
commentary (C7.4) [9].   
2.4 Reliability-Based Design and Application to Redundancy 
Characterization   
As described in section 2.3, current design and evaluation procedures are based 
on the comparison between factored nominal resistances and factored nominal loads [8], 
[9].  These load and resistance factors are implemented to account for the bias and 
variability of the estimated loads and resistances.  As it is recognized that load and 
resistance are not deterministic quantities, they should be described through statistical 
parameters.  Further, a probability of failure, characterized by a target reliability index, 
must also be tolerated.  The calibration of these factors is described in NCHRP Report 368: 
Calibration of LRFD Bridge Design Code and includes six steps:  (1) selection of 
representative bridges, (2) establishing a statistical database for load and resistance 
parameters, (3) development of load and resistance models, (4) development of the 
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reliability analysis procedure, (5) selection of a target reliability, and (6) calculation of load 
and resistance factors [15].   
In NCHRP Report 368 the Rackwitz and Fiessler iterative procedure was used to 
calculate reliability indexes of existing AASHTO specifications at the time.  With the 
existing values of reliability, a choice for a target reliability index of 3.5 (associated with a 
probability of failure less than 2.33·10-4 or about one in 4,290) was made.  The then 
proposed load and resistance factors were computed assuming log-normal distribution of 
resistance and normal distribution of load.  The integration procedure described in the 
report resulted in the following equation for a resistance factor:   
 
and for a load factor: 
 
where  and  are the bias of resistance and load, and  and  are the coefficients 
of variation of resistance and load.   
The reliability principles used in the calibration of the AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design 
Specifications (AASHTO LRFD BDS) have been employed to develop procedures for the 
assessment of redundancy capacity [8].  A similar approach is described in NCHRP Report 
406: Redundancy in Highway Bridge Superstructures and NCHRP Report 776: Bridge 
System Safety and Redundancy [16], [17].  NCHRP Report 406 considers redundancy 
through the application of system factors in addition to the factored nominal resistance.  
In this research, simple finite element models were used to calculate loads that resulted 
in member failure, , undamaged system failure, , functionality loss, , and 
damaged system failure, , for several types of systems.  The computed loads are used 
to calculate ratios which are applied to log-normal distributions of load and resistance to 
calculate reliability indexes [16].   
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A calibration was then performed to develop system factors that satisfy:  (1) the 
difference between reliability indexes for undamaged system failure and member failure 
is greater than 0.85, (2) the difference between reliability indexes for functionality loss 
and member failure is greater than 0.25, and (3) the difference between reliability indexes 
of a damaged system failure and member failure is greater than -2.70.  Additionally, for 
bridges not covered in their research, they recommend the following [16]: 
 
Reliability principles and the calibration methodology applied in NCHRP Report 
406 were used in NCHRP Report 776 to estimate bridge system factors for lateral and 
vertical loads [17].  System factors were calculated to characterize redundancy in intact 
and damaged structures subjected to vehicular live loads.  However, in NCHRP Report 
776, the redundancy of deficient and overdesigned bridges was considered, while in 
NCHRP Report 406, it was assumed that the structures closely meet member strength 
design requirements.  Although the reliability principles utilized in NCHRP Report 406 and 
NCHRP Report 776 are correct, the data utilized to develop the system factors was 
generated by very simple finite element models which results were not benchmarked 
against any experimental data.  It is not clear whether important  features such as 
connection strength, interaction between the slab and the steelwork, or flexibility of the 
support system were taken into account.  Further, the suggested loading is based on the 
application of multiple HS-20 truck loads at the same location (stacked), which is an 
unrealistic loading scenario and an outdated load model that does not consider 
distributed lane loads.   
2.5 Studies on Post-Fracture Redundant Capacity   
One the earliest significant studies stating the need for redundancy is NCHRP 
Report 319: Guidelines for Redundancy Design and Rating of Two-Girder Steel Bridges 
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[18].  The overall conclusion is that simple linear elastic structural analysis, such as girder-
line analysis models, are not adequate to evaluate the capacity of a structure after the 
failure of a main load carrying member, as alternative load paths must be considered.  
The study describes how three alternate load paths exist in two-girder systems after the 
failure of one of the girders:   
 Top horizontal plane in which catenary action of the slab and composite action 
between top girder flanges and slab provide lateral stiffness and ability to carry 
vertical loads.   
 Bottom horizontal plane in which lateral bracing is able to transfer the forces 
released after fracture of a girder.   
 Vertical planes in which cross-frames, floor beams and/or diaphragms connecting 
both girders transfer load from the slab and the fractured girder to the 
undamaged girder.   
The interaction between these three alternative load paths results in the 
formation of a pseudo-truss system that may have sufficient capacity against load 
demands.  Redundancy rating equations were derived for specific bridge types, and a 
redundancy rating for evaluating bridges in which fracture has occurred was proposed in 
addition to existing inventory and operating rating procedures.  Discussion on the 
expected post-fracture performance presents the issue of extended service period in 
which the fracture has not yet been discovered.   
An important full-scale test to study redundancy is reported in Idriss et al. (1995) 
[19].  The structure was a two-girder bridge carrying I-40 over Rio Grande River in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico scheduled for demolition, which facilitated destructive testing.  
It had three continuous spans, the end spans were 131 ft long and the interior span was 
136 ft long, with the two girders spaced at 30 ft with stringers supported on floor beams.  
It appears that stringers and girders were composite with the slab, but it is not clearly 
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stated in the reports.  The fracture was simulated by torch cutting one of the girders mid 
span of the interior span, the structure was shored during the cut and was slowly release 
resulting in quasi-static loading.  Idriss et al. reported a vertical deflection of 11/16 inches 
under dead load, and an additional 1/2 inches when a single 82 kip tractor-trailer truck 
was located over the fracture.  Yielding was not observed based on strain gage 
measurements. 
Although NCHRP Report 319 provides insight regarding redundancy in girder 
systems as demonstrated by the testing described by Idriss et al. (1995), inertial effects 
that arise during the fracture event were not explicitly considered.  Before the occurrence 
of a fracture, all members are subjected to an initial stress, . After sudden failure 
takes place, members experience a maximum stress,  due to the free vibration of 
the structure.  Once the dynamic behavior dissipates, the members are subjected to a 
final stress, . As shown in Figure 2-1.   
 
Figure 2-1.  Stresses considered in computation of impact coefficients and fracture 
amplification factors.   
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It is typical to describe inertial effects through coefficients.  The most common are 
the impact coefficient or a fracture amplification fracture.  The impact coefficient is 
calculated as  while, the dynamic amplification 
factor is calculated as .  This distinction is important, as the 
impact coefficient is applied to the difference in stress from the undamaged state to the 
damaged state after inertial effects have dissipated, ; but the dynamic 
amplification factor is applied to the stress after inertial effects have dissipated, . 
L.L.-Y. Lai (1994) investigated the redundant capacity and dynamic response of a 
tied arch truss structure after failure of one tie [20].  Results from linear elastic static 
analysis concluded that the structure was able to carry its dead load plus 1.3 time the HS-
20 truck loading.  Results from linear elastic dynamic analysis concluded that the 
deflection based dynamic amplification factor was larger than 1.  The dynamic effects 
were modeled by applying the forces at the tie prior to failure, these forces were applied 
over a period similar to the fundamental period of the failed tie.  During the dynamic 
analysis the structure was subjected to its dead load only.  Although the analysis 
procedure is correct, structural damping and material non-linearity were not considered, 
and it is not clear whether large deformation effects were considered.   
More detailed FEA was carried out by Y. Goto et al. (2011), who investigated the 
dynamic response of a truss structure after sudden member failure [21].  In their analysis 
material non-linearity, large deformation effects, and assumed 5% damping ratio were 
utilized.  The analysis procedure was similar to the one described in LL-Y. Lai (1994).  The 
impact coefficients for critical members in the truss were calculated between 1.4 and 1.8 
(dynamic amplification factors approximately between 0.2 and 0.4).  In their approach 
they considered two sources of inertial effects due to sudden fracture.   
The primary source is the stress wave originating from the fracture and 
propagating throughout the structure, which takes place over a very short period of time, 
1·10-6 s to 3·10-6 s, and is rapidly dissipated.  The secondary source is the redistribution of 
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load due to a change in the stiffness of the system, which results in free-vibration at the 
fundamental period of the damaged structure.  The secondary impact was calculated to 
have much larger effect on the dynamic amplification factor than the primary impact.  Y. 
Goto et al. concluded that the inertial effects due to the initial stress wave can be 
neglected, because they are quickly dissipated and have lower effect on the dynamic 
behavior of the structure than the redistribution of load [21].   
H. Cha et al. (2014) investigated the dynamic response of a truss structure after 
sudden failure of a tension member [22].  In this case, the models were benchmarked 
against experimental data from the Milton Madison Bridge.  The FEA procedures were 
similar to the ones used by Y. Goto et al. (2011), but larger detail was input into the 
models.  The maximum dynamic amplification factor in a main truss member was under 
0.36 for, both, experiment and FEA.  Material non-linearity and large deformation effects 
were explicitly considered, and an effective damping of 4% was used in the FEA.  In 
addition to calculating the dynamic amplification factor, H. Cha et al. showed that the 
truss system exhibited large reserve capacity after failure of a FCM.   
Another large research effort regarding redundancy was carried out at the 
University of Texas at Austin.  The research was focused on twin steel box girder bridges 
with FCMs.  Williamson et al. (2010) reported results from detailed finite element models 
used to evaluate behavior of box girder bridges [23].  These models were calibrated with 
data from full scale tests on a single span twin-box girder bridge.  The finite element 
methodology was detailed in Hovell (2007) and the detailed experimental testing is 
described in Neuman (2009) [24], [25].   
In the experiments carried at UT Austin, the fracture was simulated by detonating 
explosive charges at mid span that instantly cut the flange under dead load.  The dynamic 
response was monitored so a value of 0.3 was computed for the dynamic amplification 
factor.  More weight was applied to the structure which exhibited large post-fracture 
redundant capacity.  The final failure mechanism was pull out of the shear studs under a 
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combination of shear and tension.  The calibrated finite element models were detailed 
and considered material non-linearity and large deformation effects.  Additionally, the 
pull out behavior of shear studs were modeled with connector elements (non-linear 
multi-dimensional spring elements) and the contact interaction between the slab and the 
flanges was explicitly modeled [23]–[25].   
2.6 Cases of Redundant Capacity after Failure of Fracture Critical Members   
Failure of tension components are not commonplace and the instance in which it 
results in structural collapse are exceptional.  As described in section 2.5, there are 
sources of redundancy that are not typically considered in design.  There has been a 
number of field cases in which systems traditionally considered as non-redundant did not 
collapse after significant damage of one or several steel tension members and while 
subjected to some level of live load.  A list of some of these instances is provided hereof.  
Two of those bridges, the Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge, will be analyzed in 
detail in the current research; and they are described in more detail in section 2.6.1 and 
section 2.6.2, respectively.   
The Lafayette Bridge carrying U.S. Route 52 through Saint Paul, Minnesota consists 
of two parallel two-girder bridges continuous over three spans [26].  In 1975, a main 
girder of the bridge over was discovered to be completely fractured.  The crack originated 
from lack-of-fusion at welds between the web and lateral bracing gusset plate, and 
propagated in brittle manner throughout the web and bottom flange.  The structure was 
able to maintain serviceability in the damaged state.  Holes were drilled at the corners of 
problematic welds to prevent propagation of cracks and relieve constraint.   
The Dan Ryan Transit Elevated Structure in Chicago, Illinois is composed of 
continuous and suspended plate girders with a cast in place concrete ballast [27].  Several 
spans of the structure were supported on steel box girder caps, also referred to as bents.  
The bottom flange and almost the entire web were welded to the bent, resulting in high 
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constraint at the welds that, in combination with cold temperatures led to fracture at 
three of bents.  In 1978, after the discovery of cracks, train service was discontinued; 
however, the structure had maintained service while the bents were fractured.   
The Green River Bridge carrying I-26 through Henderson County, North Carolina 
consists of two parallel two-girder bridges continuous over five spans [28].  In 1992, cracks 
were revealed in the girders, two transvers cracks on the bottom flanges and several 
shorter cracks in web-to-flange fillet welds.  The bridge maintained serviceability in the 
described conditions.  As the cracks were not removable by coring, cover plates were 
bolted to provide alternate load-paths.   
The bridge carrying US 422 over the Schuylkill River in Pottstown, Pennsylvania is 
composed of two parallel two-girder bridges continuous over six spans [29].  In 2003 a 
fracture occurred at one of the lateral gusset plate connections and resulted in a fracture 
of the girder web that propagated through the entire bottom flange and extended about 
nine inches into the web.  The cracks were concluded to be caused by triaxial tension 
stress state at lateral gusset plate connections, currently known as constraint induced 
fracture (CIF).  The structure sustained traffic loads while the fracture existed.   
The Diefenbaker Bridge carrying Highway 2 and Highway 3 over the North 
Saskatchewan River in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan is composed of parallel two-girder 
bridges continuous over seven spans [30].  In 2011 a major crack was observed in the 
southbound structure, extending through the bottom flange and the web to near the top 
of the web.  The cracks were concluded to initiate at connections details susceptible to 
CIF.  It was determined that the structure had adequate redundancy levels in the damaged 
condition.   
The Mathews Bridge carrying US 90 Alt over the Saint John’s River in Jacksonville, 
Florida is a six span truss structure.  In 2013, a Military Sealift Command ship collided with 
the center span of the Mathews Bridge, the impact severed several members including 
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one of the bottom chords.  The structure did not collapse and did not experience an 
observable increase in deflection.   
2.6.1 Neville Island Bridge   
One of the structures selected for modeling is the Neville Island Bridge, carrying I-
79 over the backchannel of the Ohio River near Pittsburgh.  The structure of interest is 
the northbound portion of the bridge between pier 8 and pier 11.  This is a continuous 
welded plate bridge with three spans of 225 feet, 350 feet and 225 feet, composed of two 
main girders (G3, and G4) with depths varying from 8 feet to 14 feet.  The concrete slab 
is 37 feet wide with monolithic barriers, supported on the main girders and three 
continuous stringers spaced at 8 feet.  The stringers are supported on a system of truss 
and welded plate floor beams typically spaced at every 25 feet.  Lateral bracing was 
provided by structural tubes attached to the floor beams and the bottom flange of the 
main girders.   
The structure of interest is supported on concrete column piers skewed at 
approximately 22°; the end piers (pier 8 and pier 11) and the northernmost pier of the 
350 span (pier 10) are expansion piers, and the remaining pier (pier 9) is a fixed pier.  The 
inner girder (girder G3) is connected to the southbound structure by a system of welded 
plate and truss diaphragms typically spaced at 50 feet, the southbound structure is a two-
plate girder structure similar to the northbound structure.   
J. Fisher et al. (1980) reported that a large crack was discovered in the fascia girder 
(G4) in the middle of a 350 feet span [31].  The fracture was attributed to defects 
originating from an electroslag groove weld repair.  There was little perceptible 
deformation in the span following the fracture and the bridge carried traffic for a period 
of time before being discovered by a tug-boat captain.  The repair procedure was 
documented by J. Fisher et al. (1980), and consisted of pulling the bottom flanges of the 
fractured girder (G4) together at the fracture section and installing a bolted field splice.  
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The relation between closing force and closing displacement during the jacking operation 
was documented along with the changes in stress profiles at several sections of the 
interior girder (G3) and fascia girder (G4).   
According to the current AASHTO MBE, the Neville Island Bridge would be 
considered as a non-redundant structure with FCMs, as the failure of the fascia girder 
(girder G4) is expected to cause collapse [9].  However, the fact that collapse did not occur 
and that deflections did not disrupt traffic suggest that the bridge system redundancy 
must be taken into account.   
2.6.2 Hoan Bridge   
The second structure selected for modeling is the Hoan Bridge, carrying I-794 over 
the Milwaukee River in the city of Milwaukee.  The structure of interest is the northbound 
portion of a southern approach span of the bridge between pier 5S and pier 2S.  This is a 
continuous welded plate bridge with three spans of 217 feet each, composed of three 
main girders (D, E, and F) 10 feet deep, tapered to 8 feet at pier 5s and 12.5 feet at pier 
2S.  The concrete slab is 55 feet and 10 inches wide with monolithic barriers, supported 
on the main girders and four continuous stringers spaced at 8 feet and 2 inches.  The 
stringers are supported on a system of welded plate floor beams typically spaced at every 
22 feet approximately.  K-type lateral bracing was provided by T sections attached to the 
floor beams and the web of the main girders.  The structure of interest is supported on 
concrete column piers normal to the roadway; all of them can be considered as fixed 
supports.  There are no connections to the adjacent southbound structure. 
In December 2000, large cracks were detected in the three girders of the structure, 
two of them (girders D and E) had full depth fractures.  The structure was close to collapse 
and the roadway was closed, demolished and re-built.  According to reports by the 
Wisconsin DOT and FHWA (2001) , and Connor and Fisher (2002), cracking developed due 
to constraint induced cracking at intersecting welds attaching connection, stiffener and 
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web plates [32], [33].  Because of their design, these weld details were subjected to 
triaxial tension, a stress state that favors void growth and crack development; the 
phenomena is currently known as constraint induced fracture (CIF).  Connor and Fisher 
reported load test performed on a segment with almost identical geometry (three 214 
feet spans, instead of three 217 feet spans) located north of the tied arch structure [33].  
In these load test the performance of the structure was evaluated as stress relieving holes 
were drilled at the problematic welds, the structure behaved as expected with no non-
appreciable differences on the structural response.  In spite of the significant damage, the 
bridge carried live load for a short period following the fracture.  Further, though the 
bridge sagged approximately 4 feet, motorists continued to cross the bridge. 
According to current AASHTO MBE [9], the Hoan Bridge may not be considered as 
a non-redundant structure; however, several states would consider three-girder bridges 
as non-redundant.  The structure lost a large portion of its flexural stiffness after the 
fracture of two girders and, although it was severely damaged and unserviceable, it did 
not collapse.  One of the possible reasons is that the concrete slab might have acted as a 
catenary providing an alternative load path.  
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CHAPTER 3 FINITE ELEMENT ANALYSIS PROCEDURES, TECHNIQUES AND 
INPUTS  
As discussed in the literature review of CHAPTER 2, it is necessary to perform 
detailed analysis in which structural redundancy and load path redundancy are 
considered in order to evaluate the capacity of structure after the failure of a primary 
steel tension member.  Although structural redundancy could be considered in structural 
analysis methods typically used by bridge engineers, load path redundancy requires the 
use of FEA.  Structural redundancy can be demonstrated if the structure is statically 
determinate in the faulted condition with no members reaching their nominal capacity.  
However, structural analysis methods typically used by bridge engineers assume linear 
elastic behavior and also do not take advantage of alternative load paths.   
Numerical approaches are essential to consider the formation of alternative load 
paths after the failure of a FCM.  These secondary load paths may be the result of complex 
interactions such as frictional contact, or resistance mechanisms not considered in design 
such as catenary action in the slab.  No simplified accepted procedures were found in the 
literature regarding these.  Further, if particular analytical tools were to be implemented 
in non-computational structural analysis for each of the possible phenomena that forms 
secondary load paths, the evaluation would become more complex than if a numerical 
methodology was utilized.  Hence, detailed FEA of multi-part assembly models in which 
the bridge geometry, materials and interactions among components are properly 
characterized are not only the best, but the required tool to perform a post-failure 
redundancy evaluation.   
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The construction of such finite element models is the subject of the current 
chapter, which will be treated from the perspective of its implementation to evaluate the 
Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge.  Section 3.1 describes the steps of the analysis 
procedures developed (1) to evaluate the redundant capacity of a steel bridge, and (2) to 
characterize the dynamic amplification effects of brittle failure of steel tension member.  
The analysis techniques and inputs required to construct the finite element model 
capable of capturing the formation of alternative load-carrying mechanisms are discussed 
in section 3.2. 
3.1 Finite Element Analysis Procedures   
Two analysis procedures have been developed in this study.  The first is intended 
for the calculation of the dynamic amplification factor following the sudden failure of a 
tension member event.  In this procedure the intent is to obtain the best estimate of the 
dynamic behavior of a structure after the sudden failure of a steel tension member.  Thus, 
since the objective is to predict real behavior, no load factors were applied for this specific 
phase of the analysis.  Applying load factors would effectively skew the results to be either 
conservative or non-conservative; thus, the nominal loads are appropriate.  The second 
analysis procedure was developed to establish if the system has a satisfactory redundancy 
level in the faulted condition.  For this analysis, load factors for both dead and live load 
were developed and are described in section 5.1.  These load factors were developed to 
achieve a target reliability index in the faulted state.   
Both analysis procedures were composed of an initial implicit static analysis and a 
final explicit dynamic analysis, in which the results from the initial implicit static analysis 
are imported.  Static implicit analysis is used when inertial effects can be neglected, and 
results in a solution by solving a system of equations involving the state of the system at 
both the beginning and at the end of the time increment.  It uses an iterative procedure 
(Newton’s method) that requires inversion of the stiffness matrix and it is unconditionally 
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stable (the magnitude of the time increment does not affect the solution) for linear 
problems.  The implicit static analysis can arrive at the solution with a small number of 
increments [34].   
Explicit dynamic analysis is used when inertial effects need to be considered or 
when the problem becomes non-linear and prevents convergence of an implicit analysis.  
It uses a central-difference time integration rule, in which the solution at the end of a time 
increment is computed based on the state of the system at the beginning of the time 
increment.  The stability of the solution is constrained to a small stable time increment 
that depends on the mass, stiffness and size of the finite elements used.  The explicit 
dynamic analysis does not require inversion of the stiffness matrix, hence, it can compute 
a large number of increments in a short time.  Thus, the analysis procedure is a sequence 
of analyses, developed to optimize the computational time required [34].   
The analysis sequence was developed so that the FEA methodology allows for 
implementation of certain aspects related to the construction sequence of a steel bridge.  
While it is possible to explicitly model every construction step, the developed analysis 
procedure focuses on capturing the effects of concrete pouring and hardening on the 
state of the structure.  The analysis procedure is composed of six steps for the calculation 
of dynamic amplification factors and seven steps when a redundancy evaluation is 
conducted.  The first five steps are carried out in the initial implicit static analysis 
described in section 3.1.1. The remaining steps are carried out in the final explicit dynamic 
analysis described in section 3.1.2.  A discussion on the effects of including the concrete 
placement and hardening in the analysis is presented in section 3.1.3.  Throughout this 
dissertation, the results form FEA use the procedures described in sections 3.1.1 and 




3.1.1 Initial Implicit Static Analysis   
Implicit static analysis was utilized to calculate the state of the structure prior to 
hardening of the concrete in the slab.  An implicit static analysis was used because, 
although non-linearity is considered in the analysis, the bridge behavior is linear and 
inertial effects can be neglected as the bridge is in the undamaged condition.  As the slab 
does not carry any load and does not contribute to the stiffness of the system before 
concrete hardening, during this initial implicit static analysis two modifications are 
required in the FEA:   
 A very low stiffness is specified for the elements composing the slab, that is the 
elements modeling concrete and rebar.  A 1/1000 of the respective moduli of 
elasticity of each material was utilized.  This is done so the load carried by the slab 
and the contribution to the stiffness of the system is negligible.  For the steelwork 
(girders, floor beams, bracing, stringers, etc.) no modifications to the stiffness 
need to be applied.   
 Instead of defining contact interaction between the slab and the steelwork, a 
mesh tie was specified.  The nodal displacements of the concrete slab elements 
are tied to the displacements of the top flanges of girders, floor beams, and 
stringers due to dead load.  As a result, the slab deforms with the steelwork and it 
does not sag between the girders, floor beams, and stringers, as would be 
observed in a real bridge.   
It is worth noting that the remainder of the finite element modeling is identical 
between the initial implicit static analysis and the final explicit dynamic analysis.  The 
specific steps in the initial implicit static analysis are described as follows:   
1. Application of load due to self-weight of the structural steel components as a body 
force.  This load is not factored for the calculation of dynamic amplification factors 
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for the reason stated above.  However, when a redundancy analysis is performed, 
these loads are factored according to the load combination to achieve a desired 
reliability index.   
2. Application of load due to self-weight of the wet slab components as a body force.  
This load is not factored for the calculation of dynamic amplification factors for 
the reason stated above.  However, when a redundancy analysis is performed, 
these loads are factored according to the load combination to achieve a desired 
reliability index.   
3. The system is then fixed in terms of position, that is, the displacement degrees of 
freedom are not allowed to change.   
4. The elements composing the slab (elements modeling rebar and concrete) are 
then deactivated.   
5. The elements composing the slab are then reactivated.  During this reactivation 
the strain in the elements composing the slab is reset to zero.   
3.1.2 Final Explicit Dynamic Analysis   
As contact algorithms, softening material behavior, and non-linear geometry are 
required to be part of the FEA, implicit solution procedures present unavoidable 
convergence problems in most FE solvers.  Also, in order to calculate the dynamic 
response of the bridge or its capacity after sudden failure of a tension component, a 
dynamic explicit analysis needs to be carried out.  The results obtained from the initial 
implicit static analysis are imported into the final explicit dynamic analysis.  In other 
words, the state of the system (stresses, strains, displacements and forces) at the 
beginning of the final explicit dynamic analysis is defined by the state of the system 
computed at the end of the initial implicit static analysis.   
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In the initial implicit static analysis, the slab was modeled with softened stiffness 
to reflect that it is not hardened and a mesh tie constraint was used to assure that the 
slab deformed with the steelwork and to prevent slump between girders and stringers.  
After the state of the system is imported, the following changes are made to capture the 
response of the structure after the concrete has hardened:   
 The modulus of elasticity of the concrete and rebar elements in the slab is changed 
to their final real values.  For the steelwork (girders, floor beams, bracing, 
stringers, etc.) no modifications need to be applied.   
 The mesh tie constraint between the slab concrete elements and the top flanges 
of girders and stringers is replaced by a frictional contact interaction.   
All of the body forces applied during the initial implicit static analysis (i.e., the dead 
load of the structure) are maintained throughout the final explicit dynamic analysis.   
For the calculation of dynamic amplification factors due to the fracture event, the 
following step is carried out in the final explicit dynamic analysis.   
6. To model sudden fracture, elements in the member under consideration are 
instantly deleted.  The system is then allowed to oscillate and dampen until 
negligible kinetic energy is present.   
Only the nominal dead load of the structure is applied to the model.  If live loads 
were to be applied in the calculation of dynamic amplification, the resulting inertial 
effects would be lower due to load stiffening of the structure.  Further, if live loads were 
to be applied, the masses associated with those loads and the interaction between those 
masses and the structure need to be considered as well.  Due to the complexity of the 
aforementioned phenomena, it was considered that inclusion of live loads in the 
calculation of dynamic amplification could yield inconsistent or non-conservative results.   
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Once a dynamic amplification due to the fracture is calculated, this factor can be 
used to greatly simplify the analysis of future bridges since the results from a static 
analysis can simply be amplified by this factor.  This approach is analogous to how truck 
load effects obtained from a static analysis are amplified to account for the dynamic 
effects associated with impact.  To evaluate the capacity of the structure in the faulted 
state, the following steps were carried out in the final explicit dynamic analysis:   
6. The stiffness of the elements located at the fracture location under consideration 
was slowly reduced.  The stiffness was slowly reduced in order to minimize any 
dynamic effects.  If dynamic effects are significant, the system is allowed to 
oscillate until these effects are dampened.   
7. Factored live loads due to traffic and dynamic amplification of the factored dead 
loads are applied.  These loads also were very slowly applied to minimize any 
dynamic effects.  If dynamic effects are significant, the system is allowed to 
oscillate until these effects are dampened.   
3.1.3 Effect of Pouring Sequence Inclusion   
As previously stated, the analysis procedure sequence described in sections 3.1.1 
and 3.1.2 is intended to capture the effects of concrete pouring and hardening.  When 
concrete is placed, the slab does not contribute to stiffness of the system and the weight 
of the slab is carried by the steel work, and once concrete hardens, the slab is able to 
carry loads and contribute to the stiffness of the structure.  While in the analysis 
procedure sequence it is assumed that all of the concrete is poured and hardens at the 
same time; in general, concrete is typically poured in stages with the objective of reducing 
dead load deflections.  In the current section three scenarios are compared:   
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 No pouring sequence scenario, in which it assumed that concrete is hardened 
from the beginning.  This situation is similar to shored construction in which the 
structure is continuously supported and then is released.   
 Simplified pouring sequence scenario, in which it is assumed that all concrete is 
placed and hardens at the same time.  This scenario is the one modeled in the 
analysis procedure sequence of sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 is followed.   
 Detailed pouring sequence scenario, in which the placement sequence described 
in the construction plans in modeled.  In this case, it assumed that each slab 
section hardens before the next section is placed.   
These three scenarios were modeled for the Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan 
Bridge.  For the comparison of the three scenarios, only implicit static analysis procedures 
are utilized.  In the no pouring sequence the moduli of elasticity of concrete and 
reinforcement are 3,600 ksi and 29,000 ksi, respectively, the interaction between the slab 
and the steelwork is modeled by a contact interaction as described in section 3.2.5, and 
two analysis steps are carried out: 
1. Application of load due to self-weight of the structural steel components as a body 
force; this is a nominal (unfactored) load. 
2. Application of load due to self-weight of the slab components as a body force; this 
is a nominal (unfactored) load.   
In the simplified pouring sequence, the modulus of elasticity of concrete and 
reinforcement initially are 1/1,000 of their respective values, and the interaction between 
the slab and the steelwork is modeled by a tie constraint as described in section 3.2.5.  
The analysis procedure has the following 6 steps: 
1. Application of load due to self-weight of the structural steel components as a body 
force; this is a nominal (unfactored) load. 
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2. Application of load due to self-weight of the slab components as a body force; this 
is a nominal (unfactored) load.   
3. The system is then fixed in terms of position, that is, the displacement degrees of 
freedom are not allowed to change.   
4. The elements composing the slab (elements modeling rebar and concrete) are 
then deactivated.   
5. The elements composing the slab are then reactivated.  During this reactivation 
the strain in the elements composing the slab is reset to zero.   
6. The moduli of elasticity of concrete and reinforcement is changed to 3,600 ksi and 
29,000 ksi, respectively.  The tie constraint between the slab and the steelwork is 
replace with a contact interactions as described in section 3.2.5.   
For the detailed poring sequence scenario, the analysis procedure is similar to the 
simplified pouring sequence scenario, except that steps 2 through 6 are carried out 
sequentially for each segment of the slab described in the concrete placement sequence 
in the construction plans of each structure until the entire slab is placed and hardened.   
The finite element models were constructed in accordance with the techniques 
and inputs described throughout section 3.2, except for the tension behavior in the 
concrete material model.  Cured concrete was modeled utilizing the concrete damage 
plasticity model [35], a modulus of elasticity of 3,600 ksi and a Poisson’s ratio of 0.2 were 
used for initial linear elastic response, the compression inelastic behavior was based on 
the experimental model proposed by Popovics (1973) [36] and tension inelastic behavior 
was modeled as perfectly plastic with a yield stress in tension of 0.4 ksi.  Ideally a softening 
behavior could be employed for the tension inelastic behavior of concrete but it 
presented convergence difficulties in a static implicit analysis; however, for the 
comparative purposes of this study, successful inclusion of that softening behavior would 
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not have had a significant effect in the results.  Figure 3-1 shows the uniaxial behavior of 
the material modeled employed for hard concrete.   
 
Figure 3-1.  Uniaxial behavior of concrete damage plasticity model employed in the 
analysis of the effects of pouring sequence inclusion.   
After completion of the analysis for the Neville Island Bridge, focus is paid to the 
forces carried by the primary member, in this case the girders, and the concrete slab.  
Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3 show the longitudinal normal stress along the center of the 
bottom flange of girder G3 and girder G4, respectively, for the three scenarios.  According 
to these results, the stresses in the bottom flange are not significantly affected by taking 
the concrete hardening into account.  However, the longitudinal normal stress along the 
top flange of the girders differ significantly depending on the modelling approach, Figure 
3-4 and Figure 3-5 show the longitudinal normal stress along the center of the bottom 
flange of girder G3 and girder G4, respectively.   
The stresses on the top flange are severely underestimated in the no pouring 

















steelwork at a stage when it should not since concrete would not carry any of its own self-
weight.  On the other hand, when any of the two pouring-hardening sequence approaches 
is taken (simplified sequence scenario or detailed sequence model), the results are 
similar.  The simplified sequence scenario resulted in stresses up to 2.5 ksi larger at the 
middle span, and up to 7.5 ksi smaller at the end spans than in the detailed sequence 
scenario.  The no sequence scenario underestimated stress in the middle and end spans, 
by up to 12 ksi, in comparison with the simplified and the detailed sequence scenarios.   
 
Figure 3-2.  Comparison of longitudinal normal stress along the bottom flange of 
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Figure 3-3.  Comparison of longitudinal normal stress along the bottom flange of 
girder G4 in the Neville Island Bridge.   
 
Figure 3-4.  Comparison of longitudinal normal stress along the top flange of girder G3 

























Distance from Pier 9 (Fixed Pier) (in)

























Distance from Pier 9 (Fixed Pier) (in)
Detailed Sequence Simplified Sequence No Sequence
45 
 
Figure 3-5.  Comparison of longitudinal normal stress along the top flange of girder G3 
in the Neville Island Bridge.   
In Figure 3-6 and Figure 3-7, the extent of tension cracking based on inelastic 
tensile strain in the deck is shown.  There is no inelastic tensile strains in the simplified 
sequence scenario and, in the detailed sequence scenario, a small amount of tensile 
inelastic straining takes place at shared edges of slab segments poured and hardened at 
different stages.  The no sequence scenario shows large concentrations of tensile inelastic 
behavior in the concrete slab at locations over interior supports (negative moment 
regions) which would not take place in the real structure since the concrete in the slab 
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Figure 3-6.  Comparison of tension cracking in concrete slab of the Neville Island 
Bridge, viewed from top. 
 
Figure 3-7.  Comparison of tension cracking in concrete slab of the Neville Island 
Bridge, viewed from bottom. 
The results of the application of the three pouring sequence scenarios to the Hoan 
Bridge were similar to those previously reported for the Neville Island.  Figure 3-8, Figure 
3-9, and Figure 3-10 show the longitudinal normal stress along the center of the bottom 
flange of girder D, girder E and girder F, respectively, for the three scenarios.  The stresses 
in the bottom flange are very similar for the three pouring sequence scenarios, with the 
no sequence scenario resulting is slightly smaller stress.  However, larger differences in 
the longitudinal stresses in the top flange were computed as shown in Figure 3-11, Figure 
3-12, and Figure 3-13 for girder D, girder E and girder F, respectively.  In the case of the 
Hoan Bridge, the simplified pouring sequence scenario resulted in larger stress in all span, 
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up to 2 ksi larger than the detailed sequence scenario.  The no pouring sequence scenario 
resulted in underestimated longitudinal stress in all three spans, up to 8 ksi smaller than 
in the simplified and detailed pouring sequence scenarios.   
 
Figure 3-8.  Comparison of longitudinal normal stress along the bottom flange of 
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Figure 3-9.  Comparison of longitudinal normal stress along the bottom flange of 
girder E in the Hoan Bridge.   
 
Figure 3-10.  Comparison of longitudinal normal stress along the bottom flange of 























Distance form Pier 5S (in)























Distance form Pier 5S (in)
Detailed Sequence Simplified Sequence No Sequence
49 
 
Figure 3-11.  Comparison of longitudinal normal stress along the top flange of girder D 
in the Hoan Bridge.   
 
Figure 3-12.  Comparison of longitudinal normal stress along the top flange of girder E 
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Figure 3-13.  Comparison of longitudinal normal stress along the top flange of girder E 
in the Hoan Bridge.   
Figure 3-14 and Figure 3-15 show the extent of inelastic tensile strains which 
indicates occurrence of tensile cracking in the concrete slab.  While no tensile inelasticity 
was calculated for the detailed and simplified pouring sequence scenarios, the no pouring 
sequence scenario resulted in the slab cracking in tension over the piers of the middle 
span.  This cracking would not occur in the real structure since the concrete in the slab 
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Figure 3-14.  Comparison of tension cracking in concrete slab of the Hoan Bridge, 
viewed from top.   
 
Figure 3-15.  Comparison of tension cracking in concrete slab of the Hoan Bridge, 
viewed from bottom.   
The effect of concrete pouring and hardening needs to be explicitly considered in 
the analytical recommendations produced through this research, especially when 
analyzing long-span structures since their dead load demands are comparable to their live 
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load demands.  It is evident that not considering the self-weight of wet concrete (no 
pouring sequence model) will result in large underestimation of the load carried by the 
steel work.  Further, if there are continuous spans, the concrete slab could undergo 
significant tensile cracking at the negative moment locations if such the no pouring 
sequence scenario modeling approach is utilized.  Detailed simulation of the concrete 
pouring-hardening sequence (detailed pouring sequence scenario model) revealed that a 
small amount of localized tensile cracking may develop at the interfaces between pouring 
segments in the concrete slab, and that the stress distribution along the girders of the 
bridge is very similar to the obtained from the model in which all of the concrete slab is 
assumed to be poured and hardened at once (simplified pouring sequence scenario).   
Depending on the concrete placement sequence described in the construction 
plans, the stresses at the top flanges of members in contact with the slab calculated by 
the simplified pouring sequence scenario modeling approach may be underestimated or 
overestimated in comparison with those calculated with the detailed pouring sequence 
scenario modeling approach.  This difference may be larger in bridges with larger spans 
or with very complex concrete placement sequences.  Taking into account that (1) the 
concrete placement sequence is rarely known in detail by a structural analyst evaluating 
an existing structure, (2) the similarity between the results calculated in the simplified 
and the detailed pouring sequence scenarios for both structures, and (3) the complexity 
and additional time cost of comprehensively modeling the concrete placement and 
hardening effects, the modeling approach of the simplified pouring sequence scenario is 
recommended for most steel bridges.  The analysis procedures utilized in the finite 
element models discussed in the current dissertation, and described in sections 3.1.1 and 




3.2 Finite Element Analysis Techniques and Inputs   
For the two bridges analyzed in the development of the finite element 
methodology, the geometry provided in the original design plans was used to develop the 
finite element models.  An effort was made to produce finite element models as 
computationally inexpensive as possible, while maintaining a high level of detail.  Hence 
a variety of elements, material models and other modeling techniques were used.  The 
material models utilized to describe the behavior of bridge structural component are 
presented in section 3.2.1.  The types of elements used to predict the behavior of each of 
the structural members, their application and the types of constraints utilized are 
described in section 3.2.2.  Additionally, the special procedures used and developed to 
model various components and actions are described as follows: 
 Section 3.2.3 describes the modeling techniques to characterize the flexibility of 
the support system.   
 Section 3.2.4 presents the procedures for modeling connections among steel 
components.   
 Section 3.2.5 discusses the utilization of penalty contact to model the interaction 
between the slab and the steelwork.   
 Section 3.2.6 shows the application of loads and boundary conditions.   
3.2.1 Material Models   
The majority of the primary load carrying components in a bridge superstructure 
are either made of steel or concrete.  During this research, a linear elastic-Mises plastic 
relation with linear kinematic hardening and a specified failure strain for modeling steel 
components was used.  For the modeling of concrete, linear elastic-concrete damage 
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plastic relation was utilized and is recommended.  Nominal strength values were used to 
develop the material constitutive laws.   
3.2.1.1 Steel Material Model   
The stiffness of the steel elements is defined by an initial linear elastic behavior, 
followed by Mises plasticity with linear kinematic hardening and a specified failure strain.  
The linear elastic behavior is defined by the specification of the modulus of elasticity and 
Poisson’s ratio, which were 29,000 ksi and 0.3, respectively.  Onset of plasticity takes place 
at nominal yield strength and the material hardens until nominal ultimate strength is 
reached, the hardening is linear and kinematic.  Instead of specifying failure strains 
related to uniaxial tension tests, the failure strain was conservatively assumed to be 0.05, 
in order to recognize possible biaxial stress states and the presence of welds that limit 
ductility.   
It is possible that certain steel types will have a nominal elongation at failure that 
is less than 0.05 (such as steel used in the fabrication of hanger cables); in those cases, 
the nominal elongation at failure should be taken as the failure strain.  However none of 
the steel types in the Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge have nominal elongation 
at failure lower than 0.05.  Once the failure strain is attained, the element fails.  The stress-
strain relation for steel in the finite element models is shown in Figure 3-16   
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Figure 3-16.  Steel stress-strain relation input in FEA.   
3.2.1.2 Concrete Material Model   
A combination of linear elasticity and concrete damage plasticity models was 
utilized to define the material model for concrete [35].  For the initial linear elastic 
behavior, a modulus of elasticity calculated in accordance with ACI 318-14 (
) and a Poisson’s ratio of 0.2 were used [37].  Concrete damage 
plasticity assumes that the main two failure mechanisms are tensile cracking and 
compressive crushing of the concrete material.  The evolution of the yield (or failure) 
surface is controlled by two hardening variables, tensile and compressive equivalent 
plastic strains, linked to failure mechanisms under tension and compression loading, 
respectively.   
Under uniaxial tension, the stress-strain response follows a linear elastic 
relationship until the value of the failure stress is reached.  The failure stress corresponds 
to the onset of micro-cracking in the concrete material.  Beyond the failure stress, the 
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formation of micro-cracks is represented macroscopically with a softening stress-strain 
response, which induces strain localization in the concrete structure.  A tensile strength 
based on the modulus of rupture calculated in accordance with ACI 318-14 (
) is utilized [37], and tabular data for the tension softening behavior is developed 
using Wittmann et al. (1988) fracture energy model [38].  Wittmann et al. (1988) used 
compact tension (CT) specimens to determine fracture energy and strain softening of 
concrete, and developed a bi-linear softening relation that once applied to finite element 
models, resulted in good agreement with experimental data [38].  In general, the fracture 
energy of concrete can be assumed to be 8.57·10-4 kip/in (150 N/m) for any type of 
concrete.  The uniaxial tensile stress-crack opening relation used in the finite element 
models is shown in Figure 3-17.   
 
Figure 3-17.  Concrete uniaxial tensile stress-displacement relation input in finite 
element models.   
Under uniaxial compression the response is linear until the value of initial yield.  In 
the plastic regime the response is typically characterized by stress hardening followed by 
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strain softening beyond the ultimate stress.  Nominal compressive strength of concrete is 
used as initial yield stress, and tabular data for the compressive hardening-softening 
behavior is developed using Popovics’ experimental relation [36].  Popovics’ stress-strain 
relation is entirely defined by the compressive strength and two constants, one related 
to the cementitious material type (concrete, mortar or paste) and another related to the 
type of aggregate and test method used.  This relation was compared against a 
comprehensive set of experimental tests resulting in good correlation.  According to 
Popovics, the compression stress for a given total strain, , can be calculated using the 
following equation:   
 
where  is the compressive strength of concrete,  is the total strain at compressive 
strength, and  is a parameter calculated from experimental data.  The concrete uniaxial 
compressive stress-strain relation used in the finite element models is shown in Figure 
3-18.   
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Figure 3-18.  Concrete uniaxial compressive stress-strain relation input in finite 
element models. 
It should be noted that  is the total strain ( ).  The total strain 
at compressive strength, , the experimental parameter, , and the plastic strain, 




3.2.2 General Elements and Constraints Utilized   
The slab is composed of two types of elements:  (1) solid elements to model 
concrete and (2) truss elements to model steel reinforcement.  The literature review and 
experience have shown that concrete can be modeled best with solid elements.  
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Specifically, 8-node linear bricks with reduced integration and hourglass control were 
used (C3D8R per Abaqus designation [34]).  It was found that at least four solid concrete 
elements should be used through the thickness of the slab to achieve accurate results.  
Further, a maximum aspect ratio (length of longest edge divided by length of shortest 
edge) of 15, and corner angles (angle at which two element edges meet) between 40 and 
140 degrees should be maintained.  At the locations in contact with steelwork (such as 
bottom slab haunches) the mesh density must be higher than the mesh density of the 
steelwork to ensure proper enforcement of the contact interaction.   
The reinforcing steel was modeled using 2-node truss elements with linear 
displacement (T3D2 per Abaqus designation [34]).  The length of the truss elements were 
approximately equal to the length of the longest edge of the solid concrete elements.  
These truss elements are also embedded within the solid concrete elements.  At the 
nodes of the embedded truss elements, the translational degrees of freedom are 
eliminated and the nodal translations were constrained to interpolated values of the 
nodal translations of the host solid concrete element.   
Girders, stringers and fabricated plate floor beams were modeled with 4-node 
shells with reduced integration, hourglass control, and finite membrane strains (S4R 
elements per Abaqus designation [34]).  These elements are highly robust and have been 
found to provide accurate prediction of behavior of steel members, even in the highly 
inelastic range by many other researchers.  A minimum of four elements along the flange 
width and the web height were found to give satisfactory results.  Further, the maximum 
aspect ratio should be kept to about five and corner angles kept between 60 and 120 
degrees.  It was also found that truss type floor beams, bracings and cross frames can be 
modeled with shell elements (as described for girders, stringers and fabricated plate floor 
beams) or with beam elements by using at least three 2-node linear shear-flexible 
(Timoshenko) beam elements (B31 elements per Abaqus designation [34]) per 
component.   
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Connections between steel members are modeled through the use of mesh ties.  
In a mesh tie, the motion of a slave surface or node group is linearly interpolated from 
the motion of a master surface or node group [34]. If the nominal capacity of a connection 
is calculated to be lower than the nominal capacity of the connected members, additional 
procedures as described in section 3.2.4 were applied.  Vertical stiffeners were either 
explicitly modeled with 4-node shells with reduced integration, hourglass control, and 
finite membrane strains (S4R elements per Abaqus designation [34]) or with kinematic 
coupling constraints.  In a kinematic coupling constraint, the motion of a surface or a node 
set is constrained to the motion of a master node [34]; when modeling stiffeners, 
kinematic couplings were used to prevent cross-sectional distortion.   
3.2.3 Substructure Flexibility Modeling   
Fracture of main tension members can result in significant changes in the lateral 
and torsional stiffness of the structure.  This may result in very large horizontal reaction 
forces at fixed supports when rigid boundary conditions (prescribed displacements) are 
specified.  Alternatively, there may be significant displacements at expansion bearings, 
with a concern being the element slipping off the support.  In either case, the support 
conditions must be accurately modeled.  Since no forces should be generated at 
expansion bearings, the greater concern is at “fixed” bearings to which significant load 
may be transmitted.  Assuming full fixity (i.e., zero translation) in a model may be very 
unrealistic since, (1) the support or bearing may fail under the extreme load, and (2) even 
small amounts of flexibility within the substructure or bearing will greatly reduce the 
forces attracted to the support.  Hence, the reaction forces calculated without the 
inclusion of substructure flexibility may be greatly overestimated.   
In order to account for substructure longitudinal and transverse flexibility, 
connector elements were utilized.  These elements allow for the definition of coupled 
force-deformation relations.  Basically, connector elements can be thought of as multi-
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dimensional springs.  The type that was determined to best capture the intended 
behavior was a Cartesian connector.  These elements provide a connection between two 
nodes where the change in position is measured in three directions local to the 
connection [34].  One of the nodes is fixed (or connected to ground) and the other node 
is the support point in the superstructure.  The connector element is rigid in the vertical 
direction, and has a coupled linear elastic relation in the two horizontal directions 
(longitudinal and transverse).  Depending on the complexity of the supporting element 
(geometry, skewed, material homogeneity, etc.), the horizontal force-deformation 
relation can be obtained by hand calculations or through a simple FEA.  In the case of the 
current research, simple elastic finite element models were used.   
Since elastic connector elements were used to characterize substructure 
flexibility, its application was limited to static and quasi-static phenomena.  In order to 
include the effect of substructure flexibility in dynamic phenomena, the damping 
characteristics of the substructure would of course have to be included.  Further, the 
interaction with the foundations themselves would have to be modeled.  This is a complex 
task in itself and one that does not have appreciable effect on the overall dynamic 
response of the system.  Therefore, during the calculation of the dynamic amplification 
factor used to account for sudden fracture, substructure flexibility was neglected.   
3.2.3.1 Effect of Substructure Flexibility Inclusion   
In order to show the importance of including the flexibility of the substructure in 
the finite element models, failure of a tension primary member was modeled for the 
Neville Island Bridge.  Two scenarios are considered for each model, the first is the 
scenario in which rigid boundary conditions are used, and in the second the flexibility of 
the substructure is included by utilizing the aforementioned Cartesian connector.  In 
order to calculate the stiffness of the substructure simple finite element models of the 
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substructure were constructed.  The focus will be paid to the fixed pier, pier 9, as it is the 
only fixed support location.   
The geometry of pier 9 was obtained from construction plans and was modeled 
with solid 8-node linear bricks with reduced integration and hourglass control.  The 
material model in the calculation of the stiffness of pier 9, was linear elastic with a 
modulus of elasticity of 1800 ksi and a Poisson’s ratio of 0.2.  The modulus of elasticity 
used was approximately half of that calculated in accordance with ACI 318-14 (
) in order to reflect possible flexural cracking [37].  Since the 
reinforcement does not significantly change the stiffness of the modeled piers, it was 
neglected.  In addition to the self-weight of the pier, at the top of the pier columns, 
vertical point loads were applied, representing the reaction forces due to the dead load 
of the superstructure.  The base of the pier was in contact with a rigid mat, modeling the 
bedrock.  Contact tangential behavior between the mat and the bedrock was modeled as 
rough interface preventing slip, as long as a contact pressure existed.  The geometries 
used in the finite element model of pier 9 of the Neville Island Bridge are shown in Figure 
3-19.   
63 
 
Figure 3-19.  Geometries in finite element model of pier 9 of the Neville Island Bridge.  
Pier 9 shown in red, rigid matt shown in blue.  Longitudinal direction is X axis. 
To the effect of pier 9 flexibility at the supports of girders G3 and G4, incremental 
forces in the longitudinal and transverse directions were applied at the support locations.  
The forces were applied until uplift begins to occur; at which point the applied forces and 
displacements in the longitudinal and transverse directions are recorded at the support 
locations.  Assuming that the response of the pier is linear until uplift begins to occur, it 
is possible to calculate the coefficients of the flexibility matrix at each support location, 
as shown in Table 3-1 for the support of girder G3 and Table 3-2 for the support of girder 




Table 3-1.  Applied forces, calculated displacements and coefficients of flexibility 
matrix for support of girder G3 at pier 9 of the Neville Island Bridge.  . 
ΔFx ΔFz Δux Δux Δux/ ΔFx Δuz/ ΔFx Δux/ ΔFz Δuz/ ΔFz 
(kip) (kip) (in) (in) (in/kip) (in/kip) (in/kip) (in/kip) 
-1275 - -1.20 -0.386 9.44E-04 - 3.03E-04 - 
1259 - 1.19 0.382 9.46E-04 - 3.04E-04 - 
- -2088 -0.590 -0.666 - 2.83E-04 - 3.19E-04 
- 2596 0.751 0.840 - 2.89E-04 - 3.24E-04 
Average 9.45E-04 2.86E-04 3.03E-04 3.21E-04 
 
Table 3-2.  Applied forces, calculated displacements and coefficients of flexibility 
matrix for support of girder G4 at pier 9 of the Neville Island Bridge.   
ΔFx ΔFz Δux Δux Δux/ ΔFx Δuz/ ΔFx Δux/ ΔFz Δuz/ ΔFz 
(kip) (kip) (in) (in) (in/kip) (in/kip) (in/kip) (in/kip) 
-1050 - -1.90 -0.239 1.81E-03 - 2.28E-04 - 
1049 - 1.95 0.240 1.85E-03 - 2.29E-04 - 
- -3091 -1.09 -4.47 - 3.52E-04 - 1.45E-03 
- 2587 0.544 3.53 - 2.10E-04 - 1.36E-03 
Average 1.83E-03 2.81E-04 2.29E-04 1.41E-03 
 
Hence, as the coefficients of flexibility matrices are known, the stiffness matrices 
can be calculated as the inverse of these.  Since a symmetric stiffness matrix is desired, 
the off-diagonal coefficients were replaced with their average value.  For the support of 
girder G3 the result is as follows:   
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while for the support of girder G4 the results is as follows:   
 
These stiffness matrices are then applied to the Cartesian connector elements that 
model flexible boundary conditions in the model of the superstructure.  The finite 
element model of the superstructure was constructed in accordance with the techniques 
and inputs described throughout section 3.2.  The analysis procedure is as described in 
section 3.1, that is a two part analysis with an initial implicit static analysis and a final 
explicit dynamic analysis; however, only the nominal (unfactored) dead load of the 
structure is applied (no traffic load are applied in the analysis).  In the analysis the failure 
of girder G4 at the middle of it center span is modeled by reducing the stiffness of the 
cross section of the girder at the failure location.  The horizontal reaction forces obtained 
for both scenarios, rigid boundary conditions and flexible boundary conditions are shown 
in Table 3-3.   
Table 3-3.  Calculated reaction forces and displacements at support for flexible and 
rigid boundary conditions.   
Boundary Condition Flexible Rigid 
Girder G3 
Longitudinal Reaction (kip) 51.9 72.2 
Transverse Reaction (kip) 25.3 49.8 
Longitudinal Displacement (in) -0.0567 - 
Transverse Displacement (in) -0.0235 - 
Girder G4 
Longitudinal Reaction (kip) -51.9 -73.3 
Transverse Reaction (kip) -21.5 -41.6 
Longitudinal Displacement (in) 0.101 - 
Transverse Displacement (in) 0.0434 - 
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Based on the results obtained, it is clear that substructure flexibility must be 
included in the FEA.  In this example, the longitudinal reactions were overestimated by 
approximately 40% and the transverse reaction were overestimated by approximately 
95% when pier flexibility was not included, while the calculated displacements were very 
small ,less than 1/8”, when substructure flexibility was included.  The larger reaction 
forces calculated when rigid boundary conditions are used also result in large stresses in 
the elements located around the support point that may lead to premature failure of 
these elements.  Thus, substructure flexibility must be included when modeling the bridge 
in the faulted condition, unless it can be shown that the effects are negligible.   
3.2.4 Connection Failure Modeling   
When a connection is likely to fail before yielding of the member, in addition to 
the use of mesh ties to attach the components, an additional procedure may be necessary 
to capture connection failure.  Although it is possible to develop force/moment-
displacement/rotation relations which can be applied to a connector element, a simpler 
approach was developed and utilized in all models.   
If the members are directly connected to each other (i.e., there are no connection 
plates or other components that significantly affect the flexibility of the connection) a 
section at the end of the members can be treated as a fuse.  That “end fuse” section will 
be assigned a failure criteria based on the stress or load level that will produce failure of 
the connection.  This level of stress or load will of course be different than the rest of the 
member.  If connection plates exist, and they increase the flexibility of the connection, 
they should be included in addition to the previously described procedure.  As the load 
factors utilized in the analysis consider the statistical variance of both, load and 
resistance, as discussed in section 5.1; it should be noted that the strength of the fuse 
element input in the FE model is the nominal (unfactored) strength.   
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In the case of the Neville Island Bridge, the connection nominal capacities are 
larger than the member nominal capacities, and the connections were also stiffer than 
the connected members; hence, lateral bracing and floor beams were simply attached to 
the girder with mesh tie constraints.  A typical connection of the Neville Island Bridge is 
shown in Figure 3-20.   
 
Figure 3-20.  Typical connection details of the Neville Island Bridge.   
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In the case of the Hoan Bridge, the flexibility of the connection, the eccentricity of 
bracing elements at the connection, and possible failure of the braces at the connection 
needed to be implemented in the analysis.  Hence, the geometry of the connection plate 
and the stiffener were explicitly included in the finite element model.   A sketch of a typical 
connection detail in the Hoan Bridge is shown in Figure 3-21, and Figure 3-22 shows a 
detail of the connections as modeled in the finite element model.   
 
Figure 3-21.  Typical connection details of the Hoan Bridge.  Longitudinal stiffener was 
not included in finite element model.   
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Figure 3-22.  Detail of connection as modeled in finite element model of the Hoan 
Bridge.  Stiffener and connection plate shown in orange.  Bracing (green), girder 
(blue) and floor beam (red) shown as well.   
3.2.5 Contact Modeling   
Contact between the bottom of a concrete slab and the top of the steelwork was 
modeled using two different approaches.  The first approach was a mesh tie, between all 
exterior nodes of the slab and the top flanges of girders and slabs, and was used before 
the slab hardens.  In a mesh tie, the motion of a slave surface or node group is linearly 
interpolated from the motion of a master surface or node group.  In this case, the exterior 
nodes of the slab were slaved to the top flanges of girders and stringers.  In this way, the 
deformation of the slab conformed to the deformation of the steelwork while preventing 
unrealistic sagging between supporting elements.  This also prevented the “wet” concrete 
barrier from tipping over.   
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Once concrete hardens, it is necessary to allow separation between the steel and 
the concrete, and to consider the frictional behavior.  This was achieved by substituting 
the previously applied mesh tie with a contact interaction.  The normal behavior of the 
contact interaction is modeled through a penalty stiffness.  The penalty stiffness is several 
orders of magnitude larger than the normal stiffness of the underlying contacting 
elements and allows a very small penetration so a pressure can be calculated.  The 
tangential behavior of the contact interaction is modeled through an algorithm based on 
Coulomb friction with a limit on the allowable shear. A friction coefficient ( ) of 0.55, as 
suggested by Lai et al. (2015) [39], [40], and an interfacial shear strength ( ) of 0.06 
ksi, based on the lower bound provided in the commentary of AISC 360-10, were specified 
[41].   
3.2.6 Loads and Boundary Conditions   
Two types of loads were applied in the finite element models:  body forces and 
surface tractions.  Body forces were applied for component dead loads (e.g., “DC” per 
AASHTO designations).  These are simply the product of mass, gravity and applicable load 
factors.  Surfaces tractions were applied for traffic live loads (LL per AASHTO designation).  
These are based on the HL-93 load model described in the AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design 
Specifications [8].  None of the bridges modeled included any bituminous pavement.  
However, if the load effect of the pavement must be included, it may be modeled by 
specifying a layer of relatively soft solid elements (analyst should refer to SHRP-A-388 as 
asphalt stiffness varies very significantly with temperature [42]) and apply the 
correspondent body force.   
Component dead loads were linearly applied in the initial implicit static analysis.  
Traffic live loads and dynamic amplifications were applied in the final explicit dynamic 
analysis, these steps are discussed in detail in section 3.1.  Their dynamic effects were 
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minimized by applying them slowly through the use of smooth step, per the following 
equation as implemented in Abaqus:   
 
where  is the fraction of live load at a load application time , and  is the duration 
of the load application [34].  The duration of the load application was larger than the 
fundamental period of the structure to avoid vibration of the structure effects.  It must 
be noted that the dynamic amplification effects are captured through the use of dynamic 
amplification factors which are discussed in section 4.2.  Although analyses focused on 
the dynamic behavior of the structure were carried out to determine the dynamic 
amplification factor, the FEA methodology was developed so its application did not 
require such complex analysis.   
Regarding prescribed boundary conditions, at all support points vertical 
translation is assumed to be zero.  For horizontal (longitudinal and transverse) support 
conditions at fixed support points, two approaches were taken.  If the modeled 
phenomenon was static or quasi-static, substructure flexibility was included as described 
in section 3.2.3.  For dynamic phenomena, the horizontal translations at fixed supports 
were assumed to be zero (i.e., substructure flexibility is ignored).  
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CHAPTER 4 FINITE ELEMENT MODELS OF CASE STUDY STRUCTURES  
Two non-composite steel structures are utilized in the application of the FEA 
procedures, techniques and inputs detailed in CHAPTER 3.  These structures are the 
Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge.  The finite element models described in the 
current section are used in the benchmarking procedures to be discussed in section 4.1 
and for the calculation of dynamic amplification after sudden failure of a primary steel 
member, as reported in section 4.2.  Original design plans were used to create the 
geometries of the different members modeled and to obtain the material properties 
specified in the material models.  When generating the finite element model, splices, 
holes, access hatches, etc. are neglected.  The structures are assumed to be flat in the 
vertical plane, in other words, camber and superelevation are ignored.  The finite element 
models were built as described in section 3.2, and subjected to the analysis procedures 
as specified in section 3.1, albeit particular modifications were required in the benchmark 
analyses.   
The Neville Island Bridge is a non-composite continuous three-span bridge, 
straight and skewed by approximately 22°, and composed of the following components: 
 Two welded plate girder with depth ranging between 5 ft and 14 ft.  These are 
considered to be as the only primary steel tension members and would be 
designated as FCMs prior to the redundancy evaluation.  They are modeled with 
shell elements.   
 A system of floor beams attached to the girders.  It is composed of nine welded 
plate floor beams (five near the south end of the structure, and fourth near the 
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north end of the structure) and 27 truss floor beams, typically spaced at 25 ft.  The 
welded plate floor beams are modeled with shell elements while the truss floor 
beams are modeled with beam elements.   
 A system of lateral diagonal bracings attached to the girder, modeled with beam 
elements.   
 Three stringers, continuous over the three spans, simply supported on the floor 
beam system, modeled with shell elements.   
 A reinforced concrete slab supported on the stringers and girders, in which the 
concrete is modeled with solid elements and the reinforcements is modeled with 
embedded truss elements.   
The stiffeners of the Neville Island Bridge are modeled with kinematic constraints 
Figure 4-1 shows a detail view of the assembled components of the Neville Island Bridge, 
details of the meshes used for the steel components and the reinforced concrete slab are 
shown in Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3, respectively.   
 
Figure 4-1.  Geometries of the Neville Island Bridge, detailed bottom view.  Concrete 
slab and barriers (grey), plate girdes (blue), diagonal-bracing (green), stringers 
(magenta), floor beams (red), and slab reinforcement (black).   
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Figure 4-2.  Mesh details of the steel components of the Neville Island Bridge.   
 
Figure 4-3.  Mesh details of the reinforced concrete slab of the Neville Island Bridge.   
The Hoan Bridge is a non-composite continuous three-span bridge, straight and 
without skew, and composed of the following components: 
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• Three welded plate girder, 10 ft deep (tapered to 8 ft at the south end and to 12.5 
ft at the north end).  These are considered to be as the only primary steel tension 
members and would be designated as FCMs prior to the redundancy evaluation.  
They are modeled with shell elements.   
• A system of floor beams attached to the girders.  It is composed of fifty plate floor 
beams typically spaced at 20 ft.  The welded plate floor beams are modeled with 
shell elements.   
• A system of K-type lateral bracings attached to the girder, modeled with shell 
elements.   
• Four stringers, continuous over the three spans, simply supported on the floor 
beam system, modeled with shell elements.   
• A reinforced concrete slab supported on the stringers and girders, in which the 
concrete is modeled with solid elements and the reinforcements is modeled with 
embedded truss elements.   
The stiffeners of the Hoan Bridge are modeled with kinematic constraints, except 
at the connections, in which the geometry of the stiffener and the connection plate are 
explicitly modeled.  Figure 4-4 shows a detail view of the assembled components of the 
Hoan Bridge, details of the meshes used for the steel components and the reinforced 
concrete slab are shown in Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6, respectively.   
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Figure 4-4.  Geometries of the Hoan Bridge, detailed bottom view.  Concrete slab and 
barriers (grey), plate girdes (blue), K-bracing (green), stringers (magenta), floor 
beams (red), slab reinforcement (black) and stiffeners and connection details 
(orange).   
 
Figure 4-5.  Mesh details of the steel components of the Hoan Bridge.   
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Figure 4-6.  Mesh details of the reinforced concrete slab of the Hoan Bridge.   
4.1 Benchmarking of FEA Procedures, Techniques and Inputs   
Results of finite element analyses of the Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge 
are compared with available experimental field measurements hereafter to benchmark 
the FEA procedures, techniques and inputs described in sections 3.1 and 3.2.  The 
conducted finite element analyses replicate phenomena that took place as the 
experimental measurements were recorded.  Hence, certain steps of the analysis 
procedure differ from those described in section 3.1, but the finite element models were 
constructed following the procedures in section 3.2.  The benchmarking of the finite 
element model of the Neville Island Bridge is described in section 4.1.1, while section 
4.1.2 describes the benchmarking of the finite element model of the Hoan Bridge.   
4.1.1 Benchmarking of the Finite Element Model of the Neville Island Bridge   
To benchmark the finite element model of the Neville Island Bridge the repair 
operation documented by J. W. Fisher et al (1980) was replicated [31].  After the fracture 
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of the fascia girder (girder G4) was discovered, the girder was jacked to close the opening 
that occurred when the crack, which originated from a defect in a repair in the original 
electroslag flange butt weld.  The fracture propagated through the entire bottom flange 
and extended into the web of girder.  Once the two segments of the girder G4 were jacked 
(i.e., pulled) together and an adequate load level was measured, a bolted moment splice 
was installed.  In the FEA, the fracture of girder G4 and the jacking operation were 
modeled quasi-statically, and the calculated results were compared with the measured 
jacking force-closing displacement relation and changes in stress distributions in the 
girders after the jacking operation was completed.  Figure 4-7 shows the location of the 
sections at which the stress distributions were measured and the fracture location.  J. W. 
Fisher et al. (1980) reported strain gage measurements of girder G4 at sections 1 and 2, 
and of girder G3 at section 1.   
 
Figure 4-7.  Location of fracture and sections where stress data was measured by J. W. 
Fisher et al. (1980) [31].   
The analysis procedure consisted of an initial implicit static analysis and a final 
explicit dynamic analysis, with a total of seven analysis steps.  The first five steps were 
performed with an implicit static analysis as described in section 3.1.1, and after the 
stiffness of the elements composing the slab was increased and the mesh tie constraint 
between the slab and the steelwork was replaced with a contact interaction, the following 
steps were carried out in the final explicit dynamic analysis:   
6. The stiffness of the elements located at the fracture location under consideration 
was slowly reduced.  The stiffness was slowly reduced in order to minimize any 
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dynamic effects.  The system was allowed to oscillate until any dynamic effects 
were dampened out.   
7. The jacking forces reported by J. W. Fisher et al (1980) were applied as described 
in the report [31]. These forces were slowly applied to minimize any dynamic 
effects.   
It should be noted that all dead load applied in the initial implicit static analysis 
was nominal (unfactored) dead load; and that two contact models were studied in the 
current benchmarking effort.  The field measurements reported in J. W. Fisher et al (1980) 
suggested that, although the structure was not composite, the structure acted 
compositely while subjected to the repair operation [31].  To investigate that claim and 
to assess the performance of the contact interactions, two tangential contact models 
were used.  The first one is the penalty friction model described in section 3.2.5, with a 
friction coefficient ( ) of 0.55 and an interfacial shear strength ( ) of 0.06 ksi.  The 
second one is a rough contact model in which no slip is allowed if a contact pressure exist; 
which would be equivalent to a penalty friction model with infinite friction coefficient and 
no interfacial shear limit.   
Both approaches to the tangential contact behavior, penalty friction and rough 
contact models, resulted in good correlation with the measured strain data reported in J. 
W. Fisher et al. (1980), showing that the structure behaved compositely while in service 
[31] and that the frictional contact model is capable of adequately model is adequately 
capable of modeling the shear behavior at the interface between the slab and the 
steelwork.  This correlation is shown in Figure 4-8 for the closing force-closing 
displacement data, and in Figure 4-9, Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-11 for the changes in stress 
distributions for girder G3 at section 1, and for girder G3 at section 1 and section 2, 
respectively.  Additionally, a post-fracture deflection of 5.9 inches was calculated in the 
FEA, which is similar to the deflection of 5 inches observed by J. W. Fisher et al. (1980) 
(this deflection was estimated and not directly measured) [31].   
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Figure 4-8.  Comparison of closing force versus closing displacement relations.   
 
Figure 4-9.  Comparison of longitudinal normal stress change during repair operation 


























































Figure 4-10.  Comparison of longitudinal normal stress change during repair 
operation at section 1 in girder G4. Closing force of 1674 kips.   
 
Figure 4-11.  Comparison of longitudinal normal stress change during repair 








































































As shown in the comparisons between the results from FEA and field 
measurements, it can be concluded that the finite element model of the Neville Island 
Bridge yielded very good correlation with observed deflections and field measured 
strains.  Based on the data and the overall response of the finite element model matching 
the overall behavior of the bridge in the faulted state; the FEA procedures, techniques 
and inputs described in sections 3.1 and 3.2 were deemed adequate.   
4.1.2 Benchmarking of the Finite Element Model of the Hoan Bridge   
To benchmark the finite element model of the Hoan Bridge two finite element 
analyses were conducted.  Firstly, full depth fractures at Girder E and Girder F were 
modeled while the structure was under dead load only in order to replicate the state of 
the structure before its demolition.  Several cracks were detected in all three girders in 
the northernmost end span.  The cracks were initiated at details that were prone to 
develop constrained induced fracture (CIF). Two of the cracks extended to full depth 
fractures in one of the exterior girders (Girder F) and the interior girder (Girder E).  Figure 
4-12 shows the locations were the cracks were detected; locations F28 and E28 had full 
depth fractures.   
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Figure 4-12.  Location of cracks in the Hoan Bridge (from Connor et al. (2002) [33]).   
Secondly, strain gage measurements recorded during the load tests described in 
R. J. Connor et al. (2002) were compared with the results from FEA.  The load tests were 
not conducted in the structure of interest but on a twin structure located north of the 
tied-arch span of the Hoan Bridge [33].  The geometry of the twin structure is almost 
mirrored, except that the spans measure 214 feet (instead of 217 feet).  The location of 
the strain gages is shown in Figure 4-13.  The loading conditions during the test were 
replicated.  The loading applied in the FEA is based on the dump truck utilized in a static 
load test, which had a gross vehicle between 65.6 kip and 67.9 kip.  Figure 4-14 shows the 
loading scheme input in the FEA.   
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Figure 4-13.  Location of strain gages in load test (from Connor et al. (2002) [33]).   
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Figure 4-14.  Vehicle loads based on description in Connor et al. (2002) [33].   
The analysis procedure consists of six steps for both benchmarking efforts, the 
calculation of post-fracture deflections and the comparison with load tests from R. 
Connor et al. (2002) [33].  The first five analysis steps are carried in the initial implicit 
analysis as described in section 3.1.1, it should be noted that all dead load applied in the 
initial implicit static analysis was nominal (unfactored) dead load.  For the calculation of 
post-fracture deflection, once the stiffness of the elements composing the slab was 
increased and the mesh tie constraint between the slab and the steelwork was replaced 
with a contact interaction, the following step was carried out in the final explicit dynamic 
analysis:   
6. The stiffness of the elements located at the fracture locations under consideration 
was slowly reduced.  The stiffness was slowly reduced in order to minimize any 
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dynamic effects.  The system was allowed to oscillate until any dynamic effects 
were dampened out.   
On the other hand, for the comparison with the load test, the following step was 
carried out in the final explicit dynamic analysis: 
6. The vehicular live loads described by R. Connor et al (2002) [33] and shown in 
Figure 4-14 were applied very slowly to minimize any dynamic effects.   
A post-fracture deflection of 36 inches was calculated in the FEA in which girders 
E and F were fractured.  According to eyewitness reports, the deflection was estimated 
to be between 36 and 42 inches.  (It is noted that some reports indicate 48 inches).  Since 
the defections were not actually measured, the calculated deflections under dead load 
are considered to be reasonable.  The observed deflections may have been larger than 
the ones computed in the FEA because Girder D had large web cracks that were not 
explicitly model in the analysis, and it is possible that inspection vehicles were parked on 
the failed span.   
Satisfactory correlation was observed when comparing the stress measurements 
documented in R. Connor et al (2002) [33] and the calculated values by FEA.  The average 
error is approximately 7.7% with the maximum error approximately being 15% 






Table 4-1.  Comparison between load test gage readings in Connor et al. (2002) [33] 
and results from FEA. All results are ksi.   
Gage Member 















0.26 0.35 0.43 0.28 0.36 0.48 
CH72 -0.84 -0.73 0.38 -0.86 -0.76 0.40 




-0.17 0.05 0.49 -0.18 0.06 0.54 
CH75 0.02 -0.05 -0.12 0.02 -0.06 -0.13 




0.27 0.41 0.33 0.30 0.43 0.37 
CH78 0.21 0.29 0.24 0.22 0.31 0.24 




0.19 0.09 -0.04 0.19 0.10 -0.04 
CH81 0.51 0.28 -0.15 0.57 0.29 -0.17 
CH82 -0.16 -0.12 0.01 -0.17 -0.13 0.01 




0.84 1.11 0.99 0.91 1.16 1.00 
 
As shown in the comparisons between the results from FEA and field 
measurements, it can be concluded that the finite element model of Hoan Bridge yielded 
very good correlation with estimated deflections and available stress data from load tests.  
Based on the data and the overall response of the finite element model matching the 
overall behavior of the bridge in the faulted state; the FEA procedures, techniques and 
inputs described in sections 3.1 and 3.2 were deemed adequate.   
4.2 Calculation of Dynamic Amplification Factors   
To establish whether a structure has adequate strength and is able to provide a 
certain level of serviceability after the failure of a primary member, it is necessary to know 
the additional dynamic demands that sudden failure of such member would impose on 
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the structure.  In order to estimate the magnitude of those demands, finite element 
models of the Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge were constructed and subjected 
to sudden (instantaneous) failure of a member that could be classified as a FCM.  These 
models were analyzed and developed in accordance with the FEA procedures, techniques 
and inputs described in sections 3.1 and 3.2.   
The objective of the finite element analyses discussed in the current section is to 
calculate a dynamic amplification factor to be applied in the reliability-based load 
combinations to be discussed in section 5.1.  When a structure is loaded and a load-
carrying member fails suddenly, the structure is subjected to additional load demands 
generated by (1) the stress wave that originates due to the sudden failure, and (2) the 
load redistribution to the remainder components of the structure.  As discussed in section 
2.5, Y. Goto et al. (2011) showed that load redistribution was the main source of dynamic 
amplification rather than the initial stress wave, which occurs at high speed and dissipates 
quickly [21].  After the failure of the member, as the load redistribution occurs in a system 
which stiffness has changed, the structure oscillates about its static equilibrium position 
until the dynamic effects are dampened out, as shown in Figure 4-15.  The dynamic 
amplification factor, , is defined in terms of the peak stress, , and the final stress, 
, as .   
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Figure 4-15.  Stresses considered in computation of impact coefficients and fracture 
amplification factors.   
Three main factors affect the dynamic amplification of the structure after the 
failure of a primary member:  (1) the stiffness of the structure, (2) the load that the 
structure supports at the time of failure, and (3) the damping of the structure.  The 
stiffness of the system is dictated by the geometry and mechanical properties of the 
bridge materials; however the loading and damping characteristics are not so easily 
defined.  In general, larger changes of stiffness result in larger dynamic amplification 
factors; for example, after the failure of a girder, a two-girder bridge will have larger 
dynamic amplification factor than a three-girder bridge.  Similarly, bridges with larger 
fundamental periods of oscillation experience larger dynamic amplification factors; for 
example, of two bridges with similar stiffness, the heavier one will undergo larger 
dynamic effects after the failure of a member.   
In the calculation of dynamic amplification factor in the current dissertation, only 
the nominal (unfactored) dead load of the structure is applied because the intent is to 
develop a finite element model that best estimates the actual in-service behavior of the 
bridge.  One may defend the application of a certain level of live load as the member 
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failure occurs; however, the application of live load without the inclusion of the mass 
associated with such live load results in load stiffening which decreases the dynamic 
amplification.  If the mass of the vehicles is to be included, the stiffness, damping 
characteristics and moving nature of the vehicular live loads (i.e., the overall suspension) 
need to be considered.  Modeling such interaction of the vehicle with the slab is very 
complex, requiring benchmarking with experimental data, which was not found.  
Additionally, the intent is to capture the best estimate of the post-fracture dynamic 
behavior of the bridge; hence applying vehicular live loads in the worst possible location 
does not represent average loading conditions; not even in causative terms, as there is 
not full correlation between load and occurrence of fracture in FCMs.   
When a dynamic analysis is performed, the damping characteristics of the system 
are very important and should be adequately implemented.  Typically the damping of a 
steel structure at service levels is 2% of the critical damping for the lowest frequency 
mode, and 5% for reinforced concrete structures [43]. The majority of the mass of the 
Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge is reinforced concrete (approximately 70%), so 
the critical damping ratio should be closer to 5% than 2%; however, no empirical 
observations were found regarding the dynamic behavior of these particular structures.  
In the calculation of dynamic amplification factor an initial damping ratio of 2% of the 
critical damping for the fundamental frequency mode in the undamaged state is 
conservatively applied in the form of mass proportional damping.  The damping is applied 
in the form of mass-proportional damping; which has higher effect on the modes with 
lower frequencies and does not have appreciable effects on the minimum stable time 
increment in the final explicit dynamic analysis.  This damping ratio will increase as the 
period of the structure increases due to the fracture of the girder, and dissipation occurs 




4.2.1 Dynamic Amplification Factor of the Neville Island Bridge   
A finite element model of the Neville Island Bridge was developed as described in 
section 3.2 and subjected to the analysis procedures described in section 3.1 for the 
calculation of dynamic amplification factors.  Two separate failure scenarios were 
considered.  Firstly, sudden failure of the fascia girder (girder G4) in the middle of the 
center span and, secondly, sudden failure of the fascia girder (girder G4) at the middle of 
the northernmost end span.  Figure 4-16 shows the failure locations in the Neville Island 
Bridge for the calculation of dynamic amplification factors.  The first location was chosen 
because it is where the positive flexural demands are maximum and because it matches 
the location where the fracture took place as reported by J. W. Fisher et al. (1980) [31].  
Although the largest flexural demands take place over pier 9 and pier 10, it is very unlikely 
that fracture of a steel component will take place at a negative moment region.  Several 
locations where considered for the northernmost span, the location that resulted in the 
largest dynamic amplification is reported in the current section.   
 
Figure 4-16.  Location of failure locations for the calculation of dynamic amplification 
factors of the Neville Island Bridge.   
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The reported peak stress, , and the final stress, , used to calculate the 
maximum dynamic amplification factor, , occur in the interior girder (girder G3), 
which is the only other primary steel tension member, at the location that undergoes the 
largest increase in demands after the occurrence of the fracture, largest .  
Sudden failure of girder G4 (fascia girder) in the middle of the center span resulted in a 
maximum  of 0.39 in girder G3 (interior girder), with , equal to 28.0 ksi and 
, equal to 20.1 ksi.  Sudden failure of girder G4 in the middle of the northernmost 
end span resulted in a maximum  of 0.26 in girder G3, with , equal to 10.7 ksi 
and , equal to 8.52 ksi.  Figure 4-17 and Figure 4-18 show the response of the 
undamaged girder (girder G3) after sudden failure of girder G4 at the center span and at 
the end span, respectively.   
 
Figure 4-17.  Longitudinal normal stress at bottom flange of Girder G3 after sudden 
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Figure 4-18.  Longitudinal normal stress at bottom flange of Girder G3 after sudden 
failure of Girder G4 at the middle of the northern end span.   
4.2.2 Dynamic Amplification Factor of the Hoan Bridge   
A finite element model of the Hoan Bridge was developed as described in section 
3.2 and subjected to the analysis procedures described in section 3.1 for the calculation 
of dynamic amplification factors.  Two separate failure scenarios were considered.  Firstly, 
sudden failure of the westernmost girder (girder D) in the middle of the northernmost 
end span and, secondly, sudden failure of the middle girder (girder E) at the middle of the 
northernmost end span.  Both locations were chosen because it is where the positive 
flexural demands are maximum and because they match the locations where the 
fractures took place as reported by R. Connor et al. (2002).  Although the largest flexural 
demands take place over pier 3S and pier 4S, it is very unlikely that fracture of a steel 
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Figure 4-19.  Location of failure locations for the calculation of dynamic amplification 
factors of the Hoan Bridge.   
The reported peak stress, , and the final stress, , used to calculate the 
maximum dynamic amplification factor, , occur in the remaining girders (girders E 
and F when failure of girder D is modeled, girders D and F when failure of girder E is 
modeled), which are the only other primary steel tension member, at the locations that 
undergo the largest increase in demands after the occurrence of the fracture, largest 
.  Sudden failure of girder D (westernmost girder) in the middle of the 
center span resulted in a maximum  of 0.21 in girder E (middle girder), with , 
equal to 27.6 ksi and , equal to 22.8 ksi.  Sudden failure of girder E (middle girder) 
in the middle of the northernmost end span resulted in a maximum  of 0.19 in girder 
D (westernmost girder), with , equal to 26.9 ksi and , equal to 22.6 ksi.  As 
expected the responses of the exterior girders (girders D and F) are almost identical after 
the failure of the middle girder (girder E).  Figure 4-20 and Figure 4-21 show the response 
of the undamaged girders after sudden failure of girder D and girder E, respectively, at 
the northernmost end span.   
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Figure 4-20.  Longitudinal normal stress at bottom flange of Girder E and Girder F 
after sudden failure of Girder D.   
 
Figure 4-21.  Longitudinal normal stress at bottom flange of Girder D and Girder F 


















































4.2.3 Recommended Dynamic Amplification Factor for Redundancy 
Evaluation   
Dynamic amplification factors can be calculated for the majority of non-composite 
steel bridges if the FEA methodology described in sections 3.1 and 3.2 is followed.  
However, due to complexity of the finite element model, and the time cost of the analysis, 
a recommended universal dynamic amplification factor based on an upper bound limit of 
the available data is utilized in the reliability-based load combinations discussed in section 
5.1.  In the current dissertation a maximum dynamic amplification factor of 0.39 was 
calculated for the Neville Island Bridge, while for the Hoan Bridge, the maximum dynamic 
amplification factor was 0.21.  Similar detailed FEA and experimental measurements 
discussed in section 2.5 reported dynamic amplification factors in the 0.2 to 0.4 range.  
Hence, it is concluded that 0.40 is a reasonable upper bound dynamic amplification factor 
for non-composite steel plate girder structures undergoing sudden failure of a primary 
tension member and will be specified in section 5.1.   
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CHAPTER 5 RELIABILITY BASED LOADING COMBINATIONS AND MINIMUM 
PERFORMANCE CRITERIA  
To establish if failure of a steel tension member could result in loss of service or 
collapse of the bridge it is necessary (1) to develop load cases characterizing the loading 
conditions experienced by the bridge, and (2) to create a set of benchmarks the structure 
must fulfill to be considered redundant.  The loading combinations and performance 
criteria described in this chapter complement the FEA procedures, techniques and inputs 
described in CHAPTER 3, resulting in a complete analysis methodology in which demand 
and capacity are defined.  Section 5.1 describes reliability-based loading combinations 
that characterize the loading conditions at the time a primary tension member fails and 
for an extended service period after such failure occurs.  Section 5.2 describes minimum 
performance requirements that a steel structure must successfully fulfill to demonstrate 
adequate system-level redundancy.   
5.1 Reliability-based loading combinations   
The current Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRFD) procedures described in 
AASHTO LRFD BDS are based on the application of factors to both load and resistance [8].  
The calibration of these factors in AASHTO LRFD BDS was performed by A.S. Nowak and 
others for a target system reliability factor, , of 3.5.  The calibration approach is 
described in detail in NCHRP Report 368 [15].  When simple linear elastic analysis models 
are used, it is relatively straight forward to incorporate the concepts of LRFD.  Specifically, 
various loads are scaled and combined while material or component resistance is 
generally decreased.  However, when attempting to accurately model real behavior, in 
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particular when non-linear behavior occurs, simply reducing the capacity of a material or 
component through resistance factors in the FE model is not appropriate, as there is a 
direct impact on the predicted behavior.   
As the direct application of resistance factors in non-linear FEA results in the 
predicted behavior in the model being different from the nominal or expected, 
application of typical LRFD methods, as in AASHTO LRFD BDS, is problematic.  The finite 
element models developed in the current research require non-linear material 
constitutive models and element formulation featuring geometric non-linearity, and the 
application of resistance factors when the response is not linear elastic is questionable at 
best.  Further, some resistance factors are based on material properties while others are 
based on component tests, such as composite girders.  Some have also been established 
to address the consequence associated with a failure mode.  As an overall example, 
resistance factors for net section fracture are different than those for gross section 
yielding.  Including these factors in the finite element models will result in the predicted 
response being markedly different, and in some cases incorrect, than had the nominal 
values been used.   
Therefore, the approach taken was to use FEA to most accurately estimate the 
resistance of a damaged structure to factored loads.  The load factors proposed herein 
were developed to achieve a specific target reliability index, including the statistical 
parameters of both load and resistance.  In that case, the basic design equation becomes:   
 
where  is the nominal resistance,  is the nominal load and  is the reliability-based 
load factor.  In other words, the target reliability is reached by only factoring the loads 
with no adjustment to the resistance of a material or component strength.   
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Based on the principles used in NCHRP Report 368 [15], the system reliability factor, , 
was computed by assuming a log-normal distribution of resistance and a normal 
distribution of load as:   
 
where  is the nominal resistance,  is the bias of the nominal resistance,  is the 
coefficient of variation of the resistance,  is the mean load,  is the standard deviation 
of the load, and  is a calibration parameter which was calibrated to 2.0 in NCHRP Report 
368 [15].  Knowing that (1) the nominal load is biased with respect to the mean load, 
( ), (2) the definition of coefficient of variation ( ), and (3) the basic 
design equation ( ), the following equation for estimating the reliability is 
obtained:   
 
Reordering the terms in the previous equation resulted in the following expression 
for the calculation of load factors: 
 
5.1.1 Resulting Load Combinations Using Available Resistance and Load 
Statistical Parameters   
In order to apply the equation described in NCHRP Report 368, it is necessary to 
know the statistical parameters used in that work to define resistance and load.  For 
typical design of new bridges, the professional bias, material properties, and fabrication 
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procedures along with their associated variations, are accounted for in the calibration of 
the resistance factors.  However, since the estimate of the actual behavior is directly 
obtained from the analytical model with no simplifications, the professional factor was 
conservatively neglected.  In other words, no simplifications are being made to arrive at 
a design equation or simplified model of the behavior.  Therefore, only the bias and 
coefficient of variation due to variability in material properties and fabrication procedures 
were considered.  The statistical parameters utilized for resistance were the same as 
those reported in NCHRP Report 368 accounting for fabrication and material variability 
only [15].  These are summarized in Table 5-1.   
The statistical parameters characterizing dead load of structural components (DC) 
and future wearing surfaces/utilities (DW) were also obtained from NCHRP Report 368.  
However, for evaluation of existing structures, it is considered that dead load (DC) and 
dead load for future wearing surface (DW) are known to the analyst and can be directly 
measured.  Thus, the bias and coefficient of variation of those loads can be neglected 
( ).   
Table 5-1.  Resistance statistical parameters (NCHRP Report 368 [15]).   
Type of Structure 
Bias C. O. V. 
λR VR 
Non-Composite Steel Girders 
Moment (Compact) 1.095 0.075 
Moment (Non-Compact) 1.085 0.075 
Shear 1.12 0.08 
Composite Steel Bridges 
Moment 1.07 0.08 
Shear 1.12 0.08 
 
Two cases were considered for the statistical characterization of live load.  The 
first case was intended to conservatively describe the loading condition of the structure 
at the instant the failure of the member occurred.  In a way, this load case could be 
101 
considered analogous to the existing Extreme Event load combinations currently included 
in the AASHTO LRFD BDS, which use a load factor of 0.5 on live load, since average levels 
of live load are applied.  This is reasonable, as there is no correlation between transient 
live load and the load associated with the extreme event for which the current Extreme 
Event load combinations are intended (i.e.:  earthquake, blast, ice or collision loads).   
However, the same cannot be said with absolute certainty regarding failure of a 
member, say due to brittle fracture.  For example, except in the cases of constraint 
induced fracture (CIF), member fracture has generally been due to a flaw reaching a 
critical size while subjected to dead load and some level of live load.  But, the likelihood 
of fracture also depends heavily on material toughness, the degree of constraint, 
magnitude of residual stresses, temperature, and detailing.  All of which have as large if 
not larger influence on the likelihood of fracture potential as applied live load.  However, 
while no data exists regarding the correlation between the magnitude of the applied live 
load and observed fractures in the field, it also does not seem reasonable to assume there 
is never any correlation.  In fact, the perception of most engineers when asked is that 
brittle fracture is generally the result of overload.  While this is anecdotal, it is an 
important consideration to keep in mind during the development of load combinations 
that are intended to address redundancy.   
Therefore, it was considered that a reasonable base load to apply for this load case 
is the nominal value of the HL-93 load, neglecting its bias and variation (
).  According to NCHRP Report 368, this level of load is representative of an “average 
maximum live load” [15].  Again, it is noted that this load case only applies to the instant 
in time that the failure occurs and is not intended to address the period of time following 
the failure until detection, which is covered in the subsequent load case to be discussed.  
This first case will be referred to as the Redundancy I load combination for which a target 
reliability index of 3.5 was selected to ensure the bridge meets the same level of reliability 
at the instant in time the fault occurs.  Since there is no warning associated with the actual 
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failure nor opportunity for detection through inspection, this level reliability under a 
reasonably heavy live load is appropriate.   
The second case will be referred to as the Redundancy II load combination.  The 
Redundancy II load combination is intended to evaluate the structure at the maximum 
level of live load that could be expected between the failure of the member and the time 
the damage is discovered by a bridge inspector.  The author does not believe it is 
reasonable to assume that the public will be able to detect the damage immediately after 
the event.  Thus, the interval will be assumed to be between inspection intervals.  
Unfortunately, that period of time is not easily established since the interval should be 
tied to additional aspects associated with the behavior and performance of the bridge in 
the faulted state.  While 24 months may initially seem to be the appropriate interval, one 
objective of this research is to extend the interval between hands-on inspections for some 
bridges (some will of course be shorter than 24 months).  Fortunately, the statistical 
parameters related to live load do not change by much when considering time periods 
much longer than a few days.  This was observed by comparing the statistical parameters 
described in the SHRP 2 Report titled “Bridges for 100 Year Service Beyond 100 Years: 
Service Limit State Design” (Report S2-R19B-RW-1; hereafter referred to as SHRP 2 
Report) for maximum traffic loads between a 5 year and a 50 year period [44], [45].  The 
target reliability index for the Redundancy II load combination was set at 2.5.  This level 
of reliability is deemed to be acceptable assuming the bridge would have already been 
shown to survive the initial failure by the Redundancy I load combination.   
Table 5-2 shows the statistical parameters characterizing the loads used in the 
definition of loading combinations.  Different load factors are presented for newly 
designed bridges (i.e., bridges which have not been built), as well as for the evaluation of 
existing bridges.  Using the equation described in NCHRP Report 368 for each combination 
of load and resistance at a target reliability index, load factors were calculated and 
summarized in Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 for target reliability indexes of 3.5 and 2.5, 
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respectively.  Load factors were calculated for various structural configurations, similar to 
those presented in NCHRP 368 [15].  Also shown are the recommended load factors after 
examining all of the data.  The recommended load factors shown are the most critical for 
each load type and configuration rounded to the nearest 0.00 or 0.05 as is customarily 
done in the AASHTO LRFD BDS [8], [15].   
Table 5-2.  Load statistical parameters.   
Type of Load 
Bias C. O. V. 
Notes 
λQ VQ 
DC New 1.05 0.10 
From NCHRP Report 368 [15]. 
DW New 1 0.25 
DC Existing 1 0 Assuming that evaluator knows geometry and 
material in detail. DW Existing 1 0 
LL Nominal 1 0 
Nominal load only, in faulted state for survival 
(Redundancy I) 
LL 5 Years* 1.16 0.123 
From SHRP 2 [44], [45] for ADTT=5000.   
For consistency, the definition of bias in NCHRP 
Report 368 is used, λQ = μQ/Qn (a different definition 
of bias, related to measurement error, is used in 
SHRP 2). (Redundancy II) 









Table 5-3.  Load factors calculated according to NCHRP 368 and recommended 
load factors for  equal to 3.5.   
Type of Structure 











































































1.43 1.81 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.65 1.68 
Max. Calculated 
Load Factor, Γ 1.49 1.89 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.73 1.76 
Recommended 
Load Factor,   
Γ for β = 3.5 





Table 5-4.  Load factors calculated according to NCHRP 368 and recommended 
load factors for  equal to 2.5.   
Type of Structure 











































































1.27 1.53 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.46 1.49 
Max. Calculated 
Load Factor, Γ 1.33 1.60 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.53 1.56 
Recommended 
Load Factor,   
Γ for β = 2.5 
1.35 1.60 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.55 1.55 
 
In summary, two load combinations were developed.  The first combination 
addresses the ability of the structure to survive sudden failure at a discreet instant in time, 
and is denoted as Redundancy I with a target reliability of 3.5.  The second combination 
describes the maximum loads for which the strength of the system must be evaluated in 
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the faulted state until the damage is detected.  This load case is referred to as Redundancy 
II and has a target reliability of 2.5. 
For the Redundancy I load combination, the live load factor is intended to account 
for the nominal value.  The purpose is to characterize high traffic live loads (i.e., 
representative of the mean maximum live load) that may increase the potential for 
failure, but recognize that there is not full correlation between the failure and the 
maximum traffic load expected for 75 years return period.  In order to include the 
dynamic effects from sudden failure of a tension member, all loads are amplified by the 
dynamic amplification factor ( ). Based on the research conducted and as described 
in section 4.2, the amplification factor due to inertial dynamic response immediately after 
the member fails should be taken as 0.40.  Since the  is applied to both the live and 
dead load components, it is expected that the Redundancy I load combination could 
control for longer span bridges.  The resulting Redundancy I load combinations for 
evaluation of newly designed and existing structures are: 
 
 
For the Redundancy II load combination, the live load factor is intended to account 
for the maximum expected live load for an unspecified return period between 5 and 50 
years.  (Again, as shown in Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 there is no difference between the 
load factors for these two return periods.)  The purpose is to characterize the loads which 
the strength of the system must withstand in the faulted state for a return period 
spanning from the time of failure to its detection.  In order to include possible dynamic 
amplifications associated with the passage of traffic, the impact modifier utilized in the 
fatigue load combinations in AASHTO LRFD BDS, 15%, is only applied to the truck axle 
portion of the live load as per AASHTO LRFD BDS Article 3.6.2 [8].  AASHTO LRFD BDS uses 
an impact modifier of 33% in the evaluation for strength, however this modifier 
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represents atypical and extreme loading phenomena and is believed to be too 
conservative considering the objective of this load combination.  The resulting 




5.1.1.1 Other Levels of Reliability   
The load factors in the Redundancy I and Redundancy II load combinations 
described in section 5.1.1 were developed assuming a target reliability indices of 3.5 and 
2.5 for the Redundancy I and Redundancy II load combinations respectively.  However, 
someone might wish to use other levels of reliability when considering the bridge is in a 
faulted state.  Thus, other reliability levels may be acceptable when designing or 
evaluating for redundancy.  Table 5-5 presents the load factors for different various target 








Table 5-5.  Load factors for different reliability levels. Redundancy I and 
Redundancy II load combinations.   
Target Reliability 
(Failure Rate) 




New 1.50 1.90 1.25 
Existing 1.25 1.25 1.25 
Redundancy II 
New 1.50 1.90 1.75 




New 1.40 1.75 1.20 
Existing 1.20 1.20 1.20 
Redundancy II 
New 1.40 1.75 1.65 




New 1.35 1.60 1.15 
Existing 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Redundancy II 
New 1.35 1.60 1.55 




New 1.30 1.50 1.10 
Existing 1.10 1.10 1.10 
Redundancy II 
New 1.30 1.50 1.45 




New 1.20 1.35 1.10 
Existing 1.10 1.10 1.10 
Redundancy II 
New 1.20 1.35 1.35 




New 1.10 1.20 1.05 
Existing 1.05 1.05 1.05 
Redundancy II 
New 1.10 1.20 1.30 
Existing 1.05 1.05 1.30 
Notes: 
 For Redundancy I load combination, DC, DW and LL are amplified by (1+DAR) 
 For Redundancy II load combination, truck portion of LL is amplified by (1+IM). 
 
5.1.2 Application of Vehicular Live Load Models   
In addition to the calculation of the appropriate load factors, it is also necessary 
to establish proper application of the load components in the loading combinations.  
Although the application of dead loads is straight forward, the position and number of 
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live load models must be described.  In the current research the live load model is based 
on the HL-93 vehicular live load model described in AASHTO LRFD BDS [8]; however, some 
modification were made regarding the number of lanes loaded and the positioning of the 
load; these are described in sections 5.1.2.1 and 5.1.2.1, respectively.   
5.1.2.1 Number of Lanes Loaded   
To determine the appropriate number of lanes to be loaded for the system 
analysis, a review of the development of the current multiple presence factor criteria 
described in AASHTO LFRD BDS was performed [8].  Further, more recent data and 
research on multiple presence were also reviewed.  Based on the results of the SHRP 2 
Report [44], [45], work by Fu et al., (2013) [46], [47], as well as other references, the 
likelihood of two fully correlated trucks positioned side-by-side on a two-lane bridge is a 
relatively rare loading condition.  Further, the occurrence of two fully correlated trucks 
placed side-by-side on a bridge striped for a single lane is clearly exceptional.   
Thus, when considering bridges which are intended to carry more than one lane, 
the SHRP 2 Report suggested that a single lane of the HL-93 vehicle be used for the service 
limit state [44], [45].  However, the SHRP 2 Report was focused on serviceability limit 
states.  This was a reasonable recommendation for the service limit states since multiple 
trucks can occur many times with no measureable impact on serviceability.  However, for 
limit states which consider strength, it must also be recognized that it only takes one such 
scenario to compromise resistance.  As a result, it is proposed that more than one lane 
should be considered for the Redundancy I and II limit states on bridges which are 
intended to carry more than one lane.  In other words, when the bridge is striped for two 
or more striped lanes.   
Based on the SHRP 2 Report [44], [45], and the work by G. Fu et al. (2013) [46], 
[47], it is also clear that no more than two lanes should be considered.  The work by Fu et 
al. included weigh-in-motion data of about 68 million trucks gathered over a period of 
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436 months at 43 different sites.  The study demonstrated that the current multiple 
presence factors (MPFs) in the AASHTO LRFD are very conservative.  This study resulted 
in the following equations for calculation of the , as a function of span length, , 
average daily truck traffic, , and number of lanes,  [46]: 
 
 
For illustrative purposes, the MPF for strength was calculated based on the 
number of lanes and typical average daily truck traffic for a span of 100 ft.  Note that the 
ADTT increases with the number of loaded lanes (N) since the number of trucks crossing 
the span can also increase.  The total equivalent number of trucks distributed across the 
bridge is determined by the number of lanes multiplied by the MPF.  The results for 2, 3 
and 4 lanes loaded for the strength limit state are shown in Table 5-6.   
Table 5-6.  Strength multiple presence factor and equivalent number of trucks for 









2 100 5000 0.87 1.74 
3 100 6000 0.51 1.53 
4 100 7000 0.37 1.48 
 
From the calculated multiple presence factors presented in Table 5-6, it can be 
deduced that there is no reason to consider the effects of more than two side-by-side 
trucks. In fact, as can be seen, as the number of lanes increases, the actual demand 
decreases since the reduced number of total trucks is distributed among a greater 
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number of lanes.  Therefore, a maximum of two loaded lanes is proposed for the 
Redundancy I and II load combinations when the bridge is intended to carry two or more 
lanes.   
Since the objective of the Redundancy I and II load combinations is to ensure 
acceptable reliability for a damaged structure subjected to more “routine” loads, it is not 
recommended the use of the multiple presence factors (which are generally less than 
1,.0) for two lanes loaded as specified by Fu et al. [46].  This also ensures the approach is 
in harmony with the existing methodology for two lanes loaded as specified in the 
AASHTO LRFD BDS [8].  In cases where only a single lane is loaded, the 1.20 multiple 
presence factor applied to only one lane loaded should also not be applied.  Apparently 
the 1.2 factor was specifically developed to address issues due to the effects of heavy 
axles on decks adjacent to the curb line [Personal conversations with the late Prof. Dennis 
Mertz, Univ. of Delaware].   
It is also clear that bridges intended to carry a single lane, such as single-lane ramp 
structures, should not be evaluated for two fully loaded lanes in the faulted state.  Many 
of these bridges are curved fly-over type structures with a clear width between parapets 
often only around 20-28 feet wide.  While for the Strength I limit state full HL-93 loading 
in both lanes is appropriate in design, this is not deemed reasonable for the Redundancy 
I and Redundancy II load combinations.  First, as a practical matter, two fully correlated 
lanes of HL-93 can barely pass each other, let alone be present at the same time a highway 
speeds on significantly curved structure.  This will be discussed further in the sections 
below related to transverse position of live load.   
5.1.2.2 Longitudinal and Transverse Position of Live Load   
To maximize the load effects on the remaining intact components in the faulted 
state, the centroid of the HS-20 component of the HL-93 needs to be positioned 
longitudinally coincident with the location of the faulted member.  This is consistent with 
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current approaches to positioning live load longitudinally.  A fixed axle spacing of 14 feet 
is conservatively proposed.  The transverse position of the live loads are discussed next 
for the Redundancy I and Redundancy II load combinations in sections 5.1.2.2.1 and 
5.1.2.2.2., respectively.   
5.1.2.2.1 Transverse Position of Live Load for Redundancy I Load 
Combination   
While vehicles may occasionally be positioned outside of the normal travel lanes, 
it was deemed to be unrealistic to position vehicles outside of the striped lane for the 
Redundancy I load case, regardless of the number of normal travel lanes carried by the 
bridge.  Again, the Redundancy I load combination is only intended to apply for the brief 
instant in time during which the failure occurs and includes the effect of .  This is 
consistent with the approach that the failure of the tension member, whether it is due to 
fracture or some other mode, is only partially correlated with live load.  The number of 
lanes to be used should correspond to the number of striped lanes, but be no greater 
than two for the reasons cited in section 5.1.2.1.  If only one lane is shown on the design 
plans, only one lane should be used regardless of the width of the lane.  Since this load 
combination is intended to be representative of the mean maximum live load, it would 
only be reasonable to use a single lane of HL-93 for Redundancy I.  The live load should 
be positioned in the center of the striped lane(s).   
5.1.2.2.2 Transverse Position of Live Load for Redundancy II Load 
Combination   
The Redundancy II load case is intended to consider the interval of time between 
when a component fails and when the failure is discovered.  As stated above, in the 
development of the load factors, this interval is unspecified, but is between 5 and 50 
years.  While no data could be found in the literature that relates to the probability of 
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multiple vehicles being positioned outside of the striped lanes on a bridge that is also in 
a faulted condition, it was nevertheless deemed to be a plausible scenario during the 
interval.  Thus, for the Redundancy II load combination, it is proposed that the HL-93 
load(s) be positioned transversely such that the load effects are maximized in the faulted 
state.  This may mean the HL-93 is placed in the shoulder in some cases.   
However, the Redundancy II load combination must also represent an event that 
could reasonably occur during the interval between when the fault occurs and the time it 
is discovered.  While it may be possible to fit two full lanes of HL-93 on a one lane bridge, 
this hardly seems reasonable.  The most plausible case would be when a truck breaks 
down in a shoulder (left or right) and traffic must slowly pass this obstacle.  One lane of 
HL-93 coupled with a single HS-20 in a shoulder would represent this case.  One may 
question the likelihood of this loading scenario in a bridge striped for a single lane.  
However, one simply has to recognize that the event which produces such loading occurs 
during every inspection in which an 80 kip under bridge inspection vehicle is located in 
the right shoulder while normal traffic is shifted to the left.  Hence, this is what is 
recommended for Redundancy II on a bridge intended to carry a single lane.  The dynamic 
allowance 15% should only be applied to the HS-20 load placed with the distributed lane 
load.  If there is an isolated HS-20 load, as in the case of a bridge striped for one lane, the 
15% dynamic allowance should not be applied to that HS-20 load.  As stated, if the bridge 
is intended (striped) to carry two or more lanes, two lanes of HL-93 should be applied 
with the 15% dynamic allowance applied to both HS-20 loads.   
5.2 Minimum Performance Criteria in the Faulted State   
Once a FEA of a model constructed in accordance with CHAPTER 3 and subjected 
to the loads described in section 5.1 has been completed, it is necessary to establish 
whether the structure has adequate capacity after the sudden failure of a given tension 
member.  Thus, minimum strength and serviceability performance requirements have 
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been developed as described below.  The requirements are to be checked against the 
results from analysis using the Redundancy I and/or Redundancy II loading combinations, 
depending on the specific criterion under study.   
As stated in section 2.2, if it can be demonstrated that the bridge has sufficient 
capacity in the faulted state, there is no basis to support that the failure of the steel 
tension member would result in collapse or loss of serviceability.  Hence, such member is 
not a FCM.  If the structure fails to meet these performance requirements in the faulted 
state, the failed steel tension member should be considered a FCM.  On the other hand, 
if the strength and serviceability requirements are met, the member should be classified 
as a SRM because it is a member that could be traditionally be classified as a FCM but it’s 
redundancy is demonstrated by refined analysis [13].  The minimum strength 
requirements are described in section 5.2.1, while section 5.2.2 describes the minimum 
serviceability requirements.   
5.2.1 Minimum Strength Requirements   
The primary objective of these criteria is to determine if the bridge is able to 
reliably demonstrate sufficient strength in the faulted state.  The focus is on primary steel 
members, the concrete slab, and the substructure/bearings. In general, the system 
demonstrates that it has sufficient strength after the failure of a tension member if it is 
able to carry the loads in both the Redundancy I and Redundancy II load combinations.  In 
other words, the bridge does have adequate strength in the faulted state. 
The results from 3D non-linear FEA include nodal displacements, and element 
stresses and strains, including the von Mises stress to establish yielding, and post-yielding 
plastic strains (if they occur).  These results from FEA cannot be linked directly to nominal 
member capacities calculated using AASHTO specifications.  This of course presents a 
challenge when developing acceptance criteria based on FEA results.  This is also true 
regardless of whether or not the bridge is in the faulted state.  For example, consider a 
115 
two-girder composite simple span bridge.  In the undamaged state, a typical line-girder 
analysis results in moments and shear demands calculated at various locations along the 
girder.  These force effects are then compared to nominal moment or shear capacities 
calculated using code provisions.  For the composite girder, both the demand and capacity 
calculations include simplifications regarding effective slab width, stiffness, and strain 
distribution through the girder, among other aspects.  In contrast, when using 3D non-
linear FEA to analyze the same bridge, the approach focuses on solid mechanics and the 
output is in terms of nodal displacements and element stresses and strains, not member 
level moment or shear demands.   
Since there are no assumptions that are made regarding effective slab width, 
stiffness, etc. in the FEA, it is not possible to make direct comparisons with the nominal 
member capacities calculated using code provisions.  In order to obtain some form of an 
equivalent moment carried by each girder, one would need to integrate the stresses over 
some equivalent cross section.  Of course, in the case of inelastic behavior or when 
damage occurs, such as shear stud pull-out or loss of bond in non-composite sections, this 
becomes even more complicated and in many cases, meaningless.  It is also noted that 
the FEA will always predict a greater system strength since the behavior, mechanics, and 
force redistribution are directly incorporated into the model.  In short, direct comparison 
to code-based nominal member capacities using estimated force effects from non-linear 
FEA is inappropriate to assess the state of the structure.   
For consistency, it would be more appropriate to compare the results from the analysis 
to stress and strain based failure criteria and evaluate the overall strength of the system.  
As a result, the limits proposed next are based on stress or strain that are reached at the 
limit states typically considered in bridge design.  Therefore, the acceptance criteria for 
strength presented below were developed with this in mind while relying on established 
limits currently contained in AASHTO where feasible.  Such strength requirements are 
described hereafter, regarding strength of structural steel members, in section 5.2.1.1, 
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strength of reinforced concrete members, in section 5.2.1.1, strength of substructure, in 
section 5.2.1.3, and stability of the superstructure , in section 5.2.1.4.   
5.2.1.1 Structural Steel   
It is possible that, once the analysis is completed, the nominal yield stress, 
ultimate stress, or the failure strain is reached at some location(s) in the structural steel.  
This is deemed acceptable if the regions where this has taken place are in secondary 
components while primary members perform adequately.  Analysis and in-service 
performance have shown that failure of secondary members does not necessarily 
compromise the overall ability of the bridge to carry vertical loads.  Secondary members 
such as stringers or floor beams carry a small portion of the load that is easily 
redistributable among other components.  Other secondary elements, for example, 
braces are not designed for the direct transfer of vertical loads and failure of a particular 
component is not likely to result in any perceivable reduction of strength.  This is not to 
say the analytical procedures do not need to accurately predict the capacity and failure 
of these members.  It is simply saying that failure of such secondary members is not 
reason to conclude the strength of the bridge is compromised.  In fact, following the 
proposed procedures ensures failure of these members is predicted by the FEA.  It is also 
noted that if the failure of the brace results in overall structural instability, this will be 
revealed in the analysis, presuming it is performed in accordance with the methodology 
proposed herein.   
On the other hand, for primary members, specific criteria have been developed to 
ensure sufficient system performance in the faulted stated.  The following are considered 
to be primary steel members as discussed herein:   
 Webs and flanges in plate girders and tub girder systems. 
 Chords, diagonals, and verticals in truss systems. 
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 Cross girders or bents supporting girders or trusses. 
 Arch ribs, truss arches, and tie girders. 
 Members deemed as such by the engineer/owner 
Four basic strength criteria for primary steel components must be met when the 
bridge is subjected to the Redundancy I and II load combinations.  These criteria are as 
follows:   
 The average strain across a component of a cross section (e.g., a flange) must be 
below 5 times the yield strain, or 1% strain, whichever is smaller.  For example, 
the average strain in a tension flange must remain below 5εy, or 1% strain.  The 
limit is meant to represent yield related limit states.   
 The maximum strain anywhere in a primary component shall not exceed ultimate 
strain, which is conservatively limited to 5% strain.  The effects of strain 
concentrations, such as at reentrant corners or terminations of details need not 
be considered for this limit.  The limit is meant to represent fracture related limit 
states.   
 The compression stress must remain below the critical buckling stress of 
the component in cases where the finite element model does not account for the 
buckling mode. While a finite element model constructed with Abaqus per the 
procedures described in CHAPTER 3 capture these buckling modes it might be 
necessary to check the membrane and bending stress at a compression member 




5.2.1.2 Reinforced Concrete   
The nominal compressive strength of concrete may be exceeded in the analysis as 
well.  This is acceptable if the regions where this has taken place are in the barriers or 
haunches and the system is able to sustain the factored loads.  Concrete crushing in the 
aforementioned regions is not expected to result in appreciable reduction of strength 
based on the results of the analysis and in-situ performance of bridges where tension 
members have failed.  However, if concrete crushing takes place in a significant portion 
of the slab, the structure should not be considered as redundant as passage of traffic and 
environmental conditions will rapidly deteriorate the slab to a point where capacity may 
further be reduced.  In other words, if the portion of the slab where a compressive strain 
of 0.003 (based on ACI 318-14 analysis procedures for flexural members) has been 
exceeded is large enough to compromise the overall system load carrying capacity or if 
significant hinging occurs, the structure should not be considered as sufficiently 
redundant.  In such cases, slope of the load-deflection curve would be flat or negative.  In 
general, this will be captured by the analysis if the guidance on modeling developed 
during this research is followed.   
5.2.1.3 Substructure   
In addition to checking the strength of the superstructure, the substructure must 
also be analyzed. Although the substructure many not be explicitly included in the finite 
element model, the displacements and reaction forces at support locations are calculated 
in the analysis.  These should be taken as the factored demands that the substructure 
must be able to safely sustain.  Given the existing variety of support systems, it is not 
possible to specify any universal criteria; for instance, the same force demand may result 
in stability issues for one pier but not affect the performance of an abutment.   
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5.2.1.4 Superstructure Stability   
While the finite element model constructed for the evaluation of redundancy after 
the failure of a primary steel tension member are very detail and consider material non-
linearity and large deformation theory, real structures contain imperfections, residual 
stresses, and other features that are not explicitly implemented in the constructed finite 
element models. Although these are not explicitly considered in design, and the 
calculated load factors account for material and fabrication variability; member 
imperfections and residual stresses might compromise the stability of a structure, 
particularly when a primary member has failed.  In general, as the analysis procedures 
consider large deformation theory, any issues regarding stability will be captured, but it 
is desired for the bridge to be in ascending branch of the load-displacement relationship.  
Hence, the bridge must demonstrate a reserve margin of at least 15% of the applied live 
load in the Redundancy I and II load combinations as determined by the owner.  
Effectively, this requirement ensures the slope of the load-displacement curve for the 
system structure remains positive.   
5.2.2 Minimum Serviceability Requirements   
Several criteria have been identified which relate to the serviceability of the bridge 
in the faulted state.  As previously explained, for a structure to be considered redundant, 
it should not only have adequate strength in the faulted condition, but also be able to 
maintain a minimum serviceability.  Such serviceability requirements are described 
hereafter, regarding: 
• Vertical deflections of the superstructure, in section 5.2.2.1.   
• Changes in the cross-slope of the slab, in section 5.2.2.2.   
• Uplift at supports beneath a joint in the deck, in section 5.2.2.3.   
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• Horizontal translation at supports, in section 5.2.2.4.   
• Remaining fatigue life in the faulted state, in section 5.2.2.5.   
It is noted that some bridges may meet the strength requirements while not 
meeting the serviceability requirements.  In those cases, the structure should not be 
considered redundant and the member in question remain classified as a FCM.  However, 
it is possible that owners would only consider the minimum strength requirements, and 
use the minimum serviceability requirements to modify the inspection interval.  Further 
discussion regarding the implementation of the FEA methodology for the prescription of 
minimum inspection interval is discussed in CHAPTER 6.   
Additionally, it should be noted that if the results of the analysis comply with the 
serviceability requirements described below, it is very unlikely that the structure will have 
any overall stability issues, although a check for the stability of the superstructure is 
described in section 5.2.1.4 as a minimum strength requirement.  The reason being, that 
deflections necessary to compromise the stability of the structure are typically larger than 
the deflection serviceability limits proposed.   
5.2.2.1 Vertical Deflection of the Superstructure   
Current deflection limits in AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications do not 
contain any serviceability requirements for the case of member failure, as expected [8].  
Nevertheless, the AASHTO provisions were reviewed to ascertain if any existing criteria 
could be applicable or modified for the purpose of evaluating the acceptable deflection 
in the faulted state.  One requirement that appeared to possibly be applicable is the 
requirement related to deflections of cantilevers.  One can see that in the case of a girder 
bridge (I or tub), the fractured girder resembles a cantilever to some degree.  For a truss 
span, this is not as apparent, but is still believed to be a reasonable starting point.   
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At present, AASHTO LRFD BDS limits the deflection of a cantilever to the span 
length over 300 due to the application of vehicular load when consideration of pedestrian 
comfort is not required [8]. However, the objective of the AASHTO LRFD BDS deflection 
criteria were often based on and intended for controlling vibration under live load and 
not deflections, per se.  Rather than require an engineer to perform the dynamic analysis, 
the same objective was achieved by limiting static deflections, which were much easier 
to calculate.  In the faulted state, the deflection (i.e., vibrations) due to live load is not as 
important as the overall deflection of the bridge due to dead load only in the faulted state.  
Thus, it was concluded that the existing criteria are not applicable.   
Alternatively, existing bridges where fractures or pier settlements have resulted 
in significant dead load deflection were also examined.  Specifically, four cases where 
deflections were visually apparent but traffic was known to continue crossing the bridge 
prior to closure by the authorities.  It is noted that all three bridges examined also carry 
interstate traffic.  The first bridge is the Hoan Bridge, a three-girder structure that 
underwent multiple girder fracture and resulted in a post-fracture deflection of 
approximately 3.5 ft [32], [33].  Figure 5-1 shows the post-failure condition of the 
structure.  The second bridge carried I-65 over the Wildcat Creek and experience a 
deflection of approximately 0.75 ft as shown in Figure 5-2 after pier settlement occurred 
[Personal conversations with INDOT engineers].  The third structure is the Leo Frigo Bridge 
carrying I-43, which pier settlement resulted in an additional deflection of approximately 
2 ft, sagging of the slab is shown in Figure 5-3 [48].  Lastly, the bridge carrying I-495 over 
the Christina River experience pier settlement which imposed an additional deflection of 
1.57 ft approximately, as show in Figure 5-4.   
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Figure 5-1.  Deflection after multiple girder fractures in the Hoan Bridge.   
 
Figure 5-2.  Deflection after pier settlement in the bridge carrying I-65 over the 
Wildcat Creek.   
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Figure 5-3.  Deflection after pier settlement in the Leo Frigo Bridge.   
 
Figure 5-4.  Deflection after pier settlement in the bridge carrying I-495 over the 
Christina River.   
These deflections are summarized in Table 5-7, which provides the bridge name, 
cause of the observed deflection, amount of the deflection, and corresponding ‘L-over’ 
value.  The span length (L) is taken as the actual span length or in the case of pier 
settlement, the summation of the length of each span on either side of the pier.  In each 
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case, traffic had safely crossed the bridge with the roadway in this severely distorted 
condition. Based on the cases observed, it appears that substantial vertical deflections 
can be tolerated by motorists without impact to the traveling public’s safety, at least in 
the short term.   
Table 5-7.  Faulted bridges where vertical deflections were easily detected by the 











3.5 ft 217 ft L/62 




0.75 ft 170 ft L/227 
Leo Frigo Bridge 
Pier 
settlement 
2.0 ft 400 ft L/200 




1.57 ft 436 ft L/277 
 
As can be seen, the L-over values range from about L/60 to L/277.  It is noted that 
two of the three girders completely fractured in the Hoan Bridge resulting in the large 
deflection of L/62.  However, even in this condition, interstate traffic continued to cross 
the bridge prior to closure by the police and there were no issues, such as vehicular 
accidents, due to the sag.  Therefore, a deflection limit based on the average of all four 
bridges of about L/190 would seem reasonable.   
However, in each case, only dead loads are considered.  Further, the dead load on 
these bridges is assumed to be equivalent to nominal dead load in the real bridge, without 
any load factors applied.  Since only the static dead load deflection is desired, it is 
proposed to use the Redundancy II load case, but without live load.  Since a dead load 
factor of 1.35 is applied to DC for the Redundancy II load case (the load factor on DW is 
conservatively assumed to be the same), the deflection limit should be increased to 
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correct for the fact that the dead load is factored in this load combination.  Applying this 
correction would result in a limit of L/141.  Based on the above experiences, it is proposed 
to round this deflection limit to L/150 for the vertical deflection limit in the faulted state.  
The Redundancy II load case can then be used directly without including the effects of live 
load.  It is noted that NCHRP Report 406 suggested a similar limit of L/100, though it was 
to include live load [16].  There was no rational given in NCHRP Report 406 to justify this 
recommendation, other than the authors suggested it seemed reasonable.   
A major advantage of ignoring live load ensures designers will not attempt to 
strengthen the bridge to meet a deflection limit in the faulted state.  Doing so would have 
the unintended consequence of reducing the deflection due to dead load only, thereby 
potentially making it more difficult to detect the faulted condition.  Further, the 
deflections due to dead load only would already have been calculated since the fault must 
be present prior to the application of the live load in the Redundancy II load combination.  
Thus, the data would be readily available in the analysis.   
Lastly, it must be recognized that the Redundancy II load case corresponds to a 
loading event with a return period between 5 and 50 years and includes up to two lanes 
of HL-93 located in the most critical position.  While this load case is appropriate to check 
the strength of the bridge in the faulted state, it may actually never occur.  Hence, 
including live load would result in overly conservative limits on deflections that result in 
strengthening of a given structure to meet deflection limits and again, the unintended 
consequence of making it more difficult to detect the faulted condition.  The proposed 
limit meets the objective of maximizing the likelihood the deflection will be sufficiently 
large to alert the authorities or the motoring public.   
5.2.2.2 Changes in the Cross-Slope of the Slab   
In addition to an overall check of vertical deflection, the effect of the failure on 
the cross slope of the slab should be taken into account, particularly on curved bridges.  
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A significant change in cross-slope will negatively affect vehicle control, requiring the 
driver to make adjustments to correct the trajectory of the car and/or limit the likelihood 
of overturning.  Discussions with experts in highway design indicate that in order to 
properly define a limit on the change of cross-slope, several factors must be considered, 
such as the design speed of the bridge, radius of the curve, lane width, ADTT, road 
superelevation, etc. [49].   
Since no experimental data or analytical studies exist on this topic, as related to 
member failures, a unique rational approach would need to be developed, which 
incorporates all of these factors.  Developing a procedure that takes into account all of 
these factors is out of the scope of the current study. However, for illustrative and 
comparative purposes, a maximum change of 5% in cross-slope after the failure of a 
tension member has been considered in the current study.  For example, a bridge that 
initially has a 8% cross-slope shall not be considered redundant if the cross-slope after 
the failure of a tension member is less than 3% or larger than 13%.  For this load case, 
only factored dead loads in the Redundancy II load combination should be considered.   
5.2.2.3 Uplift at Supports beneath a Joint in the Deck   
Uplift at a bearing may occur in the faulted state.  If this were excessive and were 
to occur at a location of a deck joint, it would negatively impact driving.  While there is 
also no published literature on this topic, it is assumed that the maximum uplift that 
should be permitted is 2.5 inches at any deck joint.  As discussed above, using the factored 
dead loads in Redundancy II load combination requires this limit to be increased to adjust 
for the fact that nominal dead loads are desired.  Hence, the deflection limit is increased 
by 35%, resulting in an adjusted limit of 3.375 inches.  For simplicity, and considering the 
lack of any data on this topic, it proposed to use an uplift limit of 3.5 inches using only 
factored dead loads in the Redundancy II load combination.   
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5.2.2.4 Horizontal Translation at Supports   
Transverse and longitudinal displacements at support locations should be 
considered as a member may lose support, particularly at supports that allow for 
expansion.  Hence, it should be verified that these horizontal displacements can be 
accommodated by the support.  The criteria simply require that the structure does not 
fall off of a support, whether that be a bearing tipping over or a girder coming completely 
off of a pier or abutment.   
5.2.2.5 Fatigue Evaluation in the Faulted State   
It is anticipated that the serviceability criteria described above will ensure 
excessive deflections and movements which could result in danger to vehicular traffic 
following failure of a tension member are avoided.  The vertical deflection limit in 
particular, if approached, will likely be of significant magnitude to ensure prompt 
detection.  However, there are many documented cases where a complete girder has 
fractured and there was little, if any, perceptible deflection.  Although this suggests there 
is considerable reserve strength, this not ideal as the failed component may go 
undetected for a considerable period.  In such a condition, the bridge is damaged yet must 
still carry traffic, possibly until the failure is detected through inspection.   
While the Redundancy II load combination will ensure the bridge has sufficient 
reserve strength in the faulted condition, it presumes no other damage occurs during the 
interval between failure and detection.  Realistically, fatigue damage will be accelerated 
in the faulted state due to routine traffic.  In cases where there is little perceptible visual 
evidence, such as obvious sagging, this could be of concern depending on the interval 
between failure and the inspection/detection of the damage.  In contrast, if the visual 
evidence is clearly noticeable, such as on the structures described in Table 5-7, traffic will 
be detoured immediately and there would be no concern regarding fatigue.  In light of 
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this, it is proposed that the fatigue be checked in the faulted state when the maximum 
deflections are below some threshold. 
The Diefenbaker Bridge (Canada) [30], Neville Island Bridge (PA) [31], Dan Ryan 
Transit Elevated Structure (IL) [27], US 422 over the Schuylkill River (PA) [29], Lafayette 
Street Bridge (MN) [26], and Milton Madison Bridge (IN) [22], [50] are structures where 
deflections following complete member failure were imperceptible.  Based on available 
data of the bridges previously cited, deflections limits were in the range of L/850 to 
approaching L/5000.  In these cases, the public continued to cross the bridge with no 
visual perception of the damaged condition of the bridge.   
No reliable data on what level of deflection is necessary for the motoring public 
to perceive the bridge is in the faulted condition was identified in the literature review, 
but traditionally a limit of L/100 has been considered as a level of deflection that is 
noticeable to bridge users [16].  Hence a limit between L/100 and L/850 (the highest limit 
for which data are available in which the public did not perceive the deflection) would 
seems reasonable.  Taking the average between L/100 and L/850 (from the bridge in 
which deflection due to the sagging was not detected) results in a limit of L/475.  Since 
this obviously is not extremely precise and taking into account that the loads applied in 
the analysis are factored, a limit of L/400 is proposed.  When the deflections are less than 
this, a fatigue evaluation should be considered.   
The fatigue evaluation would be performed using the Fatigue II load combination 
(finite life check) and the remaining life estimated.  The calculation must include the effect 
of any fatigue damage that may have occurred prior to the failure.  Procedures provided 
in NCHRP Report 721 can be used to examine various levels of reliability associated with 
the remaining life calculation [47].  Once the level of fatigue reliability is determined, the 
remaining life following the failure may be calculated, which will be used in the calculation 
of an appropriate inspection interval as exemplified in section 6.4.  It must be noted that 
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the fatigue evaluation shall only be performed for live load stresses due to the Fatigue II 
load combination for the primary load carrying steel members.  
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CHAPTER 6 APPLICATION OF FINITE ELEMENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY  
In the current chapter the FEA methodology is applied to the Neville Island Bridge 
and the Hoan Bridge.  The application of the FEA methodology is composed of three steps.  
The first step is a screening conducted to warrantee the applicability of the FEA 
methodology, as described in section 6.1.  The second step is the redundancy evaluation 
of the finite element models constructed per the analysis procedures, techniques and 
inputs described in CHAPTER 3, and analyzed for the loads and performance criteria 
described in CHAPTER 5.  As the finite element models of both bridges had been 
previously described in CHAPTER 4, section 6.2 and section 6.3 are focused on the 
discussion of the obtained results for the Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge, 
respectively.  The third step is the recommendation of an inspection interval based on the 
conducted redundancy evaluations and the methodology developed by Parr et al. (2010) 
[1], as shown in section 6.4 for the Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge.   
6.1 Applicability of the FEA Methodology and Screening Criteria   
Not all possible bridge attributes can be explicitly included in the FEA 
methodology.  Some attributes such as corrosion cannot be implemented because there 
are no verified models that relate inspection aspects, such as element level inspection 
categories, to mechanical behavior, such as tensile strength reduction.  Implementation 
of other attributes that are localized phenomena, like existing fatigue cracks, require FEA 
procedures and techniques that are complex, computationally expensive and cannot be 
reliably benchmarked in the context of finite element models of large multi-component 
assembly.  Additionally, certain outdated design or fabrication practices, such as pin and 
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hangers or discontinuous back up bar splices, that have historically resulted problematic 
should not exist in a bridge analyzed per the current FEA methodology.   
Hence, in the development of the FEA methodology, it was assumed that every 
bridge member is capable of reaching its nominal ultimate capacity.  This requires that 
the geometry and the material of each member are as described in the design drawings, 
in sufficiently good condition and lacking problematic details.  As described in the 
methodology developed by M. Parr et al. (2010), nine attributes that are considered 
problematic were identified [1].  Additionally, these attributes cannot be reliably 
implemented in the FEA methodology.  If a bridge has any of the following characteristics, 
the FEA methodology described in the current dissertation cannot be reliably used to 
assess its redundancy:   
 Presence of one or more new/recently retrofitted or rehabilitated FCMs whose 
condition or effectiveness has not been verified through a hands-on inspection.   
 Presence of pin and hangers.   
 Presence of non-redundant eyebars.   
 Presence of plug welds or discontinuous back up bar splices.   
 Presence of active fatigue cracks including out-of-plane distortion cracks or cracks 
that may be inactive but have not been mitigated through hole drilling or some 
other strategy.   
 Susceptibility to constraint induced fracture as described in Article 6.6.1.2.4 of the 
AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications.   
 Presence of existing maintenance problems/load posting.   
 Unreliable or unavailable field inspection data.   
132 
 Presence of element level bridge inspection condition state 3 or 4.   
It must be noted that the objective of the FEA methodology is to evaluate the 
redundancy of a steel structure that contains FCMs so that a rational inspection interval 
can be recommended; not to demonstrate that a bridge can operate while having 
maintenance or design problems.  If any of the nine aforementioned attributes exist in a 
steel bridge containing FCMs, its redundancy cannot be reliably evaluated and the 
maximum inspection interval is 24 months.  While, in those cases, the FEA methodology 
cannot be used to demonstrate redundancy, it would be prudent to develop a finite 
element model of the structure to gain insight into the expected response after the failure 
of a member.   
The Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge had at least one attribute from the 
screening criteria list and would have to be inspected every 24 months at the very least.  
Both had active fatigue cracks, in the case of the Neville Island Bridge these cracks 
emanated from defective electro slag welds, and in the case of the Hoan Bridge, the 
bracing to girder connection details resulted in constrain induced fatigue.  In the current 
dissertation and for illustrative purposes, it will be assumed that neither of the bridges 
possess any of the attributes, or that these were effectively retrofitted, so their inspection 
interval may be increased beyond 24 months.   
6.2 Redundancy Evaluation of the Neville Island Bridge   
The redundancy of the Neville Island Bridge, a continuous three span two-plate 
girder bridge, was analyzed by developing a finite element model in accordance with the 
FEA procedures, techniques and inputs described in CHAPTER 3 and subjecting it to the 
loads and performance criteria described in CHAPTER 5.  The westernmost girder, Girder 
G4, is assumed to be the failing member, for which two cases were analyzed.  The first 
case is failure in the middle of the center span and the second case failure in the middle 
of the north end span, as shown in Figure 6-1.  The failure locations chosen in this 
133 
evaluation were considered to be the most critical.  In the first case, failure was modeled 
in the middle of the center span because, under dead load only, the largest longitudinal 
stresses in a positive bending location take place at that location.  Although, in the end 
spans, the largest longitudinal stresses do not take place in the middle of the north span.  
Failure was modeled at that location because it resulted in the largest shift of load to the 
other girder.  In both failure scenarios the entire cross section of the girder is assumed to 
have failed.  The results of the redundancy evaluation of the Neville Island Bridge are 
discussed in section 6.2.1 for the failure of girder G4 in the middle span, and in section 
6.2.2 for the failure in the north end span.   
 
Figure 6-1.  Failure locations in the redundancy evaluation of the Neville Island Bridge.   
The analyses were performed in order to establish if the system performs 
adequately after the failure of a primary steel tension member.  To do so, the analysis 
procedures described in section 3.1, which require an initial implicit analysis and a final 
explicit dynamic analysis, were applied to the finite element model described in CHAPTER 
4.  For each of the failure scenarios, failure of girder G4 in the center span and in the north 
end span, the two redundancy load combinations were studied separately.  Table 6-1 
details the actions taken in each of the analysis steps carried out in the analysis procedure.   
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Table 6-1.  Description of steps in analysis procedure for the redundancy evaluation of 
the Neville Island Bridge.   
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The transverse positioning of the load is the same for all of the analysis conducted 
in the redundancy evaluation of the Neville Island Bridge; and it is depicted in Figure 6-2.  
Longitudinally, the middle axis of the truck portion (HS-20) of the HL-93 load model is 
aligned with the failure location and only the span in which the failure is modeled is 
subjected to distributed lane loads.  For the failure of girder G4 in the middle span, the 
vehicular live loads are positioned between pier 9 and pier 11, as shown in Figure 6-3.  For 
the failure of girder G4 in the north end span, the vehicular live loads are applied between 
pier 10 and pier 11, as shown in Figure 6-4.   
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Figure 6-2.  Transverse position of live load for the redundancy evaluation of the 
Neville Island Bridge after the failure of girder G4 in the center span and the north end 
span.   
 
Figure 6-3.  Longitudinal position of live load for the redundancy evaluation of the 
Neville Island Bridge after the failure of girder G4 in the center span.   
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Figure 6-4.  Longitudinal position of live load for the redundancy evaluation of the 
Neville Island Bridge after the failure of girder G4 in the center span.   
6.2.1 Results for the Failure of Girder G4 at the Center Span   
After completion of the finite element analyses of the failure of Girder G4 in the 
center span for the Redundancy I and Redundancy II load combinations, the obtained 
results were compared against the performance criteria described in section 5.2.  The first 
requirements are related to the strength of primary steel members, which are the girders.  
The requirements are that the plastic strain in the primary steel members must not be 
larger than 0.05 at any location, or larger than an average of 0.01 across a component of 
a cross section (section 5.2.1.1).  These requirements need to be checked for both load 
combinations at the end of the step 7A shown in Table 6-1.  At end of step 7A, the 
maximum equivalent plastic strain for the Redundancy I load combination was 0.00539, 
as shown in Figure 6-5, and 0.000543 for the Redundancy II load combination, as shown 
in Figure 6-6.  For both load combinations the maximum plastic strains were below 0.01, 
hence the minimum strength requirements for steel are satisfied.   
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Figure 6-5.  Equivalent plastic strain in primary steel members after the failure of 
girder G4 at the center span for the Redundancy I load combination.   
 
 
Figure 6-6.  Equivalent plastic strain in primary steel members after the failure of 
girder G4 at the center span for the Redundancy II load combination.   
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Another strength requirement is that the slab does not undergo a large amount 
of compressive cracking that may compromise the overall system load carrying capacity 
(section 5.2.1.2) at the end of step 7A in Table 6-1.  After the failure of girder G4, for the 
Redundancy I load combination, localized compression cracking takes place at the top of 
the barrier over the fracture location. This is characterized by longitudinal normal plastic 
strains exceeding 0.00189 in compression (equivalent to a total longitudinal normal strain 
of 0.003), as shown in Figure 6-7.  For the Redundancy II load combination, the maximum 
longitudinal normal plastic strain also exceeds 0.00189 in compression in a localized 
region atop of the barrier over the fracture location, as shown in Figure 6-8.  Since, under 
both load combinations, the failure of girder G4 does not result in widespread 
compression cracking in the slab and the bridge was able to carry an additional 15% of 
the factored live load, the superstructure successfully met the strength requirement 
regarding reinforced concrete strength and the requirement regarding stability of the 
superstructure (section 5.2.1.4).   
 
Figure 6-7.  Longitudinal normal plastic strain in the concrete elements of the slab 
after the failure of girder G4 at the center span for the Redundancy I load combination.   
139 
 
Figure 6-8.  Longitudinal normal plastic strain in the concrete elements of the slab 
after the failure of girder G4 at the center span for the Redundancy II load 
combination.   
It is required for the substructure to be able to safely resist the forces and 
displacements calculated at the support locations at the end of step 7A (see Table 6-1) 
for both loading combinations, in order to meet the strength requirement regarding 
strength of the substructure (section 5.2.1.3), and the serviceability requirement 
regarding horizontal translation at supports (section 5.2.2.4).  These reactions and 
displacements are summarized in Table 6-2 for the Redundancy I load combination and 
in Table 6-3 for the Redundancy II load combination.  Although, in the current 
dissertation, the strength of the piers is not explicitly calculated, it is assumed that the 





Table 6-2.  Reaction forces and displacements at supports after the failure of girder G4 
at the center span for the Redundancy I load combination.   
Pier Girder 
Reaction Forces Support Displacements 
Vertical Longitudinal Transverse Longitudinal Transverse 
(kip) (kip) (kip) (in) (in) 
8 
G3 295 0 -90.1 1.39 0.087 
G4 315 0 -35.0 1.51 0.183 
9 
G3 2548 122 204 -0.176 -0.102 
G4 2675 -122 -19.1 0.229 0.058 
10 
G3 2491 0 -23.5 2.05 0.008 
G4 2704 0 7.59 1.99 -0.011 
11 
G3 321 0 -37.0 0.718 0.106 
G4 289 0 -6.79 0.605 0.128 
Notes: 
 Positive vertical direction points upwards.   
 Positive longitudinal direction points northwards.   










Table 6-3.  Reaction forces and displacements at supports after the failure of girder G4 
at the center span for the Redundancy II load combination.   
Pier Girder 
Reaction Forces Support Displacements 
Vertical Longitudinal Transverse Longitudinal Transverse 
(kip) (kip) (kip) (in) (in) 
8 
G3 189 0 -81.7 1.03 0.079 
G4 149 0 -36.6 1.29 0.191 
9 
G3 1574 48.1 184 -0.100 -0.074 
G4 1987 -48.1 -11.3 0.091 0.028 
10 
G3 1515 0 -14.6 1.66 0.005 
G4 2023 0 -3.39 1.75 0.005 
11 
G3 227 0 -32.2 0.730 0.093 
G4 122 0 -4.25 0.532 0.080 
Notes: 
 Positive vertical direction points upwards.   
 Positive longitudinal direction points northwards.   
 Positive transverse direction points eastwards.   
 
The serviceability requirements regarding vertical deflections, change in cross-
slope, uplift at supports beneath deck joints and fatigue evaluation in the faulted state 
are checked at the end of step 6 (see Table 6-1), for the Redundancy II load combination 
only.  The failure of girder G4 resulted in an additional deflection of 18.8 inches, which is 
less than 28 inches, satisfying the upper serviceability limit of L/150 (section 5.2.2.1).  The 
change in cross-slope was 3.84% which is less than the 5% limit utilized in this dissertation 
for comparative purposes (section 5.2.2.2).  Additionally, no uplift was calculated at any 
support during the analysis (section 5.2.2.3).  Given that the maximum vertical deflection 
is 18.8 inches, a fatigue evaluation in the faulted stated does not need to be carried out 
because the deflection is larger than 10.5 inches, satisfying the lower serviceability limit 
of L/400 (section 4.2.2.5).  All of the strength and serviceability requirements of the 
minimum performance criteria are satisfied for the failure of Girder G4 in the center span.   
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6.2.2 Results for the Failure of Girder G4 at the North End Span   
As previously done for the failure of Girder G4 in the center span, the results 
obtained for the analyses of the failure of Girder G4 in the north end span, for the 
Redundancy I and Redundancy II load combinations, were subjected to the performance 
criteria described in section 4.2.  Firstly, the requirements regarding strength of primary 
members were checked for both load combinations at the end of the step 7A shown in 
Table 6-1.  At the girders it is checked that the plastic strain in the primary steel members 
must not be larger than 0.05 at any location, or larger than an average of 0.01 across a 
component of a cross section (section 4.2.1.1).  At end of step 7A, the maximum 
equivalent plastic strain for the Redundancy I load combination was 0.0117, as shown in 
Figure 6-9, and 0.00141 for the Redundancy II load combination, as shown in Figure 6-10.  
Although the plastic strain for the Redundancy I load combination is larger than 0.01, it is 
localized to a point.  In the Redundancy II load combination the maximum plastic strains 
is below 0.01. Therefore, the minimum strength requirements for steel are satisfied.   
 
Figure 6-9.  Equivalent plastic strain in primary steel members after the failure of 
girder G4 at the north end span for the Redundancy I load combination.   
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Figure 6-10.  Equivalent plastic strain in primary steel members after the failure of 
girder G4 at the north end span for the Redundancy II load combination.   
Secondly, the strength requirements regarding reinforced concrete were checked.  
For both load combinations at the end of step 7A in Table 6-1, it must be checked that the 
slab does not undergo a large amount of compressive cracking that may compromise then 
overall system load carrying capacity (section 4.2.1.2).  Figure 6-11 shows that after the 
failure of girder G4 in the end span, for the Redundancy I load combination, longitudinal 
normal plastic strains exceeding 0.00189 in compression (equivalent to a total 
longitudinal normal strain of 0.003) are calculated in a region atop the concrete barrier 
over the fracture location, indicating localized compression cracking.  On the other hand, 
for the Redundancy II load combination, the maximum longitudinal normal plastic does 
not exceed 0.00189 in compression (equivalent to a total longitudinal normal strain of 
0.003), as shown in Figure 5 12.  Given that compression cracking at a localized region was 
calculated for the Redundancy I load combination and no compression cracking occurs 
for the Redundancy II load combination, the requirement regarding strength of reinforced 
concrete is fulfilled.  The strength requirement regarding superstructure stability (section 
4.2.1.4) was also met as the bridge was able to carry an additional 15% of the factored 
live load under both load combinations.   
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Figure 6-11.  Longitudinal normal plastic strain in the concrete elements of the slab 
after the failure of girder G4 at the north end span for the Redundancy I load 
combination.   
 
Figure 6-12.  Longitudinal normal plastic strain in the concrete elements of the slab 
after the failure of girder G4 at the north end span for the Redundancy II load 
combination.   
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To meet the strength requirement regarding strength of the substructure, (section 
5.2.1.3), and the serviceability requirement regarding horizontal translation at supports, 
(section 5.2.2.4), the substructure must have sufficient capacity to withstand the reaction 
forces and displacements at support locations calculated at the end of step 7A (see Table 
6-1).  In the current dissertation, the strength of the piers is not explicitly calculated, and 
it is assumed that the substructure can withstand such forces and displacements.  These 
reactions and displacements are summarized in Table 6-4 for the Redundancy I load 
combination and in Table 6-5 for the Redundancy II load combination.   
Table 6-4.  Reaction forces and displacements at supports after the failure of girder G4 
at the north end span for the Redundancy I load combination.   
Pier Girder 
Reaction Forces Support Displacements 
Vertical Longitudinal Transverse Longitudinal Transverse 
(kip) (kip) (kip) (in) (in) 
8 
G3 459 0 24.0 0.016 -0.023 
G4 469 0 -0.251 -0.049 0.001 
9 
G3 2095 -7.14 -14.3 0.011 0.007 
G4 2332 7.14 -18.3 -0.008 0.024 
10 
G3 2559 0 19.1 0.131 -0.006 
G4 2681 0 -24.3 0.292 0.034 
11 
G3 535 0 -39.6 0.738 0.114 
G4 567 0 53.7 -1.21 -1.01 
Notes: 
 Positive vertical direction points upwards.   
 Positive longitudinal direction points northwards.   





Table 6-5.  Reaction forces and displacements at supports after the failure of girder G4 
at the north end span for the Redundancy I load combination.   
Pier Girder 
Reaction Forces Support Displacements 
Vertical Longitudinal Transverse Longitudinal Transverse 
(kip) (kip) (kip) (in) (in) 
8 
G3 311 0 37.6 -0.210 -0.036 
G4 315 0 1.57 -0.263 -0.008 
9 
G3 1365 0.000 -2.57 0.001 0.001 
G4 1457 0.000 -7.63 0.002 0.011 
10 
G3 1546 0 -34.6 -0.011 0.011 
G4 2065 0 6.82 -0.425 -0.010 
11 
G3 328 0 -17.6 -0.051 0.051 
G4 446 0 16.4 0.270 -0.308 
Notes: 
 Positive vertical direction points upwards.   
 Positive longitudinal direction points northwards.   
 Positive transverse direction points eastwards.   
 
The serviceability requirements regarding vertical deflections, change in cross-
slope, uplift at supports beneath deck joints and fatigue evaluation in the faulted state 
are checked at the end of step 6 (see Table 6-1), for the Redundancy II load combination 
only.  The failure of girder G4 in the end span resulted in a calculated additional deflection 
of 6.10 inches, which is less than 18 inches, satisfying the upper serviceability limit of 
L/150 (section 5.2.2.1).  The change in cross-slope was 1.59% which is less than the 5% 
limit utilized in this dissertation for comparative purposes (section 5.2.2.2).  Additionally, 
no uplift was calculated at any support during the analysis (section 5.2.2.3).  Given that 
the maximum vertical deflection is 6.10 inches, a fatigue evaluation in the faulted stated 
needs to be carried out because the deflection is smaller than 6.75 inches, which does 
not satisfy the lower serviceability limit of L/400 (section 5.2.2.5).   
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The largest stress amplitude calculated in a fatigue evaluation after the failure of 
Girder E is 6.78 ksi.  The worst detail in the structure is a welded gusset plate on the web 
very close to the bottom flange which has been identified as a Category E detail, for which 
the constant-amplitude fatigue threshold is 4.5 ksi.  Since the constant amplitude fatigue 
threshold is smaller than the largest stress amplitude, the number of cycles before fatigue 
damage appears, , needs to be calculated using the constant for Category E fatigue 
details, , and the factored force effect, , as follows: 
 
 
Given that the single average daily truck traffic, , is 4,250 trucks (based 
on a total average daily truck traffic of 5,000 trucks), and that the number of stress range 
cycles per truck passage, , is 1.0, the number of year until appearance of fatigue damage 
can be calculated as follows: 
 
 
These 5.39 years are approximately 64 months, which is the maximum period that can be 
allowed between hands-on inspections.  Since all of the strength and serviceability 
requirements of the minimum performance criteria are satisfied if the inspection period 
is kept below 64 months, Girder G4 which initially was designated as a FCM, now can be 
designated as SRM because its redundancy was demonstrated through detailed analysis 
procedures.   
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6.2.3 Summary of Redundancy Evaluation of the Neville Island Bridge   
To establish whether the Neville Island Bridge has adequate redundancy, failures 
of primary steel tension members were evaluated in accordance with the FEA 
methodology described in CHAPTER 3 and CHAPTER 5.  The structure is a continuous 
three-span two-plate girder bridge, hence one of the girders (Girder G4) was analyzed at 
two failure locations, one in the center span and one in the north end span.  In the center 
span, the location with the largest longitudinal normal stresses, under dead load only and 
within a positive moment region, was chosen as the most critical.  In the north span the 
location that produced the largest shift of load to the other girder was chosen as the most 
critical.  The most critical results of the analyses are summarized in Table 6-6.  Given that 
all of the strength and serviceability requirements of section 4.2 were met as long as a 
hands-on inspection is performed every 64 months or less, the structure can be 
considered to be redundant and any tension member previously designated as FCM can 










Table 6-6.  Summary of the redundancy evaluation of the Neville Island Bridge.   
Performance 
Requirement 
Most Critical Case 
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6.10 in max. vertical 
deflection 
6.78 ksi max. long. 
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Since the Neville Island Bridge is a two-plate girder structure, it is typically 
considered as non-redundant with both girders being considered as FCMs, and would 
have been subjected to hands-on inspections every 24 months.  Now, after the 
redundancy evaluation was completed, it has been shown that the structure is redundant 
and that any member previously considered as FCM can be now designated as SRM, and 
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that fatigue damage would not appear before 64 months after the hypothetical failure of 
a primary steel tension member.  It should be noted that it was assumed that the 
structure would have passed the initial screening in section 6.1 (the Neville Island Bridge 
had active cracks emanating from defective electro slag welds and would not have passed 
the initial screening), that the current redundancy evaluation of the Neville Island Bridge 
was done for illustrative purposes, and that, ideally, it is recommended to consider 
additional failure scenarios.   
6.3 Redundancy Evaluation of the Hoan Bridge   
The redundancy of the Hoan Bridge, a continuous three span three-plate girder 
bridge, was analyzed by developing a finite element model in accordance with the FEA 
procedures, techniques and inputs described in CHAPTER 3 and subjecting it to the loads 
and performance criteria described in CHAPTER 5.  In this case, two failure scenarios were 
analyzed; firstly the failing tension member is assumed to be the exterior westernmost 
girder, girder D, and secondly, the failing tension member is assumed to be the interior 
girder, girder E.  In both instances, the entire cross section of the girder is assumed to 
have failed south of the northernmost pier (Pier 2S) as shown in Figure 6-13.  The failure 
locations chosen in this evaluation were considered the most critical, and, under dead 
load only, they were the ones with largest longitudinal stresses in a positive bending 
location.  The results of the redundancy evaluation of the Hoan Bridge are discussed in 
section 6.3.1 for the failure of girder D, and in section 6.3.2 for the failure of girder E.   
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Figure 6-13.  Failure locations in the redundancy evaluation of the Hoan Bridge.   
The analyses were performed in order to establish if the system performs 
adequately after the failure of a primary steel tension member.  To do so, the analysis 
procedures described in section 3.1, which require an initial implicit analysis and a final 
explicit dynamic analysis, were applied to the finite element model described in CHAPTER 
4.  For each of the failure scenarios, failure of girder D and failure of girder E, the two 
redundancy load combinations were studied separately.  Table 6-7 details the actions 










Table 6-7.  Description of steps in analysis procedure for the redundancy evaluation of 
the Hoan Bridge.   
Step Action Analysis 
Load Factors 
Redundancy I Redundancy II 
DL LL DL LL 
1 
Application of steelwork 












1.25 - 1.15 - 
2 
Application of slab factored dead 
load 
3 System is fixed 
4 Deactivation of slab elements 
5 
Reactivation of slab elements 
and system is released 















Application of amplified and 








Application of additional 15% of 







Load factors include the effects of DAR, and IM. 
 
The transverse positioning of the load is different among the different analysis 
conducted; and it is depicted in Figure 6-14 for the failure of girder D and in Figure 6-15 
for the failure of girder E.  Longitudinally, the middle axis of the truck portion (HS-20) of 
the HL-93 load model is aligned with the failure location (86.75 ft south of Pier 2S) and 
only the northernmost span, between pier 2S and pier 3S, is subjected to the lane loads, 
as shown in Figure 6-16.   
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Figure 6-14.  Transverse position of live load for the redundancy evaluation of the 
Hoan Bridge after the failure of girder D.   
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Figure 6-15.  Transverse position of live load for the redundancy evaluation of the 
Hoan Bridge after the failure of girder E.   
 
Figure 6-16.  Longitudinal position of live load for the redundancy evaluation of the 
Hoan Bridge after the failure of girder D and girder E.   
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6.3.1 Results for the Failure of Girder D at the North End Span   
After completion of the finite element analyses of the failure of Girder D for the 
Redundancy I and Redundancy II load combinations, the obtained results were compared 
against the performance criteria described in section 5.2.  The first requirements are 
related to the strength of primary steel members, which are the girders.  The 
requirements are that the plastic strain in the primary steel members must not be larger 
than 0.05 at any location, or larger than an average of 0.01 across a component of a cross 
section (section 5.2.1.1).  These requirements need to be checked for both load 
combinations at the end of step 7A as shown in Table 6-7.  At end of step 7A, the 
maximum equivalent plastic strain for the Redundancy I load combination was 0.00553, 
as shown in Figure 6-17, and 0.000595 for the Redundancy II load combination, as shown 
in Figure 6-18.  In both load combinations the maximum plastic strains are below 0.01, 
hence the minimum strength requirements for steel are satisfied.   
 
Figure 6-17.  Equivalent plastic strain in primary steel members after the failure of 
girder D for the Redundancy I load combination.   
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Figure 6-18.  Equivalent plastic strain in primary steel members after the failure of 
girder D for the Redundancy II load combination.   
Another strength requirement is that the slab does not undergo a large amount 
of compressive cracking that may compromise the overall system load carrying capacity 
(section 5.2.1.2) at the end of step 7A in Table 6-7.  After the failure of girder D, for the 
Redundancy I load combination, no compression cracking takes place as the longitudinal 
normal plastic strain does not exceed 0.00189 in compression (equivalent to a total 
longitudinal normal strain of 0.003), as shown in Figure 6-19.  For the Redundancy II load 
combination, the maximum longitudinal normal plastic does not exceed 0.00189 in 
compression either (equivalent to a total longitudinal normal strain of 0.003), as shown 
in Figure 6-20.  Since the failure of girder D does not result in any compression cracking 
in the slab under both load combinations, the superstructure successfully met the 
strength requirements regarding reinforced concrete strength.  Additionally, the bridge 
was able to carry an additional 15% of the factored live load under both load 
combinations, so the requirement regarding stability of the superstructure (section 
5.2.1.4) was met as well.   
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Figure 6-19.  Longitudinal normal plastic strain in the concrete elements of the slab 
after the failure of girder D for the Redundancy I load combination.   
 
Figure 6-20.  Longitudinal normal plastic strain in the concrete elements of the slab 
after the failure of girder D for the Redundancy II load combination.   
It is required for the substructure to be able to safely resist the forces and 
displacements calculated at the support locations at the end of step 7A (see Table 6-7) 
for both loading combinations, in order to meet the strength requirement regarding 
158 
strength of the substructure (section 5.2.1.3), and the serviceability requirement 
regarding horizontal translation at supports (section 5.2.2.4).  These reactions and 
displacements are summarized in Table 6-8 for the Redundancy I load combination and 
in Table 6-9 for the Redundancy II load combination.  Although, in the current 
dissertation, the strength of the piers is not explicitly calculated, it is assumed that the 
substructure can withstand such forces and displacements.   
Table 6-8.  Reaction forces and displacements at supports after the failure of girder D 
for the Redundancy I load combination.   
Pier Girder 
Reaction Forces Support Displacements 
Vertical Longitudinal Transverse Longitudinal Transverse 
(kip) (kip) (kip) (in) (in) 
2S 
D 354 -229 56.0 1.31 -0.071 
E 1048 -233 5.60 1.53 -0.007 
F 389 -95.1 -43.0 0.889 0.060 
3S 
D 1630 97.2 19.3 -0.817 -0.038 
E 2099 96.9 -22.9 -0.960 0.047 
F 1241 57.0 -29.6 -0.838 0.068 
4S 
D 1129 -34.4 25.8 0.247 -0.041 
E 1537 -22.1 10.7 0.188 -0.018 
F 1234 -12.1 -22.0 0.155 0.042 
5S 
D 615 157. 23.4 -0.976 -0.031 
E 805 127 -1.18 -0.933 0.002 
F 615 90.1 -22.1 -1.02 0.035 
Notes: 
 Positive vertical direction points upwards.   
 Positive longitudinal direction points northwards.   




Table 6-9.  Reaction forces and displacements at supports after the failure of girder D 
for the Redundancy II load combination.   
Pier Girder 
Reaction Forces Support Displacements 
Vertical Longitudinal Transverse Longitudinal Transverse 
(kip) (kip) (kip) (in) (in) 
2S 
D 282 -198 35.8 1.13 -0.046 
E 807 -185 -5.62 1.22 0.007 
F 197 -60.6 -45.9 0.577 0.064 
3S 
D 1202 77.8 27.3 -0.653 -0.055 
E 1469 75.3 -2.64 -0.745 0.005 
F 761 40.8 -3.74 -0.598 0.009 
4S 
D 730 -17.5 17.3 0.126 -0.028 
E 1017 -9.97 9.16 0.085 -0.016 
F 822 -5.30 -14.7 0.068 0.028 
5S 
D 408 119 10.9 -0.741 -0.015 
E 536 96.1 -7.56 -0.707 0.011 
F 411 67.4 -20.4 -0.759 0.033 
Notes: 
 Positive vertical direction points upwards.   
 Positive longitudinal direction points northwards.   
 Positive transverse direction points eastwards.   
 
The serviceability requirements regarding vertical deflections, change in cross-
slope, uplift at supports beneath deck joints and fatigue evaluation in the faulted state 
are checked at the end of step 6 (see Table 6-7), for the Redundancy II load combination 
only.  The failure of girder D resulted in an additional deflection of 8.51 inches, which is 
less than 17.4 inches, satisfying the upper serviceability limit of L/150 (section 5.2.2.1).  
The change in cross-slope was 2.02% which is less than the 5% limit utilized in this 
dissertation for comparative purposes (section 5.2.2.2).  Additionally, no uplift was 
calculated at any support during the analysis (section 5.2.2.3).  Given that the maximum 
vertical deflection is 8.51 inches, a fatigue evaluation in the faulted stated does not need 
to be carried out because the deflection is larger than 6.51 inches, satisfying the lower 
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serviceability limit of L/400 (section 5.2.2.5).  Since all of the strength and serviceability 
requirements of the minimum performance criteria are satisfied, Girder D which initially 
was designated as a FCM, now can be designated as SRM because its redundancy was 
demonstrated through detailed analysis procedures.   
6.3.2 Results for the Failure of Girder E at the North End Span   
As previously done for the failure of Girder D, the results obtained for the analyses 
of the failure of Girder E for the Redundancy I and Redundancy II load combinations were 
subjected to the performance criteria described in section 5.2.  Firstly, the requirements 
regarding strength of primary members were checked for both load combinations at the 
end of step 7A as shown in Table 6-7.  At the girders it is checked that the plastic strain in 
the primary steel members must not be larger than 0.05 at any location, or larger than an 
average of 0.01 across a component of a cross section (section 4.2.1.1).  At end of step 
7A, the maximum equivalent plastic strain for the Redundancy I load combination was 
0.00330, as shown in Figure 6-21, and 0.000203 for the Redundancy II load combination, 
as shown in Figure 6-22.  In both load combinations the maximum plastic strains are below 
0.01, hence the minimum strength requirements for steel are satisfied.   
161 
 
Figure 6-21.  Equivalent plastic strain in primary steel members after the failure of 
girder E for the Redundancy I load combination.   
 
Figure 6-22.  Equivalent plastic strain in primary steel members after the failure of 
girder E for the Redundancy II load combination.   
Secondly, the strength requirements regarding reinforced concrete were checked.  
For both load combinations at the end of step 7A in Table 6-7, it must be checked that the 
slab does not undergo a large amount of compressive cracking that may compromise the 
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overall system load carrying capacity (section 5.2.1.2).  Figure 6-23 shows that the failure 
of girder D, for the Redundancy I load combination, no compression cracking takes place 
as the longitudinal normal plastic strain does not exceed 0.00189 in compression 
(equivalent to a total longitudinal normal strain of 0.003). Similarly, for the Redundancy 
II load combination, the maximum longitudinal normal plastic does not exceed 0.00189 
in compression either (equivalent to a total longitudinal normal strain of 0.003), as shown 
in Figure 6-24.  Since the failure of girder D did not result in any compression cracking in 
the slab under both load combinations, the superstructure successfully met the strength 
requirements regarding reinforced concrete strength.  The strength requirement 
regarding superstructure stability (section 5.2.1.4) was met as the bridge was able to carry 
an additional 15% of the factored live load under both load combinations.   
 
Figure 6-23.  Longitudinal normal plastic strain in the concrete elements of the slab 
after the failure of girder E for the Redundancy I load combination.   
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Figure 6-24.  Longitudinal normal plastic strain in the concrete elements of the slab 
after the failure of girder E for the Redundancy II load combination.   
To meet the strength requirement regarding strength of the substructure, (section 
4.2.1.3), and the serviceability requirement regarding horizontal translation at supports, 
(section 4.2.2.4), the substructure must have sufficient capacity to withstands the 
reaction forces and displacements at support locations calculated at the end of step 7A 
(see Table 6-7).  In the current dissertation, the strength of the piers is not explicitly 
calculated, and it is assumed that the substructure can withstand such forces and 
displacements.  These reactions and displacements are summarized in Table 6-10 for the 






Table 6-10.  Reaction forces and displacements at supports after the failure of girder E 
for the Redundancy I load combination.   
Pier Girder 
Reaction Forces Support Displacements 
Vertical Longitudinal Transverse Longitudinal Transverse 
(kip) (kip) (kip) (in) (in) 
2S 
D 734 -226 27.7 1.30 -0.035 
E 284 -211 0.507 1.39 -0.001 
F 781 -145 -24.6 1.36 0.034 
3S 
D 1509 99.3 28.4 -0.834 -0.056 
E 1760 79.20 -1.34 -0.784 0.003 
F 1580 58.43 -31.1 -0.858 0.071 
4S 
D 1217 -15.27 25.0 0.110 -0.040 
E 1580 -12.58 -3.36 0.107 0.006 
F 1216 -8.45 -26.5 0.108 0.050 
5S 
D 614 162 25.1 -1.01 -0.033 
E 803 129 0.728 -0.952 -0.001 
F 617 91.0 -20.6 -1.03 0.033 
Notes: 
 Positive vertical direction points upwards.   
 Positive longitudinal direction points northwards.   









Table 6-11.  Reaction forces and displacements at supports after the failure of girder E 
for the Redundancy II load combination.   
Pier Girder 
Reaction Forces Support Displacments 
Vertical Longitudinal Transverse Longitudinal Transverse 
(kip) (kip) (kip) (in) (in) 
2S 
D 441 -141 27.7 0.809 -0.035 
E 276 -150 -0.396 0.989 0.001 
F 443 -87.9 -25.5 0.822 0.037 
3S 
D 1025 55.1 15.7 -0.463 -0.031 
E 1124 46.3 -1.51 -0.458 0.003 
F 1030 31.6 -15.4 -0.464 0.037 
4S 
D 875 -5.59 17.3 0.040 -0.027 
E 1136 -3.90 -0.893 0.033 0.002 
F 877 -2.99 -15.9 0.038 0.031 
5S 
D 426 109 13.5 -0.676 -0.018 
E 559 88.8 -1.46 -0.653 0.002 
F 431 61.3 -13.2 -0.691 0.022 
Notes: 
 Positive vertical direction points upwards.   
 Positive longitudinal direction points northwards.   
 Positive transverse direction points eastwards.   
 
The serviceability requirements regarding vertical deflections, change in cross-
slope, uplift at supports beneath deck joints and fatigue evaluation in the faulted state 
were checked at the end of step 6 (see Table 6-7), for the Redundancy II load combination 
only.  The failure of girder D resulted in an additional deflection of 2.09 inches, which is 
less than 17.4 inches, satisfying the upper serviceability limit of L/150 (section 5.2.2.1).  
The change in cross-slope was 0.631% which is less than the 5% limit utilized in this 
dissertation for comparative purposes (section 5.2.2.2).  Additionally, no uplift was 
calculated at any support during the analysis (section 5.2.2.3).  Given that the maximum 
vertical deflection is 2.09 inches, a fatigue evaluation in the faulted stated needs to be 
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carried out because the deflection was smaller than 6.51 inches, which did not satisfy the 
lower serviceability limit of L/400 (section 5.2.2.5).   
The largest stress amplitude calculated in a fatigue evaluation after the failure of 
Girder E is 1.26 ksi.  The worst detail in the structure is a welded gusset plate on the web 
very close to the bottom flange which has been identified as a Category E detail, for which 
the constant-amplitude fatigue threshold is 4.5 ksi.  Since the constant amplitude fatigue 
threshold was larger than the largest stress amplitude, no fatigue related issues are 
expected after the failure of girder E.  Since all of the strength and serviceability 
requirements of the minimum performance criteria are satisfied, Girder E which initially 
was designated as a FCM, now can be designated as SRM because its redundancy was 
demonstrated through detailed analysis procedures.   
6.3.3 Summary of Redundancy Evaluation of the Hoan Bridge   
To establish whether the Hoan Bridge has adequate redundancy, failures of 
primary steel tension members were evaluated in accordance with the FEA methodology 
described in CHAPTER 3 and CHAPTER 5.  The structure is a continuous three-span three-
plate girder bridge, hence one of the exterior girders (Girder D) and the interior girder 
(Girder E) were analyzed.  The locations with the largest longitudinal normal stresses, 
under dead load only and within a positive moment region, were chosen as the most 
critical.  The most critical results of the analyses are summarized in Table 6-12.  Given that 
all of the strength and serviceability requirements of section 5.2 were met, the structure 
can be considered to be redundant and any tension member previously designated as 




Table 6-12.  Summary of the redundancy evaluation of the Hoan Bridge.   
Performance 
Requirement 
Most Critical Case 
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Since the Hoan Bridge is a three-plate girder structure, it may considered as 
redundant or non-redundant depending on the owner or department of transportation.  
In the cases that it was considered as non-redundant, each of the three girders would be 
considered as FCMs, and would have been subjected to hands-on inspections every 24 
months.  Now, after the redundancy evaluation was completed, it has been shown that 
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the structure is redundant and that any member previously considered as FCM can be 
now designated as SRM, and that no fatigue damage is foreseeable after the hypothetical 
failure of a primary steel tension member.  It should be noted that it was assumed that 
the structure would have passed the initial screening in section 6.1 (the Hoan Bridge had 
connections prone to constraint induced fatigue), that the current redundancy evaluation 
of the Hoan Bridge was done for illustrative purposes, and that ideally, it is recommended 
to consider additional failure scenarios.   
6.4 Calculation of Maximum Inspection Intervals   
Once the redundancy evaluations of the Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge 
are completed, a hands-on inspection interval needs to be set for both structures.  The 
Neville Island Bridge would be typically considered to contain FCMs prior to the 
redundancy evaluation, and it is assumed that the owner or pertinent department of 
transportation would consider the Hoan Bridge in the same manner.  As previously 
discussed, any structure with members that are designated as FCMs are required to 
undergo a hands-on inspection every 24 months.  The rationale under this particular 
interval is not clear and no information was found on the literature providing any sort of 
fact based support.  It is particularly curious that, any steel structure with a configuration 
which redundancy is questioned, even new structures with limited truck traffic, are 
required to undergo a hands-on inspection every 24 months.  Given the cost of such 
inspections, the use of steel in most conventional bridges is effectively prevented.  Hence, 
the establishment of a rational hands-on inspection interval is an obvious need.   
In order to establish a minimum inspection interval, the methodology developed 
by Parr et al. (2010) is utilized in the current dissertation [1].  This methodology is 
composed of two stages:  screening part and scoring part.  In the scoring part there are 
eight criteria that need to be fulfilled so a steel structure with FCMs can be considered 
for inspection interval larger than 24 months.  The scoring part is composed of twelve 
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performance factors for which the structure can accrue points, these points are used to 
establish the hands-on inspection interval.  It must be noted that if a structure does not 
pass the scoring phase, an inspection interval shorter than 24 months may be required.  
The methodology utilized to set the inspection interval may be criticized because it does 
not employ phenomenological mathematical models to set the inspection interval, 
particularly, critics of this methodology have proposed that crack-growth models must be 
employed.  Use of such models will require, at least, knowledge of the critical crack size, 
detectability of the crack for that specific size, and crack growth rate; all of which have 
large variability.  However, there are a number of characteristics in steel bridges that are 
known to be effective in the prevention of crack formation or loss of service if fracture 
occurs.   
Those characteristics were identified, examined, rated and calibrated by a panel 
of experts (owners, designers and researchers) in steel bridge behavior at a workshop 
held at Purdue University in April, 2007, and include truck traffic, steel used, fatigue life 
and bridge condition.  Nevertheless, since bridge analysis and inspection has changed 
over the next nine years, the following modifications are made to the methodology:   
 Screening part, criterion no. 8:  If the structure contains any primary steel tension 
member with an element condition state of 3 or 4 (poor or severe) as defined in 
the NBIS, the structure fails criteria no. 8.  The current change is done because of 
the transition from outdated rating procedures to the newer element level 
inspection.   
 Scoring part, performance factor no. 6:  The following points will be awarded 
based on the element condition state of primary steel tension members and 
whether the structure is exposed to deicers or harsh environment:   
o Element condition state of 1 and not exposed to deicers or harsh 
environment: 15 points.   
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o Element condition state of 1 and exposed to deicers or harsh environment: 
10 points.   
o Element condition state of 2 or worse: 0 points.   
The current change is done because of the transition from outdated rating 
procedures to the newer element level inspection.   
 Scoring part, performance factor no. 8:  If structural redundancy is demonstrated, 
25 points may be assigned to the structure.  Structural redundancy is 
demonstrated a redundancy evaluation is performed for a finite element model 
of the structure built in accordance with CHAPTER 3, and subjected to the load 
combinations and performance criteria of CHAPTER 5.  The reason why the score 
was increased from 10 to 25 points is that the FEA methodology provides a reliable 
benchmarked procedure to evaluate the capacity and serviceability of the faulted 
structure.  Additionally, it was desired that this performance factor would be the 
only one capable of increasing the inspection interval beyond 24 months by itself.   
The hands-on inspection intervals are based on the total number of points accrued 
throughout the evaluation in the following way: 
 If the bridge does not pass the screening part: 
o 45 points or less:  6 months.   
o More than 45 points up to 60 points:  12 months.   
o More than 60 points:  24 months.   
 If the bridge passes the screening part: 
o 65 points or less:  24 months.   
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o More than 65 points up to 95 points:  48 months.   
o More than 95 points up to 140 points:  72 months.   
o More than 140 points:  120 months.   
According to the methodology developed by Parr et al. (2010) [1] with the 
aforementioned modifications, the Neville Island Bridge totaled 79 points which 
translates into a 48 month hands-on inspection interval, and the Hoan Bridge totaled 99 
points which allows a 72 month hands-on inspection interval.  Table 6-13 and Table 6-14 
show the points earn for each screening criterion and performance factor, respectively, 
in the calculation of the inspection interval for the Neville Island Bridge.  The screening 
part and scoring part evaluations of the Hoan Bridge are shown in Table 6-15 and Table 
6-16, respectively.  It must be noted that throughout CHAPTER 6, for illustrative purposes, 
it was assumed that the Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge were able to pass the 
screening criteria.   
Table 6-13.  Screening part evaluation of the Neville Island Bridge, based on 
methodology by M. Parr et al. (2010) [1].   
Screening Criterion Assessment Points 
Bridge has received a hands-on inspection in the last 24 
months or since most recent retrofit or rehabilitation 
5 
No pin and hangers 5 
No non-redundant eyebars 5 
No plug welds or discontinuous backup bars 5 
No active fatigue cracks 5 
No details susceptible to constraint induced fatigue 5 
No existing maintenance problems 5 
Primary steel tension member with condition state 3 or 4 5 
Total from Screening Criteria 40 
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Table 6-14.  Scoring part evaluation of the Neville Island Bridge, based on 
methodology by M. Parr et al. (2010) [1].   
Performance Factor Assessment Points 
Fabricated under the AASHTO/AWS Fracture Control Plan 0 
Temperature zone Zone 2 5 
(ADTT)SL Larger than 1000 0 
Prohibited truck traffic (HOV bridge) 0 
Primary steel tension members fabricated in high 
performance steel 
0 
Worst condition state of primary steel tension member 2 0 
Primary steel tension members are member-level 
redundant 
0 
Primary steel tension members are system-level 
redundant 
25 
Estimated remaining fatigue life 
25 to 75  years, 
calculated 
4 
Worst fatigue category of primary steel tension members Category E 0 
No tack welds on primary steel tension members 5 
Total from Performance Factors 39 
 
Table 6-15.  Screening part evaluation of the Hoan Bridge, based on methodology by 
M. Parr et al. (2010) [1].   
Screening Criterium Assessment Points 
Bridge has received a hands-on inspection in the last 24 
months or since most recent retrofit or rehabilitation 
5 
No pin and hangers 5 
No non-redundant eyebars 5 
No plug welds or discontinuous backup bars 5 
No active fatigue cracks 5 
No details susceptible to constraint induced fatigue 5 
No existing maintenance problems 5 
Element level bridge inspection condition state 3 or  4 5 
Total from Screening Criteria 40 
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Table 6-16.  Scoring part evaluation of the Hoan Bridge, based on methodology by M. 
Parr et al. (2010) [1].   
Performance Factor Assessment Points 
Fabricated under the AASHTO/AWS Fracture Control Plan 20 
Temperature zone Zone 2 5 
(ADTT)SL Larger than 1000 0 
Prohibited truck traffic (HOV bridge) 0 
Primary steel tension members fabricated in high 
performance steel 
0 
Worst NBIS element level condition state of primary steel 
tension member 
2 0 
Primary steel tension members are member-level 
redundant 
0 
Primary steel tension members are system-level 
redundant 
25 
Estimated remaining fatigue life 
25 to 75  years, 
calculated 
4 
Worst fatigue category of primary steel tension members Category E 0 
No tack welds on primary steel tension members 5 




CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
The development and application of a FEA methodology for the evaluation of the 
redundant capacity of non-composite steel bridges has been described in the current 
dissertation.  Steel bridges which redundancy is not known a priori are required to 
undergo hands-on inspections every 24 months (in addition to the standard biennial 
inspections that all bridges are subjected to), despite the occurrence of fracture in 
primary steel members being a rare phenomenon, especially after the implementation of 
the Fracture Control Plan.  Additionally, collapse or loss of service in steel structures in 
which such fractures had occurred is exceptional.  In fact, there are only two recorded 
cases of collapse or loss of serviceability due to fracture of a primary steel member in the 
United States:  the Silver Bridge (1967) due to the failure of a non-redundant eyebar, and 
the Mianus River Bridge (1983) due to the failure of a pin and hanger assembly.  Both of 
these steel bridges were constructed before the implementation of the Fracture Control 
Plan, and non-redundant eyebars or pin and hanger assemblies are outdated design 
practices.   
On the other hand, there are several recorded cases of failures in primary steel 
members considered non-redundant that did not result in loss of service, much less 
collapse.  A total of seven cases were cited and described in section 2.6.  While the reason 
given for the 24 month hands-on inspection requirement is probable collapse after failure 
of a member designated as FCM, the reality is that fracture of a primary steel member 
rarely leads to collapse and that the occurrence of such fractures is strange.  Hence, if it 
can be demonstrated that after failure of a primary steel tension member, a certain load 
level can be reliably carried by the structure, such steel member should not be consider 
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as a FCM.  FHWA supports the previous claim as stated in a 2012 memorandum cited in 
section 2.2, in which the use of refined analysis procedures is encouraged to evaluate 
redundancy in steel bridges.  However, there are not any standardized refined analysis 
recommendations in any of the design and evaluation manuals currently utilized for steel 
bridges.   
The research described in the current dissertation was carried out with the intent 
of providing a methodology for refined analysis of redundancy in non-composite steel 
structures.  Firstly a set of FEA procedures, techniques and inputs were identified and 
utilized to construct detailed models of the Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge.  
These procedures, techniques and inputs, were developed to include geometry and 
material non-linearity, partial composite action between the slab and the steel work, 
substructure flexibility, connection failure, and construction sequence effects, as 
described in CHAPTER 3.  Secondly the procedures techniques and inputs were 
successfully benchmarked with available field data and utilized to characterize the 
dynamic amplification effects that take place after sudden failure of a primary steel 
tension member, as detailed in CHAPTER 4.  Once the required finite element tools to 
characterize the capacity of non-composite steel bridges were identified, applied and 
benchmarked, it was necessary to stablish the demands and performance requirements 
in the faulted condition, which were described in CHAPTER 5  Reliability-based load 
combinations were developed to characterize the loading at the moment that the failure 
occurs, and the loading carried by the structure until the failure is detected.  Besides, a 
set of strength and serviceability requisites in the faulted condition were stablished to 
judge the results from detailed computational analysis.   
A comprehensive FEA methodology results from the combination of the FEA 
procedures, techniques and inputs of CHAPTER 3, and the load combinations and 
performance criteria of CHAPTER 5.  The current methodology is a benchmarked tool for 
the evaluation of redundancy in non-composite steel bridges.  A structure with FCMs may 
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be analyzed per the presented FEA methodology, and after passing the minimum 
performance criteria those FCMs may be re-designated as SRMs.  However, the inspection 
requirements of such members is not stablished in any current standards or 
specifications.  A methodology to calculate the inspection interval of steel structures with 
FCMs, developed by M. Parr et al. (2010), was modified to be used in combination with 
the FEA methodology of the current dissertation.  This is shown in its application to the 
Neville Island Bridge and the Hoan Bridge as reported in CHAPTER 6.  A flowchart 
describing the application of the FEA methodology in combination with the methodology 
of M. Parr et al. (2010) is shown in Figure 7-1 and Figure 7-2.   
The presented FEA methodology provides bridge designers, evaluators and 
owners with a benchmarked tool that allows more efficient allocation of resources.  
Application of the research described in the current dissertation may reduce the life-cycle 
cost of efficient steel structural configurations, e.g. two-girder bridges, introducing 
alternatives in infrastructural development.  It allows for a distribution of inspections 
among the steel bridge inventory based on the susceptibility to collapse after member 
failure of each particular structure, rather than a universal non-justified interval.  
Additionally, hands-on inspections typically require lane closures and inspectors to be 
suspended, which imposes risks not only on the inspecting personnel but on the general 
public as well.   
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Figure 7-1.  Flowchart describing the application of the FEA methodology in 
combination with the methodology of M. Parr et al. (2010) to calculate the inspection 
interval of structures that may contain FCMs.   
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Figure 7-2.  Flowchart describing the application of the FEA methodology to assess the 
redundancy of structures that may contain FCMs.   
7.1 Future Research 
It must be noted that the methodology presented in the current dissertation is an 
inception; and there are possible additions and simplifications that will improve and 
facilitate its application.  Primarily, models characterizing the behavior of shear 
connectors (shear studs, used to create composite action between the slab and the 
steelwork) are being developed at Purdue University by C. Korkmaz under the advice of 
R. Connor, so the present FEA methodology can be applied to composite bridges as well.  
Secondarily, simplified procedures regarding the modeling of reinforced concrete slabs 
and modeling of the contact interaction between the slab and the steelwork would 
facilitate implementation.  Modelling the slab with truss elements embedded in solid 
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elements is the most accurate procedure but it requires a large mesh, the number of 
elements could be largely reduced if a valid approach using shell elements is developed.  
If the contact interaction algorithms could be replaced with an element approach (e.g. 
cohesive elements), convergence issues that require the use of explicit dynamic analysis 
could be avoided.   
Finally, as the methodology is applied to a larger numbers of cases, bridges could 
be classified into families sharing particular critical members or locations to be inspected, 
to avoid hands-on inspection of the entire structure or member.  Ideally, as the 
understanding and modeling of system-level redundancy improves, simplified analysis 
procedures may be developed in similar fashion to those utilized in fitness-for-service 
analysis and analysis of orthotropic decks.  In other words, the methodology could be 
expanded to include a basic level of analysis in which computational analysis is not 
required, an intermediate level of analysis based on two-dimensional elastic models, and 
advanced three-dimensional non-linear FEA such as the one presented in the current 
dissertation.   
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